Alan Shimel

The “Good Enough/Woe Is Me” Dissociation Postulate

By Rich

I don't get it. I mean I really don't get it. I can't possibly imagine why it isn't so obvious to everyone else!! Don't you see what's happening!!! Soylent Green is QSAs!!!

One of the more frustrating aspects of our profession is the apparent lack of security prioritization by the rest of the world. We feel like we see things they don't, and in that context many of their decisions make absolutely no sense. Are we just that much smarter than everyone else? Are they blindfully ignorant? Alan sums up our problem in his post on security gimmicks:

Agree or disagree with the gimmicks. You have to ask yourself why. With all that we read and see about data breaches, with all of these compliance regulations and rules around, why can't people take security seriously enough? Here is one man's opinion. Security is a bad news generator of an industry. We focus on what happens when things go wrong. We focus on adding to the process. We don't focus on the positive and the profitable. There is enough bad news in the world for people to focus on right now. They don't want the bad news that security makes them confront. If we can figure out how to make security a way of bringing a message of good news, we wouldn't need to resort to gimmicks.

My position is a little more zen.

Back in physical security/paramedic/firefighter/mountain rescue days I learned we all go through a process of dissociation with mainstream society. When all you see is nasty sh*t and dying people all day, every day, it's hard to give a rat's ass about someone getting the cold shoulder at the water cooler. The military, police, nurses, and many other professions suffer the same problem. In that world, there are two ways to handle it- shut up and deal, or isolate yourself into your chosen community. It's no accident that so many cops are married to nurses.

It's pretty much the same deal for IT security, except we don't have to wash blood off our shoes quite as often.

We see the fragility and danger of our online economy and society. Stolen elections, rampant fraud, and pwned grandmothers. No website is safe, all PCs have trojans, and those damn Macs will all be compromised next week.

We need to collectively chill out. Before we blow an aneurysm.

As Marcus Ranum said (totally pissing me off because I didn't say it first):

Will the future be more secure? It'll be just as insecure as it possibly can, while still continuing to function. Just like it is today.

We need to do our best to communicate risks to the business and cost effectively keep those risks within tolerance. Then we clean up the mess if the business, after being well informed, decides to accept that risk.

If we don't take risks, we can't possibly grow. No matter what someone tells us, we sometimes need to touch the hot stove and learn for ourselves. It's human nature; don't expect it to change. Security is only good news when it's no news.

Don't worry. When things get bad enough, we'll get the call. If you've kept your documentation and communication up, you won't get shafted with the proverbial short end.

Don't end up like I did in college- working as a full time medic on top of being a student wasn't exactly conducive to my dating life. That uniform didn't work nearly as well as I expected. (However, a black belt a few years later was very... effective).

–Rich

There’s Always a Double Standard

By Rich

I don't remember the exact quote from King of the Hill (an animated series here in the US), but it went something like this.

Bobby: But how come you don't want Luanne to go out with guys but you want me to date girls?

Dad: It's called the double standard, Bobby. Don't knock it -- we got the long end of the stick on that one.

Alan Shimel clearly got the short end of the stick when his account was hacked. Heck, he got the short end of the nub, and so would pretty much all of us.

Odds are high you've heard that the college kid that hacked Palin's account is being indicted and could face jail time. Twitter was all aflutter yesterday with concerns that the potential punishment exceeds the crime. Personally, I believe if you break the law, you face the consequences. I also harbor no illusions that our justice system is blind. It's clear if you mess with a popular politician, they will frack you as hard as possible, in every way possible Then bury you. Then pee on your grave. Then pee on your dog before they bury it next to you. Your family and friends? You really don't want to think about that. And when you mess with a maverick Republican? Well, let's better hope they can't track down anyone that ever bothered to smile in your general direction.

Had the perpetrator broke into a government account I would expect a different set of consequences. But a personal account should be treated the same as Joe Six Pack's. Heck, Alan's break in involved documented financial fraud, unlike Palin. Not that I think we should destroy the lives of every college kid that virtually shoplifts a virtual candy bar (punishment should suit the crime), but over-tolerance only breeds contempt.

Just call me a dreamer, but as a realist I know I'm just wasting my words on this particular topic.

Still, I've heard from businesses that unless credit cards or other hard financial losses are clearly involved it is essentially impossible to get law enforcement to take action; they just don't have the resources. As such we need to focus on our own monitoring and incident response. If you can't prove someone really stole your cash, you won't get the attention of law enforcement. If you can't give them a description, don't expect the case to go very far. It's really no different in the physical world.

A few years ago, when I moved to Phoenix, we screwed up and left the garage door open at night. One of those silly mistakes when you think the other person took care of it. Neighborhoods are routinely cruised out here, and when I woke up and noticed it was too late. There went my road bicycle, most of my climbing gear, and, worst of all, a small pack containing my original Star Wars figures I'd saved since I was a kid and some other very personal mementos. We filled out a police report but never expected any action (no, they won't take fingerprints if someone steals your bike), and after our deductible it wasn't even worth filing an insurance claim. I made the rounds of the local pawn shops, but no joy.

Society accepts a certain level of losses, since we don't have the resources to continue otherwise. That doesn't, of course, apply when something gets the press attention of the Palin hack. Sometimes it's about the losses, and other times it's about looking good in the press.

–Rich

Shimel Wants To Sell You A Dead Parrot. On An Iceberg. Slathered In GRC

By Rich

Blog War!!

It's been a while since Alan and I got into it; I think we both appreciate a little healthy debate. As friends, we don't really have to worry about offending each other or taking things out of context. Unless, of course, it will get us a laugh. In this case I think Alan is more confused than wrong.

In Alan's latest post he seems to think I'm a bit naive and off base in my criticism of GRC.

Now most of you probably think the title of this post refers to the famous Monty Python bit, but that's only one of our many popular culture dead parrot options. I'm also amused by the blind kid with the dead parakeet with its head taped back on in Dumb and Dumber. Yes, I'm just that disturbed. Pretty bird and all.

Now Alan does agree that the audit/compliance focus is an unfortunate reality that distracts from real security, but he thinks GRC tools offer at least a partial solution to this problem.

GRC is a needed tool in todays security practitioner'ss tool kit. They are being placed in the position to ensure compliance and they need the ability to do so. They also need help getting the budget approved for the tools they need to do the job. We can rant all we want about compliance for compliance sake being asinine, but the fact is that is the world we live in right now and rather than spitting into the wind, let's figure out how to make it work best for us.

Alan's falling into a trap a bunch of vendors seem unable to avoid. They confuse "GRC" with compliance, and are accidentally jumping on a bandwagon they don't really understand. In the comments on Alan's post, Hoff offers some clarity while defending his man crush (that's me):

3) The products we are referencing (and I know you didn't reference my blog entry because you probably didn't see it -- it was written the same day Gunnar wrote his) aren't simply compliance tools being re-badged as GRC -- these are monster frankensuites of audit-focused compliance framework repositories being marketed as completely new products. GRC isn't about managing risk, it's about giving people the perception that managing compliance means something special.

There is a distinct difference between a dedicated GRC tool and a security tool calling itself GRC. I'm not a fan of the dedicated tools, and I think re-branding a security tool as GRC isn't smart. Not because I think it's taking advantage of the end user, but because I don't think it will result in the desired increase in revenue for the vendor, and will eventually become problematic once the backlash hits. I spend a lot of time working with vendors, and I advise all of them to tread very carefully around GRC. A few are being driven dangerously deep into restructuring the product for GRC in the hopes of accessing the C-level, and I haven't seen it work yet.

While dashboards and reports are the tip of the iceberg and the shiny baubles that are used by the GRC vendors to get the attention at the C-level, I think that the bulk of the work takes place below the water. It is making sure that in fact the enterprise is in compliance. Making sure that everyone has the latest patch level, has AV installed and that data is protected from leakage is the real work. Testing and ensuring this is the real job of GRC, the reports and dashboard is just the way you can show it working. Rich I think you are the one being short sighted if you think these products are just about the reports. Without actually doing the analysis and investigation the reports are meaningless. In my mind is much like SIM reports. Without actionability and correlation, how much value are the SIM reports?

That's what our security tools are supposed to do in the first place. I believe that's what StillSecure products do. That's not GRC, it's just good security. If a security product can't ensure it does its job, it's a piece of garbage and we shouldn't buy something additional from the vendor to prove what we already bought is working.

If you are a vendor or an end user, don't fall into the GRC trap. As a user you'll waste your money more often than not. As a vendor you risk alienating your customers and losing revenue. If you have to add GRC to your marketing, go ahead. If you add more reports and dashboards to get the auditors off the practitioners' backs and help them communicate with management, that's great. If you rebrand your product and change its entire direction, you're in trouble.

Oh yeah, don't forget to read Hoff's post on this.

–Rich