A Bit on the State of Security MetricsBy Rich
Everyone in the security industry seems to agree that metrics are important, but we continually spin our wheels in circular debates on how to go about them. During one such email debate I sent the following. I think it does a reasonable job of encapsulating where we’re at:
- Until Skynet takes over, all decisions, with metrics or without, rely on human qualitative judgement. This is often true even for automated systems, since they rely on models and decision trees programmed by humans, reflecting the biases of the designer.
- This doesn’t mean we shouldn’t strive for better metrics.
- Metrics fall into two categories – objective/measurable (e.g., number of systems, number of attacks), and subjective (risk ratings). Both have their places.
- Smaller “units” of measurement tend to be more precise and accurate, but more difficult to collect and compile to make decisions… and at that point we tend to introduce more bias. For example, in Project Quant we came up with over 100 potential metrics to measure the costs of patch management, but collecting every one of them might cost more than your patching program. Thus we had to identify key metrics and rollups (bias) which also reduces accuracy and precision in calculating total costs. It’s always a trade-off (we’d love to do future studies to compare the results between using all metrics vs. key metrics to seeing if the deviation is material).
- Security is a complex system based on a combination of biological (people) and computing elements. Thus our ability to model will always have a degree of fuzziness. Heck, even doctors struggle to understand how a drug will affect a single individual (that’s why some people need medical attention 4 hours after taking the blue pill, but most don’t).
- We still need to strive for better security metrics and models.
My personal opinion is that we waste far too much time on the fuzziest aspects of security (ALE, anyone?), instead of focusing on more constrained areas where we might be able to answer real questions. We’re trying to measure broad risk without building the foundations to determine which security controls we should be using in the first place.