In a recent post at Security Ripcord, Cutaway says:

Let me elaborate on the second topic a little more. The days of hacking for fun are over. I think it is safe to say that nearly everybody has come to that realization (there may be a few holdouts in upper management but they will not last long). This means that the stakes are higher for the good guys and the bad guys.

Sure, the stakes might be higher, but don’t always equate hacking with security research. Hacking is fun. Research is work. Sometimes they overlap. Let’s not take the sense of wonder out of hacking, which is an exercise in exploration, just because the term also applies to the occasional transgressions of bad guys.

Of course I know Cutaway knows this (Mystery Challenge and all), but like any good blogger I’m taking something out of context to have a little fun and make a point.

As I mentioned just a couple days ago, there’s a bit of debate and confusion surrounding leak/loss prevention technologies and what the heck to call these things.

I did some thinking on the problem and here’s one way of looking at things. This is just a bit of brainstorming in public and I’m sure it will change over time.

Today we have Data Leak/Loss Prevention (DLP)/Information Leak/Loss Prevention (ILP)/Extrusion Prevention all describing essentially the same technology. I used to call this CMF: Content Monitoring and Filtering, but I realized that’s probably a better description for stage two of these products.

Data Loss Prevention (DLP) product are predominantly network based, or at least have their roots as network products, although a few endpoint products have appeared lately. They monitor communications traffic for policy violations and generate alerts or (in some cases) block inappropriate use of content. Detection techniques are content-aware; meaning the actual content is scanned using a variety of techniques such as rules-based (regex for credit card numbers) or partial document matching. DLP can easily be a feature of other products, as Hoff constantly likes to emphasize. The key to DLP is this content awareness and some sort of central policies.

Content Monitoring and Filtering (CMF) is where the leading products are today, and where the rest are headed. It includes what I described as DLP but goes further. CMF products include data at rest features, like content discovery, and may include an endpoint agent. You have to have full network capabilities to be a CMF product. Endpoint only products aren’t able to protect both managed and unmanaged systems, since you can’t guarantee that everyone has the agent. CMF integrates with email for filtering/quarantine/encryption/etc., and at a minimum can block email and web/FTP traffic, while monitoring all communications channels. There is a dedicated policy management and workflow interface; it can’t just be an extra widget on a UTM box or endpoint suite.

Content Monitoring and Protection (CMP), which I shamelessly stole from Hoff, is where leading products should be within 1-2 years, 3 on the outside. It’s the full expression of where this is headed- in the middle sits a dedicated policy, management, and workflow server with agents or some other integration to fully protect data in motion, at rest, and in use. All components are fully content aware using advanced techniques that are more than just regular expressions or basic cyclical hashing (for partial document matching). The CMP product doesn’t need to “own” any of the monitoring and enforcement points; it’s the central management for protecting content and we should expect to see a lot of partnership and maybe even an open standard or two that will get ignored. Endpoint agents are integrated with Enterprise Digital Rights Management (EDRM), finally helping that boondoggle of a technology actually work in the real world. It also bridges some of the protections applied from structured to unstructured data. There’s a lot more to say on this, but for space’s sake we’ll save it for another day.

Secure Information Lifecycle Management (SILM) is probably nothing more than a fantasy. It would be the ultimate integration of CMP with ILM; bridging security and information management seamlessly. It’s a security plane layered with ILM. The level of complexity to pull this off is astounding, and while it might happen in the distant future I’m not holding my breath. I just don’t see the security guys and the data management folks getting together tightly enough to present a unified buying center, thus no unified product.

These are just some thoughts I’m playing with, but I see this as a way of distinguishing DLP “features” from dedicated solutions, while showing how the technology will evolve.

It’s the content awareness that’s really key, and if that can’t keep up with our needs none of this will go anywhere.

I’m still catching up on my blogroll, and caught this article over at Emergent Chaos, which also referenced this one by Thurston. Both articles discuss the infamous Ponemon study that claimed the average losses in a breach were $182 per record.

Here are a couple of things to keep in mind. That particular survey was sponsored by two data security vendors: PGP and Vontu. I like both companies, and they really do help reduce breaches, but never NEVER trust vendor-sponsored numbers. I’ve written surveys; it’s damn hard, and even harder to remove bias.

This survey focused on breaking down the costs to companies that suffered breaches. In the full response details (which I can’t release since I don’t think they’re public) the costs are broken down between “hard” costs like notification and cleanup, and “soft” costs like reputation damage. Even if we remove any potential bias from Ponemon, the companies themselves doing the reporting are self-biased. If they want more money for security, they’ll exaggerate costs. If they are covering their behinds, they reduce the number, and if they’re public and have to report in a 10-K, they’ll tend to guess high.

None of it matters. All these numbers are different odors from the same source.

The hard costs alone are pretty easy to measure, and in most cases are more than enough to spur investment. How much does it cost you to compile a list of victims, get their addresses, print envelopes, stuff them, mail them, and deal with complaint/question calls? In presentations I often say let’s call it $2, and we all know it’s more than that. As the other posts state, if you add in credit monitoring costs that’s another $10 per record (most companies don’t seem to enroll people in these anymore).

If you’re fighting your CFO, and have anything more than a few tens of thousands of records, $2 per record is all you should need to get their attention. One million customers = two million in losses, even without any fines or cleanup costs.

The one category I call total BS on is “reputation” damage. Study after study shows that consumers will always say they’ll switch brands/providers if their information is lost, but looking at the real numbers this almost never happens. Why? Because it’s like moving from trash to junk to garbage- consumers don’t really believe any company is materially better than any other one at security, so it doesn’t drive their behavior.

No registration required anymore. If the trolls and spam get too bad I’ll have to turn it back on, but we’ll see how this goes…

Hoff owned me. In an email he claimed he pwned me, but he totally didn’t earn that p.

Apparently I’m slightly late to the game in talking about hyperjackstacks (we’re back on virtualization, in case I lost you). That’s something I’m totally willing to concede, especially since I’m more of a data and applications guy.

Chris agrees that this is an important issue, but then asks:

Ultimately though, I think that the point of response boils down to the definition of the mechanisms used in the detection of a malicious VMM/HV. I ask you Rich, please define a “malicious” VMM/HV from one steeped in goodness.

Umm, one that does bad stuff? Like sniff data, mess with things? Dunno, I’m a little buzzed right now from some good organic wine.

Thomas explained things a little better and I think we hit a bit of agreement. Basically, the concern is that if someone compromises the hypervisor somehow, they can do all sorts of badness. Thomas, in the comments to his post, shows how one potential solution is to nudge the hypervisor aside and run checks against it (while you’re unvirutalized, I just made up a word). But I think the real solution is something Hoff mentions that I also mentioned in my post, albeit without the proper name:

Intel TXT ensures that virtual machine monitors are less vulnerable to attacks that cannot be detected by today’s conventional software-security solutions. By isolating assigned memory through this hardware-based protection, it keeps data in each virtual partition protected
from unauthorized access from software in another partition.

Yep- dump the problem to hardware. I think that’s where we’re headed, so all this debate serves as a friendly reminder to our big chip manufacturing brethren that probably don’t pay attention to any of our blogs.

But then the bad guys will compromise the hardware, and we’ll defend against that, and then… you get the circle jerk of pain reference yet?

Like everything, it’s always an arms race. Good news is I think this is one of the more manageable problems we face, and the work of Thomas and Joanna will go a long way towards nudging the vendors to reduce our pain.

Can I talk about DLP again now?

I’m getting caught up on my blog reading after my big APAC (that’s Asia Pacific) tour with a half-busted Mac, and noticed Tom’s post at Matasano on detecting unauthorized hypervisors. Tom and Nate have been going back and forth with Joanna Rutkowska on how detectable these things might be. For those of you less familiar with all this virtualization stuff, let’s review a little bit.

There are a lot of different types of “virtualization”, but for purposes of this discussion we’re talking about operating system/platform virtualization. For a bit more background there’s always Wikipedia. OS virtualization is where we run multiple operating system instances on a single piece of hardware. To do this most efficiently, we use something called a hypervisor, which (oversimplified) is a shim that lets multiple operating systems run side by side all nice and happy. The hypervisor abstracts and emulates the PC hardware and manages resources between all the operating systems on top (yes you geeks, I’m skipping all sorts of things like Type 1 vs. Type 2 hypervisors and full vs. partial virtualization). Most people today run the hypervisor as software in a “host” operating system, with multiple “guest” operating systems inside. For example, I’m a massive fan of Parallels on my Mac, and use it to run Windows within OS X (I really should upgrade to version 3 soon).

The simple diagram is:

First things first; I feel lucky that Joanna and Ptacek (haven’t met Nate yet) let me in the same room as them. They’re smart, REALLY smart. I’ve also never programmed at that level (I was a DB/web application guy) so sometimes I can miss parts of their arguments.

Joanna has been doing some cool work around something called the Blue Pill and virtualized rootkits. To do my usual over-simplification, on a system not already running a hypervisor, the attacker runs code that launches a hypervisor. The hostile hypervisor drops below the host operating system it launched from, virtualizing the host itself. Now everything the user knows about is virtualized and the malicious hypervisor can Do Bad Things unnoticed. Our diagram becomes:

Joanna originally called this undetectable. Thomas and Nate did an entire Black Hat presentation on how they can always detect this, with some blog posts on Nate’s site and at Matasano.

Problem is, they’re looking at the wrong problem. I will easily concede that detecting virtualization is always possible, but that’s not the real problem. Long-term, virtualization will be normal, not an exception, so detecting if you’re virtualized won’t buy you anything. The bigger problem is detecting a malicious hypervisor, either the main hypervisor or maybe some wacky new malicious hypervisor layered on top of the trusted hypervisor.

Since I barely know my way around system-level programming I could easily be wrong, but reading up on Nate and Tom’s work I can’t see any techniques for detecting an unapproved hypervisor in an already virtualized environment. Long term, I think this is a more important issue (especially on servers). Since Intel will be putting some trusted virtual machines on our hardware by default, maybe that’s where we need to look.

Spinning the wrong wheels perhaps?

Read here, safe for work, but very disturbing.

Double entendre title fully intended.

Here I am, just off the bench after six months of watching from the sidelines, and when I’m still two feet away from the darn batter’s box Hoff lets loose with a hundred mile per hour fastball right at my head.
Thanks Chris, it’s not like you didn’t know exactly when I’d be back at bat.
I really suggest you go read both of Chris’ posts, but here’s a snippet so I have something to work off of:

Known by many names, what I describe as content monitoring and protection (CMP) is also known as extrusion prevention, data leakage or intellectual property management toolsets. I think for most, the anchor concept of digital rights management (DRM) within the Enterprise becomes glue that makes CMP attractive and compelling; knowing what and where your data is and how its distribution needs to be controlled is critical.
The difficulty with this technology is the just like any other feature, it needs a delivery mechanism. Usually this means yet another appliance; one that’s positioned either as close to the data as possible or right back at the perimeter in order to profile and control data based upon policy before it leaves the “inside” and goes “outside.”
I made the point previously that I see this capability becoming a feature in a greater amalgam of functionality; I see it becoming table stakes included in application delivery controllers, FW/IDP systems and the inevitable smoosh of WAF/XML/Database security gateways (which I think will also further combine with ADC’s.)
I see CMP becoming part of UTM suites. Soon.

First a little bad news; I mostly agree with Hoff, and this is such a big subject I’m only going to cover part of it today. Consider this the first part of a multipart series on DLP/CMF/CMP.

Today I’ll cover a little bit of history and what I look for when figuring out if the latest widget is just a feature of something else, or likely to be a stand alone solution.

What most people call DLP started about 5-6 years ago as an extra feature of about the only Acceptable Use Enforcement product on the market- Vericept. Vericept monitored network communications, mostly as a sniffer near the gateway, to detect things like porn, gambling, sexual harassment, and “hacker” research. A lot of people tried to position it as a network forensics tool, but instead of full packet capture it just looked for policy violations and recorded that traffic. It also came with usable business reports, not just lists of IP addresses and packets. Vericept could also detect things like credit card and social security numbers leaving the organization.

Vontu, Vidius (later PortAuthority and now Websense), and Tablus started becoming more visible, each with their own somewhat unique approach to the problem. Vontu cleaned up in the early years by really focusing on the business problem of preventing data leaks and building a tool the business guys could grok. Once Reconnex, Fidelis, and a few others appeared the marketing machines really started cranking and bringing more attention to the entire space. In 2005 Vontu had a big lead in a small market, but the competition learned fast and became MUCH more competitive in 2006, after more than a few management changes.

Early on we had a hard time naming this space. Not just us analyst types, but the vendors themselves. I even had a phone call with two of the bigger ones in 2003 or 2004 where myself and two competitive marketing managers tried to hash it out. I went with the term “Content Monitoring and Filtering” because I felt the core technology was about a lot more than just leak prevention.
New technologies pop up all the time and sometimes it’s hard to figure out which will succeed, fail, or succeed as part of something else. I ask one simple question to place my bets on something being a feature vs. a solution:

What’s the business problem, and does the technology solve it? If not, what percentage of the problem does it solve?

Okay, I cheat, because this is hard. Something like, “it blocks USB ports” isn’t a business problem; at least not with a capital B. This is also where we tend to see all the BS business-speak like “holistic” and “synergy”. I should probably do some posts just on this alone, so let’s look at DLP.

The business problem for DLP is, “tell me where my sensitive information is and help me protect it”.

Chris is correct- Data Loss Prevention is just a feature focused on one part of the problem. Monitoring data moving through the perimeter is a throwaway. The DRM part, which all DLP solutions will eventually include, is also a throwaway; let someone else do that part. Content scanning and classification for storage, email integration, internal network monitoring, and so on are all just features somebody can put into something else.

The product, and I *really* like Chris’s Content Monitoring and Protection term, is the policy management server, content analysis, and workflow and reporting tool. It’s the central console for managing all these enforcement points that will be part of UTM, endpoints, and everything else. Today the “DLP” vendors need to build most of this themselves since it’s hard to sell a product when you have to tell your client to buy 20 other components from other vendors.

This isn’t part of UTM because the people setting the policies for content and dealing with enforcement aren’t the same as those dealing with inbound threats. This isn’t part of Application Firewalls, Application Delivery Controllers, or database security gateways because those are also managed by different teams, with different responsibilities. Actually, those tools are going to consolidate into a database and application security stack, while DLP evolves into a Content Monitoring and Protection solution.

We’re solving the problem of identifying and protecting sensitive content being used by our employees (and other insiders). Those responsible for solving this problem often include non-technical types like corporate legal, risk, and compliance. The problem is different than network or database security, and will probably be managed by someone different (even if they’re on the security team), thus we’ll have some sort of stand alone product,

Even CMP is only half of where this is really going.

To really respond to Chris I need to dig deeper into what DLP is and why I think it solves a unique business problem in a way that justifies its existence as a product. It will take a few posts, so stay tuned over the coming weeks and months.

DLP as we look at it today is just a feature, but those products have the potential to turn into something a lot bigger, and a lot more powerful.

Got questions? Think I might know the answer? Just bored and need someone to pretend to be your friend?

All you have to do is look on the sidebar and click on the LiveChat link. If you’re running AIM, that will connect you to the account I’ve set up to support the site.

This is a bit of an experiment and feedback is welcome. If you aren’t running AIM, let me know in the comments what IM provider you prefer.

And no, I won’t pretend to be… something… to satisfy any of your twisted fantasies. This is for security stuff only, okay?

If you’re reading this, I’m no longer a Gartner analyst.

For the past 7 years or so I’ve had the best experience of my professional (and often personal) career. The product of a bad acquisition and short stint in consulting, Gartner gave a young unknown hothead the opportunity to become an industry analyst.

I tried my best to run with it. Seems to have worked out okay.

Gartner was an amazing experience; I learned more than I possibly imagined when I started, and any success I have in this industry is in large part the product of Big Daddy G. I learned everything from presentation and writing skills, to defending my analysis, to how to analyze in the first place. And that’s not including the massive amount of knowledge imparted by thousands of client conversations and (yes) vendor briefings. Gartner also showed me the world. Before G, I’d been to Mexico; now I’ve been to probably two dozen countries on every continent except Antarctica.

I suppose some of you reading this expect me to be disgruntled, but aside from the usual gripes of any long-term employee I have nothing but good things to say. Gartner is as successful as they are for a reason. And no, I’m not just blowing smoke in case my future plans implode- it was a great job and a great company.

So why am I leaving?

I’m just too darn young and foolish. As positive an experience as Gartner has been, I feel like I’ve gone as far as I can as an analyst. I’m still young, don’t have kids yet, and if I’m going to take a risk now is the time. I’ve been feeling unchallenged and know there’s a lot more in this big world to experience.

Back around February I decided to start poking around, but quickly realized there was no way to effectively job hunt while maintaining my integrity as an analyst. A little over 2 weeks ago, thanks to selling my old condo in Boulder, I found the financial freedom to take a little risk. I resigned without a parachute.

As of this evening, I’m now out on my own as an independent consultant. I’m the founder, owner, and sole employee of Securosis, L.L.C.

I don’t know exactly where all this will end up. Maybe I’ll get that perfect offer. Maybe I’ll stay independent. Long-term I just want to comfortably support my family, travel less, and Do Good Things. I have every intention on staying in the security industry- it’s worked since I was 18, why stop now? I don’t need the big score, just a good race.

Thanks to some industry friends I already have some good contracts to start, and despite my initial fears feel pretty good that things are headed in the right direction.

The best news (I hope) for you readers is that the blog is back! This time I’m only representing myself, and can write without restriction. I also plan on some other surprises, so stay tuned.

It’s been a great run so far; I can’t wait to see what the second lap has to offer.

(Post title inspired by Jimmy Buffet covering Harry Nilsson)