Amrit Williams dropped a post on some of the new cases, and new penalties, for certain kinds of cybercrime. In it he states:

The risk/reward for committing cybercrime is shifting, which will not result in less cybercrime only more sophisticated criminal activity. So more evidence that hostile actors will become more organized, more sophisticated, and much harder to detect with traditional security measures.

I tend to agree slightly- as you raise the stakes the potential reward needs to increase at least proportionally to the risk, but Amrit’s missing the main point. Mike Rothman gets us closer:

… but I’m not sure they are going to behave differently whether they are subject to 10 years or 3 years in the pokey. Whether the fine is $250,000 or $10 million. I don’t know much, but I suspect that most bad guys don’t want to get caught. … The folks know what’s at stake, but they don’t think they’ll be caught.

And there’s the rub. The biggest penalties in the world are totally ineffective as a deterrent if they aren’t enforced. From compliance, like PCI, HIPAA, and SOX, to cybercrime, a law isn’t a law until someone goes to jail for it.

Rothman nails it- right now the bad guys act with near impunity because they know the odds of getting caught are low. If all we do is improve enforcement of existing laws, and learn how to better enforce cybercrime laws across international boundaries (that’s a biggie) we’ll do FAR more to reduce cybercrime than increasing the penalties.

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