I have to be honest. I’m getting tired of this whole “security is failing, security professionals suck” meme.
If the industry was failing that badly all our bank accounts would be empty, we’d be running on generators, our kids would all be institutionalized due to excessive exposure to porn, email would be dead, and all our Amazon orders would be rerouted to Liberia… but would never show up because of all the falling planes crashing into sinking cargo ships.
I’m not going to say we don’t have serious problems! We do, but we are also far from complete failure. Just as any retail supply chain struggles with shrinkage (theft), any organization of sufficient size will struggle with data shrinkage and security penetrations.
Are we suffering losses? Hell, yes. Are they bad? Most definitely. But these losses clearly haven’t hit the point where the pain to society has sufficiently exceeded our tolerance. Partially I think this is because the losses are unevenly distributed and hidden within the system, but that’s another post. I don’t know where the line is that will kick the world into action, but suspect it might involve sudden unavailability of Internet porn and LOLCats email.
Those of us deeply embedded within the security industry forget that the vast majority of people responsible for IT security across the world aren’t necessarily in dedicated positions within large enterprises. I’d venture a bet that if we add up all the 1-2 person security teams in SMB (many only doing security part-time), and other IT professionals with some security responsibilities, that number would be a pretty significant multiple of all the CISSPs and SANS graduates in the world.
It’s ridiculous for us to tell these folks that they are failing. They are slammed with day to day operational tasks, with no real possibility of ever catching up. I heard someone say at Gartner once that if we froze the technology world today, buying no new systems and approving no new projects, it would still take us 5 years to catch up.
Security professionals have evolved… they just have far too much to deal with on a daily basis. We also forget that, as with any profession, most of the people in it just want to do their jobs and go home at night, perhaps 10% are really good and always thinking about it, and at least 30% are lazy and suck. I might be too generous with that 30% number.
Security, and security professionals, aren’t failing. We lose some battles and win others, and life goes on. At some point the world feels enough pain and we get more resources to respond. Then we reduce that pain to an acceptable level, and we’re forgotten again.
That said, I do think life will be more interesting once losses aren’t hidden within the system (and I mean inside all kinds of businesses, not just the financial world). Once we can tie data loss to pain, perhaps priorities will shift. But that’s for another post…
On to the Summary:
Webcasts, Podcasts, Outside Writing, and Conferences
Favorite Securosis Posts
Other Securosis Posts
Favorite Outside Posts
Top News and Posts
Blog Comment of the Week
This week’s best comment comes from Mike Rothman in response to Compliance vs. Security:
Wow. Hard to know where to start here. There is a lot to like and appreciate about Corman’s positions. Security innovation has clearly suffered because organizations are feeding the compliance beast. Yes, there is some overlap - but it’s more being lucky than good when a compliance mandate actually improves security.
The reality is BOTH security and compliance do not add value to an organization. I’ve heard the “enabling” hogwash for years and still don’t believe it. That means organizations will spend the least amount possible to achieve a certain level of “risk” mitigation - whether it’s to address security threats or compliance mandates. That is not going to change.
What Josh is really doing is challenging all of us to break out of this death spiral, where we are beholden to the compliance gods and that means we cannot actually protect much of anything. Compliance is and will remain years behind the real threats.
Posted at Friday 13th November 2009 4:52 am
(1) Comments •
By Adrian Lane
A couple weeks ago, we began an internal discussion about DNS security and X.509 certificates. It dawned on me that those of you who have never worked with certificates may not understand what they are or what they are for. Sure, you can go to the X.509 Wiki, where you get the rules for usage and certificate structure, but that’s a little like trying to figure out football by reading the rule book. If you are asking, “What the heck is it and what is it used for?”, you are not alone.
An X.509 certificate is used to make an authoritative statement about something. A real life equivalent would be “Hi, I’m David, and I live at 555 Main Street.” The certificate holder presents it to someone/something in order to prove they are who they say they are, in order to establish trust. X.509 and other certificates are useful because the certificate provides the necessary information to validate the presenter’s claim and the authenticate the certificate itself. Like a driver’s license with a hologram, but much better. The recipient examines the certificate’s contents to decide if the presenter is who they say they are, and them whether to trust them with some privilege.
Certificates are used primarily to establish trust on the web, and rely heavily on cryptography to provide the built-in validation. Certificates are always signed with a chain of authority. If the root of the chain is trusted, the user or application can extend that level of trust to some other domain/server/user. If the recipient doesn’t already trust the top signing authority, the certificate is ignored and no trust is established. In a way, an x.509 certificate is a basic embodiment of data centric security, as it contains both information and some rules of use.
Most certificates state within themselves what they are used for, and yes, they can be used for purposes other than validating web site identity/ownership, but in practice we don’t see diverse uses of X.509 certificates. You will hear that X.509 is an old format, that it’s not particularly flexible or adaptable. All of which is true and why we don’t see it used very often in different contexts. Considering that X.509 certificates are used primarily for network security, but were designed a decade before most people had even heard of the Internet, they have worked considerably better than we had any right to expect.
Posted at Thursday 12th November 2009 11:12 pm
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I just read about some Georgia Tech researchers working on remote security techniques that carriers could use to help manage attacks on cell phones.
Years ago I used to focus on a similar issue: how mobile malware was something that carriers would eventually be responsible for stopping, and that’s why we wouldn’t really need AV on our phones. That particular prediction was clearly out of date before the threat ever reared its ugly head.
These days our phones are connected nearly as much to WiFi, Bluetooth, and other networks as they are to the carrier’s network. Thus it isn’t hard to see malware that checks to see which network interface is active before sending out any bad packets (DDOS is much more effective over WiFi than EDGE/3G anyway). This could circumvent the carrier, leaving malware to propagate over local networks.
Then again, perhaps we’ll all have super-high-speed carrier-based networks on some 6G technology before phone malware is prevalent, and we’ll be back on carrier networks again for most of our connectivity. In which case, if it’s AT&T, the network won’t be reliable enough for any malware to spread anyway.
Posted at Thursday 12th November 2009 10:43 pm
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How often have you heard the phrase, “Never assume” (insert the cheesy catch phrase that was funny in 6th grade here)?
For the record, it’s wrong.
When designing our security, disaster recovery, or whatever, the problem isn’t that we make assumptions, it’s that we make the wrong assumptions. To narrow it down even more, the problem is when we make false assumptions, and typically those assumptions skew towards the positive, leaving us unprepared for the negative. Actually, I’ll narrow this down even more… the one assumption to avoid is a single phrase: “That will never happen.”
There’s really no way to perform any kind of forward-looking planning without some basis for assumptions. The trick to avoiding problems is that these assumptions should generally skew to the negative, and must always be justified, rather than merely accepted. It’s important not to make all your decisions based on worst cases because that leads to excessive costs. Expose all the the assumptions helps you examine the corresponding risk tolerance.
For example, in mountain rescue we engaged in non-stop scenario planning, and had to make certain assumptions. We assumed that a well cared for rope under proper use would only break at its tested breaking strength (minus knots and other calculable factors). We didn’t assume said breaking strength was what was printed on the label by the manufacturer, but was our own internal breaking strength value, determined through testing. We would then build in a minimum of a 3:1 safety factor to account for unexpected dynamic strains/wear/whatever. In the field we were constantly calculating load levels in our heads, and would even occasionally break out a dynamometer to confirm. We also tested every single component in our rescue systems – including the litter we’d stick the patient into, just in case someone had to hang off the end of it.
Our team was very heavy with engineers, but that isn’t the case with other rescue teams. Most of them used a 10:1 safety factor, but didn’t perform the same kinds of testing or calculations we did. There’s nothing wrong with that… although it did give our team a little more flexibility.
I was recently explaining the assumptions I used to derive our internal corporate security, and realized that I’ve been using a structured assumptions framework that I haven’t ever put in writing (until now). Since all scenario planning is based on assumptions, and the trick is to pick the right assumptions, I formalized my approach in the shower the other night (an image that has likely scarred all of you for life). It consists of four components:
- Reasoning: The basis for the assumption.
- Indicators: Specific cues that indicate whether the assumption is accurate or if there’s a problem in that area.
- Controls: The security/recovery/safety controls to mitigate the issue.
Here’s how I put it in practice when developing our security:
Assumption: Securosis in general, and myself specifically, are a visible target.
Reasoning: We are extremely visible and vocal in the security community, and as such are not only a target of opportunity. We also have strong relationships within the vulnerability research community, where directed attacks to embarrass individuals are not uncommon. That said, we aren’t at the top of an attacker’s list – there is no financial incentive to attack us, nor does any of our work directly interfere with the income of cybercriminal organizations. While we deal with some non-public information, it isn’t particularly valuable in a financial context. Thus we are a target, but the motivation would be to embarrass us and disrupt our operations, not to generate income.
Indicators: A number of our industry friends have been targeted and successfully attacked. Last year one of my private conversations with one such victim was revealed as part of an attack. For this particular assumption, no further indicators are really needed.
Controls: This assumption doesn’t drive specific controls, but does reinforce a general need to invest heavily in security to protect against a directed attack by someone willing to take the time to compromise myself or the company. You’ll see how this impacts things with the other assumptions.
Assumption: While we are a target, we are not valuable enough to waste a serious zero-day exploit on.
Reasoning: A zero-day capable of compromising our infrastructure will be too financially valuable to waste on merely embarrassing a gaggle of analysts. This is true for our internal infrastructure, but not necessarily for our web site.
Indicators: If this assumption is wrong, it’s possible one of our outbound filtering layers will register unusual activity, or we will see odd activity from a server.
Controls: Outbound filtering is our top control here, and we’ve minimized our external surface area and compartmentalized things internally. The zero-day would probably have to target our individual desktops, or our mail server, since we don’t really have much else. Our web site is on a less common platform, and I’ll talk more about that in a second. There are other possible controls we could put in place (from DLP to HIPS), but unless we have an indication someone would burn a valuable exploit on us, they aren’t worth the cost.
Assumption: Our website will be hacked.
Reasoning: We do not have the resources to perform full code analysis and lockdown on the third party platform we built our site on. Our site is remotely co-hosted, which also opens up potential points of attack. It is the weakest link in our infrastructure, and the easiest point to attack short of developing some new zero-day against our mail server or desktops.
Indicators: Unusual activity within the site, or new administrative user accounts. We periodically review the back-end management infrastructure for indicators of an ongoing compromise, including both the file system and the content management system. For example, if HTML rendering in comments was suddenly turned on, that would be an indicator.
Controls: We deliberately chose a service provider and platform with better than average security records, and security controls not usually available for a co-hosted site. We’ve disabled any HTML rendering in comments/forum posts, and promote use of NoScript when visiting our site to reduce user exposure when it’s compromised. On our side, we mandate single-site passwords for all the staff, which are not reused anywhere else. The site is hosted separately from our other infrastructure. I encourage everyone to use a single site browser that is locked down to only render content from our site (to avoid XSS/CSRF). I use two different layers to ensure I can only access the site, and nothing but the site, from my dedicated browser. Thus our own site shouldn’t be able to be used to compromise any other part of our infrastructure when someone finally pops it. Also, right now we don’t store sensitive information about any visitors on the site (no PII). When we do start offering for-pay products, we will use external credit card processing, pay for ongoing penetration testing, and remind our users to never reuse their site password anyplace else. We have a multi-level backup scheme to minimize lost data when the site is finally hacked.
Assumption: Our mail server is the most valuable target for an attacker.
Reasoning: Assuming our attacker is out to steal proprietary information or just embarrass us, our mail server is the best target (except for maybe my personal desktop). That’s where our sensitive client information is, and we pretty much give everything else away for free.
Indicators: Either a rise in attack activity on our mail server, or new outbound connections/accounts.
Controls: We have multiple layers of security on the mail server. It’s on an isolated network with nothing else on that network segment to compromise. This is the one area I don’t want to discuss in detail, but we have at least two filtering layers to get to the server (more than just a firewall), and outbound connection restrictions with a serious deny-all policy. Our mail server is locked up in my house (no remote admins, no other sites on the server that could be compromised to get to us), but not connected to my home network. The server itself is locked down pretty tight – we don’t even allow AV/anti-spam on the server since that could be a vector for attack (in other words, we minimize message processing). There’s even more, but despite what they say a little obscurity is sometimes good for security. If someone can get this server, they’ve fracking earned it.
This is already longer than I planned, but you can see the process. I’ve done the same thing for my day to day system and laptop, with a set of corresponding controls. Despite all this I’ll probably be hacked someday, but it will take a hack of a lot of time and effort since I always assume I’m under attack, and take precautions far above normal best practices. My goal is to make the effort to get to me high enough that to succeed, someone will have to give up far more lucrative financial opportunities. Even bad guys need to feed their families.
Assumptions are good… as long as you understand the reasoning, define indicators to track if they are right or wrong over time, and use them to develop corresponding controls.
Posted at Thursday 12th November 2009 4:17 pm
(6) Comments •
You can ignore this post if you aren’t interested in the for-pay side of Securosis (in other words, if you don’t want to give us any cash).
I try not to put too much of the business side here in the blog feed, but we’re doing our 2010 planning and have made some changes to our services. Since we continue to grow, we needed to formalize things a little more than we have in the past. Being transparent, we don’t have to hide any of this. So if you are looking for some independent analysis, here’s what’s on our plate for 2010.
For anything that’s public facing (whitepapers, webcasts, speaking) it has to comply with our objectivity standards (Totally Transparent Research). All of our services are open to users, vendors or the investment community, but I doubt any of you user types wants to sponsor a whitepaper.
- Retainer Programs: For 2010 we’ve split this into 2 levels – Basic and Premier. Basic is defined and priced based on the number of dedicated hours you think you might want per quarter (the lowest is 3), and includes unlimited “short” contact (quick emails/calls). Premier is our new program, priced at the level our largest retainer clients tended to go with ($7,500/quarter), but now includes unlimited hour-long calls, and up to 5 “extended inquiries” for deeper work. All retainer programs include discounts for all our other services, especially on-site days, which vary based on the tier of the retainer.
- Advisory Projects: These are custom scoped projects to meet specific objectives. Yes, pretty much just like consulting, even though we give it a fancy analyst name.
- On-Site Advisory Days: These are for on-site strategy work, although we can combine them with speaking engagements.
- White Papers/Published Research: We are formalizing our research agenda for the year and many of our papers are open for sponsorship. Sponsors cannot influence the content of the paper, but they also don’t have to pay if the paper ends up not meeting their needs. We do accept proposals for paper/research ideas, but if they don’t match our coverage agenda, or are biased by the nature of the topic, we can’t be involved. We do not do any ghostwriting. Right now we have a couple slots open on our database encryption and vulnerability assessment papers, and topics for 2010 include cloud computing (specifically a paper on data security in the cloud, and another on cloud-based security services), some data and application security topics we’re trying to narrow down, and additional work on patch management and Project Quant. There will be a bunch more, but we haven’t fully planned out our 2010 agenda yet.
- Webcasts/Speaking/Presentations: The usual – topics must be in our coverage areas and meet objectivity requirements, but we are otherwise pretty open on topics.
- Videocasts: Within the next few weeks we will be releasing our first in a series of short videos designed to supplement our other research. We’ve invested a lot of time and resources to be able to produce something a heck of a lot better than blurry talking heads, and some of these will be open for sponsorship. The first two should be ready within the next couple weeks – one on content analysis techniques, and the other on database activity monitoring collection techniques. They will average 5-15 minutes long, with laser focus on a specific topic.
And that’s it. We have some other exciting stuff in the works (all for the user community), but nothing we’re ready to announce yet.
Posted at Wednesday 11th November 2009 9:06 pm
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By David J. Meier
At lunch last week, location-based privacy came up. I actively opt in to a monitoring service, which gets me a discount on insurance for a vehicle I own. My counterpart stated that they would never agree to anything of the sort because of the inherent breach of personal privacy and security. I responded that the privacy statement explicitly reads that the device does not contain GPS, nor does the company track the vehicle’s location. But even if the privacy statement said the opposite – should I care? Is location directly tied to some aspect of my life that might negatively impact me? And ultimately is security really tied to privacy in this context?
In a paper by Janice Tsai, Who’s Viewed You? The Impact of Feedback in a Mobile Location-Sharing Application (PDF) the abstract’s last line states, “…our study suggests that peer opinion and technical savviness contribute most to whether or not participants thought they would continue to use a mobile location technology.” This makes sense as I would self-qualify my ability to understand the technology enough to be able to control and measure the level of exposure I may create. Although the paper’s focus is ultimately on the feedback (or lack thereof) that these location-based services provide, it still contains interesting information. The thing that most intrigued me is that it never actually correlated privacy to security. I expected there to be a definitive point where users complained about being less secure somehow because they were being tracked. But nothing like that appeared.
I continued on my journey, looking to tie location-based privacy to security, and ran across another paper with a more promising title: “Location-Based Services and the Privacy-Security Dichotomy” by K. Michael, L. Perusco, and M. G. Michael. The paper provides much more warning of “security compromise” and “privacy risk”, but the problem remains – again, this paper doesn’t provide any hard evidence of how these location-based services actually create a security risk. In fact it’s more the opposite – they state that if we are willing to give up privacy, then our personal security may be increased. The authors mention the obvious risks, including lack of control and data leakage, but at this point, I’m still unsatisfied and have yet to find a clear understanding of how or why using a location-based service might ultimately make me less secure. So maybe it’s simply not so, and perhaps the real problem is outlined in section 3.2 of the paper: “The Human Need for Autonomy”.
Let’s be honest – it’s more psychological than anything with a placeholder for obvious exceptions, the most notable being stalker scenarios that are linked to domestic abuse of sorts. Even in this scenario it may be a stretch to say that location-based services are really the root cause of decreased personal security. Sure an angry ex may guess or even know a password to a webmail account and skim location data from communications, but the same could be done by lock picking a place of residence and stealing a daily planner. It’s a particular area that can easily be argued from either side because of different interpretations of what it is in the end.
We’d like to think that nobody is tracking us, but we all carry mobile phones, we’re all recorded daily by countless cameras, we all badge in at work using RFID, we all swipe payment cards, and we all use the Internet (I’m generalizing “we” based on content distribution here, but flame if you must). The addition of things like Google Latitude, Skyhook Wireless, and Yahoo! Fire Eagle are adding a level of usability but in the grand scheme of things do they really impact your personal security? Probably not. In the meantime, my fellow netizens, we can at least make light of the situation while we discuss what it is and isn’t. It’s a place, no matter where we are, that can mockingly be referred to as: Oceania – because try as you might, someone is watching.
—David J. Meier
Posted at Wednesday 11th November 2009 12:35 am
(6) Comments •
By Adrian Lane
Reading Bill Brenner’s PCI Security a Devil, ‘Like No Child Left Behind’, I had the impression Brenner’s summary of Joshua Corman’s presentation would be: Joshua was %#!*$ crazy. In a nutshell:
“Organizations have made PCI DSS and compliance in general the basis of their information security policies,” he said. “They’re basing security on sloppy logic from Visa and MasterCard and in the process are ignoring some very bad state-sponsored threats. As a community, we have not evolved at all.”
You have to read the whole article to fully grasp Corman’s nuances, and note that some of the inflammatory additions seem to be Bill’s, rather than direct quotes from Joshua. Still, while there are points I agree with, Corman seems to have connected the dots arbitrarily. Not only do I not see general security policies being based off compliance initiatives, I don’t buy the argument that compliance is at the expense of security. Is there overlap? Absolutely. But the recognized lack of security is motivated by completely different forces. In the presence of evidence that many organizations are doing the absolute minumum to comply with regulations, how can you suppose that they would voluntarily invest in security without compliance requirements? Why would companies take a risk-based approach to spending efficiently, when they really don’t want to spend at all?
To me, companies embody the approach of The Three Wise Monkeys: “See no evil. Hear no evil. Speak no evil.”
Regulations espouse the ideals of safety, security and efficacy, and companies want tasks performed cheaply, quickly, and easily. Regulation is supposed to alter the way companies do business, providing guidance on how to realize the ideal. Companies often handle compliance as just another task, and try to address it from within the same processes the compliance mandate is designed to reform. If companies could be trusted to come close to the ideals and intentions, we would not have auditors.
Part of Corman’s presentation seems to be a derivative of his 8 Dirty Secrets presentation (summarized), where part 6 discusses how “Compliance Threatens Security”. Do I think that security product vendors are “…offering products that do everything from offer PCI compliance out of the box to ultimate cure-alls for healthcare entities coping with the demands of HIPAA”? Absolutely. But this was the cheapest, fastest and easiest way to comply. Take Sarbanes-Oxley as an example: products like Database Activity Monitoring and Log Management are the only way to achieve some of the required controls over automated financial systems that process millions of transactions a day. The fact that these unique data collection and analysis capabilities came from a security vendor is incidental. The security investment was made to satisfy a compliance mandate, not for the sake of security. The fact that the tools provide security as well is a by-product for many vendors and customers, often considered unimportant or incidental.
If I was going to create my own Dirty Little Secret list, I would say most companies treat security as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”. Security tools that are bought to fulfill compliance have a bad habit of illuminating threats companies really don’t want to know about. They want to pass their compliance audits and not worry about other problems problems discovered … those just lead to additional expenses. If you doubt my cynical perspective, look at how most firms react when told their corporate network is host to 5,000 bots that just commenced a DDOS attack on another company: they tend to threaten suit for invasion of privacy or libel. Another example we see is that a high percentage of companies have web application firewalls for PCI, but run them as monitors rather than proxies! They need to have WAF to comply with PCI, so they bought one, but no one mandateed they use it effectively. Security professionals really care about security, but the executive management cares precisely as much as legal and finance tells them to.
I think security is a really hard problem, and far too often our attempts at security are flawed. I just don’t see any evidence that risk management is subjugated to compliance.
Posted at Tuesday 10th November 2009 12:41 am
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- Do not expect human behavior to change. You can affect habits, but not behavior.
- No security problem ever goes away. People have always hit each other over the heads with rocks and cracked safes since they existed (which is why safes were invented, of course), and will continue to hit each other with rocks and crack safes. Problems get better or worse, but never disappear.
Posted at Monday 9th November 2009 10:02 pm
(1) Comments •
By Adrian Lane
I was playing around with Google Dashboard this morning. After reading the cnet post on Google’s Data Liberation Project, and Google’s announcement of DataLiberation.org, I could not help but get a excited about what they were doing. Trying to be ‘open’ and ‘liberate’ data sounds great!
Many web services make it difficult to leave their services – you have to pay them for exporting your data, or jump through all sorts of technical hoops – for example, exporting your photos one by one, versus all at once. We believe that users – not products – own their data, and should be able to quickly and easily take that data out of any product without a hassle. We’d rather have loyal users who use Google products because they’re innovative – not because they lock users in. You can think of this as a long-term strategy to retain loyal users, rather than the short-term strategy of making it hard for people to leave.
We’ve already liberated over half of all Google products, from our popular blogging platform Blogger, to our email service Gmail, and Google developer tools including App Engine. In the upcoming months, we also plan to liberate Google Sites and Google Docs (batch-export).
Awesome! I jumped right in as I had two very specific things to address. I wanted to see if I could remove some information from Google that would change Google search behavior. Those issues are:
1. After I responded to a friend’s email inquiry a few months ago (sent to my Gmail account) regarding a piece of electronics equipment, I started to see ads for that product in my search results. I have no interest in the product and it does not belong in my search results.
2. I do a lot of driving and I use Google and Amazon maps. Google has started altering my route endpoints arbitrarily. I own a home, but the address is not registered as my home address anywhere except tax records, and has never been used in any online search, much less a Google map search (for very specific reasons). But Google Maps has been altering the endpoints of my routes to direct me to this property; it’s not an address I want to travel to and I did not enter it. How Google found it and then associated it with me is a interesting in and of itself, but to arbitrarily assume I want to go there is both annoying and disconcerting.
So I plunged right and and found: zero. Nothing that showed any of that data, nor how it was being used. Oh well. I guess my expectations were far too high. So I took a step back and looked at exactly what Google is offering.
Digging in, what does the concept of “liberated” data get me? To “… easily take that data out of any product without a hassle” is a nice idea. Medical records, photos, and social media site contents would be great to have copies of. But making digital copies is trivial, and I don’t think Google is talking about removal from products or services, but taking a copy and importing that copy into another app or service. Looking at the Dashboard, control and management is absent. To put this into context, when I think of data management, I think of the Data Security Lifecycle concept that Rich and I present at conferences. Data ownership and management is totally different than getting a copy. Most people will read this ‘take’ in a non-digital, real-world analog sense, meaning to ‘remove’. Google is using the digital sense, where ‘take’ is closer to ‘propagate’.
Furthermore, I am not sure just what exactly they mean by an “an open web run on open standards”. Is Google offering an open data format? An open API to control or manage data? Or do they mean all web data being open to web search (Google), and available to as many applications (Google) and services (Google) as you care to use?
It sounded so good, but unfortunately there does not seem to be anything of substance behind the press releases! That’s why I think this is all window dressing. Call me a skeptical security guy, but it looks like Google is taking a page out of Microsoft’s handbook, in that they are creating a tool to combat user fears and concerns, but data storage and management become tied more closely to Google, not less. Taking data from one place to another provides additional attributes and context that increases its value. Google remains in control and it will be very difficult to argue who owns that data.
Posted at Monday 9th November 2009 7:00 am
(1) Comments •
By Adrian Lane
When I was in college, I figured every professor assumed I had only one class: the one they were teaching. They seemed to assume I dedicated days and nights solely to their coursework, and was no less interested in the subject they had dedicated their lives to. And they allocated my time accordingly, giving me enough work to do to consume 40 hours a week. But I was taking 5 classes! WTF! Berkeley was especially bad this way. By noon each Monday I felt like I was a week behind the curve. For the first few weeks I was quite angry about the selfishness of those professors: how could they possibly be so callous as to give us far more work than any two people could perform? Were they encouraging shoddy work? Were they nuts?!?
After a few weeks I grudgingly acknowledged that the profs were not in their positions because they were stupid or ignorant, but because they were smart. Well, maybe one was stupid and ignorant, but most of them were really freakin’ intelligent. And consciously or not, this overburdening forced you to work faster, prioritize, and be more efficient. Handling an overburden of requirements has been a skill that has served me better than the subject matter of any one of those courses.
I am not talking about time management here, like some motivational seminar might teach; I am talking about strategy. When you have 5 times more work work than you can do, tasks become self selecting. You do those things that you must do to survive. If you’re lucky, some of the things that you want to do overlap with what must be done. You learn to select the right opportunities that are most in line with success, and not look back when you walk away from good ideas that don’t support your goals or the requirements on you. Your choices will differ from your peers, but you make choices and you do the best you can. For those of you who have participated in startups, I expect that you have a full appreciation of this viewpoint.
That’s the way I approach my project work here. And my goal is that our research makes it easier for you to do this as well.
With just Rich and me being the only full-time guys here, we go through this process a lot. There are simply not enough hours in the day to do some things that look like great ideas at first. On the bright side it forces us to re-evaluate projects and come up with much more streamlined versions, which improves the quality and the usability of the research. And frankly I want to get away from this computer and, I dunno, have a life, so it’s important on several levels.
A big portion of this blog’s readers are not security professionals, but deal with an aspect of security in their daily jobs. They don’t necessarily want to be experts, but just understand how to find answers to their security questions and get the job done. This is a bit of a tease, but as a result of viewing our research calendar in this light, we are reconsidering what we had planned to create. In the coming weeks we are going to be adding a lot of new stuff to the research library, fitting our new more streamlined approach, as our plans grew too big for us to handle. More importantly, it was too cumbersome for part-time security practitioners to benefit from.
On to the Friday Summary:
Webcasts, Podcasts, Outside Writing, and Conferences
Favorite Securosis Posts
Other Securosis Posts
Favorite Outside Posts
Top News and Posts
Blog Comment of the Week
This week’s best comment comes from Stacy Shelley in response to Verizon Has Most of the Web Application Security Pieces… But Do They Know It?:
Hi Rich - Yes, SecureWorks offers managed WAF and web app scanning services. We also have the capability to leverage the web app scanning data in the management of WAF policies. Our Web App Sec services align pretty well with the components you guys cover in your “Building a Web Application Security Program” paper.
Our Consulting group has been doing web app pen testing and code audits for a few years now. In the spring, we launched the managed WAF service. In October, we launched the web app scanning service (which also scans databases). We’ve also had the capability to monitor application logs for quite some time, although it’s value is largely dependent on the audit logging capabilities of the app.
Posted at Friday 6th November 2009 6:50 am
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By Adrian Lane
A major flaw has been found that enables a man-in-the-middle attacks against SSL connections. Several other media outlets are reporting, but Kelly Jackson Higgins has a nice summary over at Dark Reading, and betanews has a much more detailed discussion. According to Marsh Ray at PhoneFactor:
“The bug results in a set of related attacks that allow a man-in-the-middle to do bad things to your SSL/TLS connection. The (attacker) in the middle is able to inject his own chosen text into what your application believes is an encrypted, secure communications channel,” says Ray, a senior software development engineer for PhoneFactor. “This has implications for all protocols that run on top of SSL/TLS, such as HTTPS … What’s different with this (bug) is that both the client and server need to be patched to restore the full security guarantees that are expected with TLS.”
The communication process two parties go through to establish a trusted connection inadvertently leaves some response information in clear text during part of the dialogue. Basically when they agree to change some of the session attributes the protocol leaves some information exposed:
“Methods exist for one or the other party to request a change in the parameters of their transactions, perhaps to switch to a different, stronger cipher suite … In a situation similar to someone’s e-mail application replying to your e-mail with a message whose subject line begins, RE:, the conversation between client and server over what to change to, contains a reference to the request for renegotiation – the request that had, when sent earlier, been encrypted. Now it’s not, and that’s the problem. “
The fix for this should be relatively straightforward and, from what I understand, should be available within the next few days. The issue becomes deploying a patch to a piece of code used for just about any secure communication session. So plan on patching a lot of applications in the coming weeks!
PhoneFactor named their efforts ‘Project Mogul’, which has nothing to do with The Mogull so far as I know.
Posted at Thursday 5th November 2009 10:48 pm
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Last week Verizon Business announced that they now offer web application vulnerability assessment software as a service. Specifically, they are reselling a full version of WhiteHat Security’s offering, customized for Verizon business customers.
To be honest I’m somewhat biased here since WhiteHat’s CTO, Jeremiah Grossman, is a friend; but I’ve been fairly impressed with their model of SaaS-based continuous web app vulnerability assessment using a combination of scanning and manual validation to reduce false positives. Jeremiah’s marketing folks will hate it when I say this, but in my mind it’s closer to penetration testing than the other SaaS vulnerability assessment products, which rely completely on automated scanning. Perhaps instead of calling this “penetration testing” we can call it “exploit validation”. Web application vulnerabilities are tougher to deal with from a risk management perspective since, on the surface, it can be very difficult to tell if a vulnerability is exploitable; especially compared to the platform vulnerabilities typically checked by scanners. Since all web applications are custom, it’s important to validate those vulnerabilities to determine overall risk, as the results of a blind scan are generally full of potential false positives – unless it has been de-tuned so much that the false negative rate is extremely high instead.
Verizon Business also sells a managed web application firewall, which they mention in the press release. If you refer back to our Building a Web Application Security Program series and paper; vulnerability assessment, penetration testing, and web application firewalls are core technologies for the secure deployment and secure operations phases of managing web applications (plus monitoring, which is usually provided by the WAF and other logging).
In that series and paper, we also discussed the advantages of WAF + VA, where you dynamically generate WAF policies based on validated vulnerabilities in your application. This supports a rapid “shield then patch” model.
In the released information, Verizon mentions that they support WAF + VA. Since we know they are using WhiteHat, that means their back-end for WAF is likely Imperva or F5, based on WhiteHat’s existing partnerships.
Thus Verizon has managed VA, managed WAF, managed WAF + VA, and some penetration testing support, via the VA product.
They also have a forensics investigation/breach response unit which collects all the information used to generate the Data Breach Investigations Report.
Let’s add this up… VA + Exploit Validation (lightweight pen testing) + WAF + (WAF + VA) + incident response + threat intelligence (based on real incident responses). That’s a serious chunk of managed web security available from a single service provider. My big question is: do they realize this? It isn’t clear that they are positioning these as a combined service, or that the investigations/response guys are tied in to the operations side.
The big gap is anything in the secure development side… which, to be honest, is hard (or impossible) for any provider unless you outsource your actual development to them.
SecureWorks is another vendor in this space, offering web application assessments and managed WAF (but I don’t know if they have WAF + VA)… and I’m pretty sure there are some others out there I’m missing.
What’s the benefit? These are all pieces I believe work better when they can feed information to each other… whether internal or hosted externally. I expect the next pieces to add are better integrated application monitoring, and database activity monitoring.
(For the disclosure record, we have no current business relationships with WhiteHat, Verizon, F5, or SecureWorks, but we have done work with Imperva).
Posted at Wednesday 4th November 2009 4:49 pm
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By Adrian Lane
Every now and again I run into an article that totally baffles me. It’s as if the author had a bunch of somewhat related quotes sitting around, and then stitched a Frankenstein article together. In this case the article was in the October 5th edition of eWeek, and the topic was “Databases: The next big virtualization thing”. The intention seems to be sketching out some hazy future projections about virtualized databases, and what wonderful things virtualization can do for you. But if you closely examine the assertions, not only are they are based on bad assumptions, they are flat-out misleading. I am not sure there is a single point in the article I wholly agree with. Rather than wallow in this mess, I will offer you what I consider to be 7 myths surrounding databases in virtual environments:
Myth #1 - Virtualization makes database administration easier. No. Any time you place a database into an environment, virtual or not, the database needs to be tuned to operate efficiently within that environment. Virtualization abstracts the resources underneath the database; it does not relieve you from the administrative tasks of tuning and provisioning. While it is theoretically possible to reduce administrative tasks by standardizing an environment, history has shown we need to optimize database configuration to accommodate organic changes that occur over time.
Myth #2 - Virtualization improves database performance. Possibly, but not always. Improvements to database performance are more likely to result from tuning SQL and database structures. Generally speaking, improvements in database logic offer an order of magnitude greater improvement than any ‘external’ changes. Virtualization does provide an easier way to allocate more resources to a database, and is highly beneficial when a database is memory or CPU constrained. I/O constrained databases are as likely to suffer from distributed storage latency as realize gains in performance, and more likely require some redesign to take advantage of virtual resources. Sure, you can throw twice as many resources at a database, but that does not mean it will automatically perform better!
Myth #3 - Virtualization lets you consolidate databases. Not really. Virtualization offers the ability to use a single central database installation, but you still normally use multiple database instances to support multiple applications. Effective consolidation of databases to take advantage of virtual environments requires some database re-engineering and does not magically (automatically) occur in a virtual environment.
Myth #4 - Virtualization will reduce your database licensing costs. This is not typically the case. Check with your vendor on this, because adding a virtual CPU is likely to cost you additional fees just as if you added a real CPU. Per database pricing may mean higher licensing costs, not lower. It will depend upon your vendor’s pricing model, so do not take it for granted.
Myth #5 - Virtualization provides better database security. I have never understood this claim. How exactly could virtualization make a database more secure? Through obscurity? Some giant VMotion shell game that hides the location of the data? The access to your data is still gated by access controls and governed by permissions. Security is largely dependent upon solid configuration of the database and current patches being applied, which may nor may not be easier depending upon how you have your virtual environment set up. Virtualization provides no inherent advantage to security, and opens up additional vulnerabilities. I have never been a big fan of the concept of ‘threat surface’, but if data gets copied to multiple locations there are simply more chances to gain access to the raw data files, which is why we recommend transparent database encryption for databases in virtual environments.
Myth #6 - Virtualization enables all clustered databases to be active simultaneously. Nonsense! This is possible today without virtualization. SQL Server is a good example. It offers two basic models for database clustering: an active-passive setup designed for failover, and an active-active mode for distributed processing. Both require the data sets to be synchronized, often via shared disks. The former requires no special database design work – only the appropriate configuration. In the later case you really need a data allocation strategy to minimize performance and data contention issues. Virtualization does provide the means to make physically separate disks appear as one, but it does not make synchronization issues go away.
Myth #7 - Virtualization helps abstract the database from applications: No, it doesn’t. Abstraction technologies like Hibernate can mask the underlying database usage from an application. Generalization of data types stored within a database or even use of XML allow data to be moved between heterogenous databases and applications. There is nothing inherent to virtualization technology that abstracts database usage. The benefit virtualization provides, in cases of disaster recovery, is being able to easily spawn a new copy of the database should the existing copy no longer be available.
Posted at Tuesday 3rd November 2009 8:24 pm
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This week’s Friday Summary is sponsored by Evilsquirrel Enterprises, your World Domination Specialists.
My absolute favorite holiday of the year is Halloween. More than Christmas (possibly because I’m a non-practicing Jew), more than my birthday, and even more than Talk Like a Pirate Day.
Halloween is the ultimate geek holiday. It’s the one time of year we have an excuse to pull out our table saws, microcontrollers, and pneumatics as we build wonderful devices to soil the underwear of all the neighborhood children. I knew I was finally getting it right the first year a group of kids carefully approached our home, then ran off screaming as the motion sensor tripped and the effects kicked in. Between the business and the baby I haven’t really had tine to build anything new this year, but I did finally invest in some commercial-grade fog machines. Fog, light, and sound are absolutely essential for setting a good scene, and go a long way further than any actual decorations.
I’ve previously used the cheap foggers from Party City or the Halloween stores, but never managed to get them to last more than 2 years in a row. I’m hoping this commercial unit will be a bit more reliable… and the 20,000 cubic feet per minute of fog it kicks out can’t hurt.
This is the 13th year, 4th location, and 2nd state for our annual Evilsquirrel party. It’s a bit smaller than the “Squirrel Wars” year where we had 300 people show up and 4 live bands, but that’s what happens when everyone runs off and starts careers and families. Needless to say, my friends and I are all tremendously amused that the whole “squirrel” meme is so big these days. Now we don’t seem quite as weird.
On to the Friday Summary:
Webcasts, Podcasts, Outside Writing, and Conferences
Favorite Securosis Posts
Other Securosis Posts
Favorite Outside Posts
- Rich: This Wired article on the anti-vaccination movement. It’s an extremely important article, but here’s the money quote for us security folks: “Looking back over human history, rationality has been the anomaly. Being rational takes work, education, and a sober determination to avoid making hasty inferences, even when they appear to make perfect sense. Much like infectious diseases themselves – beaten back by decades of effort to vaccinate the populace – the irrational lingers just below the surface, waiting for us to let down our guard.”
- Adrian: Jeremiah’s post on Black Box vs. White Box. QA professional have used this ‘threshold of stability’ approach for years to gate software releases, but it seems counter-intuitive to security professionals.
- Mortman: Detecting Malice Released Only halfway through and it is completely awesome. Best tech book I’ve read in ages. (I second that -Rich). (Meier thirds it: “Anyone I bring it up to first complains about the $40 eBook, but it’s the best technical book I’ve bought in a while.”)
- Meier: Amazon Lets Shoppers Pay With a Phrase This is just dumb. First we have a phrase that’s verifiably known to be taken and second I bet if someone did research on any web authentication mechanisms that are identified as “PIN” you could map the majority of those users bank PINs to their other PINs. I don’t get it. Oh and, to change your PayPhrase you have to log in anyway. Way to go, Amazon.
- Rich (2): I can’t help myself, I had a tie this week. This article from Ivan Arce at Core Security is a month old, but well worth the read.
Special – Worst Link of the Week
- “Women In IT Security Project Management”. This paper is beyond terrible. Not only is it poorly written (which it is), but it doesn’t make a lick of sense. Case in point – check out this bit from the first page:
In this study, I have tried to determine if IT security project management is a viable career choice for women. If so, do they have what it takes to be a successful IT Security Project Manager? I would like to emphasize that IT profession cannot be generalized based on gender. No conclusion has been drawn to indicate if one sex is better than the other in any of the subsets within IT field.
Isn’t it great how the author, Gurdeep Kaur, simultaneously tells us that she’s going to investigate whether one gender has the ability to do a job, and then claims that you can’t generalize on the basis of gender? You really shouldn’t read the paper, but if you do, it goes downhill from there. The analysis is shallow and suffers largely from citing lots of studies that demonstrate the problem while providing little in the way of solutions. The few suggestions provided are insulting to say the least. I’d quote more but I can’t bring myself to do it. I am amazed that SANS actually posted this to their reading room and granted the author a “Gold Certification”.
Top News and Posts
Blog Comment of the Week
This week’s best comment comes from Marc in response to Tokenization Will Become the Dominant Payment Transaction Architecture:
I always thought Chuck E. Cheese was a rat…not a mouse. That being said, I think your example of a video arcade is a good one. I have used the casino chip analogy when explaining tokenization to people. You trade the high value data (cash in the analogy and a CC# in the use case) for some lower value data (a casino chip and a piece of “tokenized” data). The problem I have with tokens though is that they still have value in a certain context. You haven’t sufficiently devalued the original data by making it a “token.” The token can still be used to perform functions, albeit in a more limited context than the original data. And I question the methodologies currently used to generate these tokens. I have yet to see any academic research that establishes that the tokens are truly random or that they are any better than hashed values. What we’ve done is traded one type of attack for one that has yet to emerge (an underground market in valid card data for one that will surely emerge trading valid token data in poorly implemented solutions). Now, coupling a token with a time-based signature or some other authentication value makes these solutions much more palatable because then I can prove the token is being properly used. There are numerous implementation issues in the different token solutions provided in the market today…and not enough discussion of provable security and standardization of those implementations…
Posted at Friday 30th October 2009 6:26 am
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This is part 2 of a series, click here for Part 1
Penetration testing solution and market changes
I’m not exactly sure when Core Security Technologies and Immunity started business, but before then there were no dedicated commercial penetration testing tools. There were a number of vulnerability scanners, and plenty of different “micro” tools to help with different parts of a pen test, but no dedicated exploitation tools. Metasploit also changed this on the non-commercial side. For those who aren’t experts in this area, it’s important to remember that a vulnerability assessment is not a penetration test – vulnerability assessment determines if a system may be vulnerable to an attack, while penetration testing determines if that vulnerability is exploitable.
Update- Ivan from Core emailed that they started as consulting in 1996, and the first version of Impact was released in 2002.
Rather than repeating Nick Selby’s excellent market summary of the three penetration testing tools providers over at IANS, I’ll focus on the changes we’re seeing in the overall market.
- The market is still dominated by services, with quality ranging from excellent to absolute snake oil. Even using a tool like Core, by far the most user-friendly, you still need a certain skill level to perform a reasonable test.
- The tools market is increasing, as Core and Immunity have experienced reasonable growth, with extensive growth of the Metasplit user community.
- Partnerships between vulnerability assessment vendors and penetration testing solution providers have grown. This was pretty much completely driven by Core until the Metasploit acquisition by Rapid7. Core partners with Tenable, Qualys, nCircle, IBM, Lumension, GFI, and eEye. Update- Immunity partners with Tenable, I missed that in my initial research.
- Web application vulnerability assessment tools (and services) almost always include some level of penetration-testing capabilities. This is a technology requirement for effective results, since it is extremely difficult to accurately validate many web application vulnerability types without some degree of exploitation. VA tools tend to restrict themselves to prevent damaging the application being tested, and (as with nearly any vulnerability assessment), can normally be run against non-production targets with less safety, in order to produce deeper and more accurate results.
- Any penetration test worth its salt includes web applications within the scope, and pen testing tools are increasing their support for web application testing.
I expect to see greater blurring of the lines between vulnerability assessment and penetration testing in the web application area, which will spill over into the infrastructure assessment space. We’ll also see increasing demand for internal penetration testing, especially for web applications.
Core will increase its partnerships and integration on the VA side, and could see an acquisition if larger VA vendors (a small list) see growing customer demand for penetration testing – which I do not expect in the short term. The VA market is larger and if those vendors see pen testing client demands, or greater competition from Rapid7, they can leverage their Core partnerships. Core’s Impact Essential tool is the first to target individuals who aren’t full-time security professionals or penetration testers, and run on an automated schedule. While it doesn’t have nearly the depth of the Pro product, it could be interesting for continuous testing. The real question is whether customers perceive it as either reducing their process costs for vulnerability management (via prioritization and elimination of non-exploitable vulnerabilities), or a replacement for an existing VA solution. If Impact Essential can’t be used to cut overall costs, it will be hard to justify in the current economic environment.
As Nick concluded, Immunity will need to improve their UI to increase adoption beyond organic growth… unless they plan to stay focused on dedicated penetration testers. They should also consider some VA partnerships, as they will be the only penetration testing tool not partnered or integrated with VA Update- I was incorrect, Immunity also partners with Tenable. Apologies for missing that in my initial research.. I agree with Nick: Immunity is most at risk in the short term from the Metasploit commercialization. If the UI improves, Immunity could use cost to compete, and some VA vendors might add them as an additional partner.
Rapid7 just jumped from being one of the less-known VA players to a household name for anyone who pays attention to penetration testing. This is a huge opportunity, but not without risks. Metasploit is an awesome tool (I’ve used it since version 1… in the lab), but not yet enterprise class. The speed, usefulness, and usability of its integration will play a major role in its long-term success and ability to springboard off the large amount of press and additional name recognition associated with this acquisition. H D also needs to aggressively maintain the Metasploit community, or Rapid7 will lose a large fraction of Metasploit’s value and have to pay staff to replace those volunteers. Quality assurance, of the product as well as the exploits, will also be important to maintain; this could reduce the speed of releasing exploits which Metasploit is famous for.
Rapid7 also faces risks due to Metasploit’s BSD license. There is nothing to prevent any other vendor from taking and using the code base. This is a common risk when commercializing any free/open source software, and we’ve seen both successes and failures.
Here’s how I see things developing:
- For infrastructure/non-web applications we will see growing demand for exploit testing automation. The vulnerability assessment vendors will add native capabilities, and Core (and Immunity, if they choose) will add more native VA capabilities and find themselves competing more with VA vendors. My gut feel is that VA vendors (other than Rapid7) will only add the most basic of capabilities, leaving the pen testing vendors with a technical advantage until both markets completely merge. That might not matter to most organizations, which either won’t understand the technology differentiation, or won’t care.
- There will continue to be a need for in-depth tools to support professional penetration testers. This market will continue to grow, but will not offer the opportunities of the broader, ‘lights-out’ automated side of the market.
- Overall, the penetration testing tools market will continue to grow. This acquisition and other market trends validate the usefulness of this market, especially in assisting with remediation prioritization – not just problem identification.
- The greatest area of growth will be in web applications, and as I mentioned before the lines between pure VA and pure penetration testing will completely blur in this area.
- All the penetration testing vendors will benefit from the Metasploit acquisition. Immunity faces the greatest mid-term risk, Core the greatest potential for price pressure, and Rapid7 the risk of losing the Metasploit community and seeing their work appear in competing products. All three vendors can manage potential risks, but the answers aren’t necessarily easy.
A bit of disclosure – I haven’t been briefed formally by Immunity, so I could be missing part of their strategy. Although I’ve talked with most of the VA vendors, I haven’t specifically discussed their plans for exploit validation or penetration testing, and I base my conclusions more on conversations with end users.
Posted at Wednesday 28th October 2009 5:53 pm
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