Disclosure Humor

Really amusing considering our current discussions: How to Handle Security Problems in Your Products This is from Thomas H. Ptacek who’s blogging at I’m not sure how old it is. Ptacek seems to think I’m smart (which I’ll never argue with) but have nothing new to say on disclosure. He’s probably right, but since we still don’t have industry consensus around disclosure there’s still words to be written, and old thoughts to be repackaged in new ways. This is a pretty old debate; one where I don’t expect resolution just because Pete Lindstrom, Ptacek, myself, or anyone else drops some blog posts. There’s just too many competing interests… Share:

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Mac Wi-FI: Gruber Needs to Let It Go (and Maynor and Ellch Should Ignore the Challenge)

Last Friday I was packing up for a weekend trip with my wife to Tuscon when my faithful RSS reader chased me down with the latest post on Daring Fireball. I ignored it over the weekend, but think it’s time for a response. John Gruber, ever the poker player (his words, not mine) issued an open challenge to Dave Maynor and John Ellch to crack a stock MacBook. If they win, they keep it. If they can’t break in, they pay Gruber the retail price. Today John Gruber followed up with this post, upping the ante a bit and explaining why he feels this is a fair challenge. Adding to the data stream, John Ellch broke silence and released some details of a similar exploit using Centrino drivers (now patched) to the Daily Dave security mailing list. First some full disclosure of my own. I’ve been a fan of Daring Fireball for some time, John and I share a mutual friend, and we’ve traded a few emails over this. But I really wish he had handled this situation differently. I respect John, and hope this post isn’t taken out of context and used for flame bait. Now, why do I think Gruber is making a mistake? Because his challenge is putting good people in bad positions, it isn’t necessarily good for security, and he isn’t playing for the right stakes. Maynor, Ellch, and the security community in general should just ignore the challenge. Check out the original post, but John challenges Maynor and Ellch to take a stock MacBook with a basic configuration and delete a file off the desktop via remote exploit. John’s reason for the challenge? As for the earlier analogy to poker, I’m no fool. I don’t expect to lose this particular bet — but I don’t expect to win it, either. I expect to be ignored. I don’t think Maynor and Ellch have discovered such a vulnerability in the default MacBook AirPort card and driver, and so, if I’m right, they certainly won’t accept this challenge. I think what they’ve discovered — if they’ve in fact discovered anything useful at all — is a class of potential Wi-Fi-based exploit, which they demonstrated on a rigged MacBook to generate publicity at the expense of the Mac’s renowned reputation for security, but that they have not found an actual exploit based on this technique that works against the MacBook’s built-in AirPort. If I’m wrong, and they have discovered such a vulnerability, they may or may not choose to accept this challenge. But it’s a bet that they’ll only accept if they can win. It comes down to this. If I’m wrong, it’d be worth $1099 to know that MacBook users are in fact at risk. And if I’m right, someone needs to call Maynor and Ellch on their bullshit. John’s challenge is misplaced and he should drop it. Why? I know the demonstration from Black Hat is real. Why? Aside from being at the presentation I had a personal demo (over live video) or exactly what they showed in the video. I got to ask detailed questions and walk through each step. Maynor and Ellch haven’t bullshitted anyone- their demo, as shown in the video and discussed in their presentation, is absolutely real. End of story. Want to see for yourself? Read to the end and you’ll have your own opportunity. Using the third-party card for the demo is responsible: Why? Because their goal was to show a class of attack across multiple platforms without disclosing an unpatched vulnerability. By using an anonymous card no single platform is exposed. Why the Mac? Because it demonstrates that a poorly written device driver can expose even a secure system to exploit. The third-party card highlights device drivers, not the OS, as the point of weakness. They could have shown this on Windows but everyone would have assumed it was just another Windows vulnerability. But the Mac? Time to pay attention and demand more from device manufacturers. Responsible disclosure encourages staying silent until a patch is released, or an exploit appears. Why? If responsibility, protecting good guys, or potential legal issues aren’t good enough for you just understand it’s the accepted security industry practice. Some vendors and independent researchers might be willing to act irresponsibly, but I respect Maynor and Ellch for only discussing known, patched vulnerabilities. I won’t pretend there’s full consensus around disclosure; I’ve even covered it here, but a significant portion of the industry supports staying silent on vulnerabilities while working with the vendor to get a patch. The goal is to best protect users. Some vendors abuse this (to control image), as do some researchers (to gain attention), but Maynor and Ellch staying silent is very reasonable to many security experts. Remember- the demonstration was only a small part of their overall presentation and probably wouldn’t have ga ered nearly as much attention if it weren’t for Brian Krebs’ sensationalist headline. That article quickly spun events out of control and is at the root of most of the current coverage and criticism. Just confirming an exploit could hurt Maynor and Ellch: Two words: Mike Lynn. This is between Maynor, Ellch, SecureWorks, and any vendors (including Apple) they may or may not be working with. I like Daring Fireball, but SecureWorks has a history of responsible disclosure and working with affected vendors, and I see no reason for them to change that policy to satisfy the curiosity of bloggers, reporters, or any other outsider. John’s stakes are too low. He’s asking Maynor and Ellch to bet their careers against MacBooks? If John puts Daring Fireball up as his ante the bet might be fair. Besides, Maynor already has a MacBook. This challenge doesn’t help anyone. At all. Is my MacBook Pro vulnerable? I don’t know, but even if it is there’s not a damn thing I can do about it until Apple issues a patch. It’s not like I’m turning off my wireless until I hear there’s some

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