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SQL Server Security Advisory (961040)

‘The Microsoft Security Advisory (961040) for SQL Server was posted on the 22nd of December. Microsoft has done a commendable job and provided a lot of information on this page, with the cross reference of the CVE number (CVE-2008-4270) so you can find more details if you need it. Like any of the store procedures that provide remote code execution, they can be dangerous and are targets for hackers. You want to patch as soon as Microsoft releases a patch. Microsoft states that “… MSDE 2000 or SQL Server 2005 Express are at risk of remote attack if they have modified the default installation to accept remote connections, if they allow untrusted users access to MSDE 2000 or SQL Server 2005 Express …”. But I rate the risk higher than what they are saying because of the following: MSDE 2000 and SQL Server Express 2005 are often bundled/embedded into applications and so their presence is not immediately apparent. There may be copies around that most IT staff are not fully aware of, and/or these applications may be delivered with open permissions because the developer of the application was not concerned with these functions. Second, replication is an administrative function. sp_replwritetovarbin, along with other stored procedures like sp_resyncexecutesql and sp_resyncexecute functions run as DBO, or Database Owner, so if they are compromised they expose permissions as well as function. Finally, as MSDE 2000 and SQL Server Express 2005 get used by web developers who run the database on the same machine with the same OS/DBA credentials, you server could be completely compromised with this one. So follow their advice and run the command: “use master  deny execute on sp_replwritetovarbin to public” A couple more recommendations, assuming you are a DBA (which is a fair assumption if you are running the suggested workaround) check the master.dbo.sysprotects and master.dbo.sysobjects for public permissions in general. Even if you are patched for this specific vulnerability, or if you are running an unaffected version of the database, you should have this procedure locked down otherwise you remain vulnerable. Over and above patching the known servers, if you have a scanning and discovery tool, run a scan across your network for the default SQL Server port to see if there are other database engines. That should spotlight the majority of undocumented databases. Share:

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SQL Server Zero Day: Security Advisory (961040)

The Microsoft Security Advisory (961040) for SQL Server was posted on the 22nd of December. Microsoft has done a commendable job and provided a lot of information on this page, with the cross reference of the CVE number (CVE-2008-4270) so you can find more details if you need it. Like any of the store procedures that provide remote code execution, they can be dangerous and are targets for hackers. You want to patch as soon as Microsoft releases a patch. Microsoft states that “… MSDE 2000 or SQL Server 2005 Express are at risk of remote attack if they have modified the default installation to accept remote connections, if they allow untrusted users access to MSDE 2000 or SQL Server 2005 Express …”. But I rate the risk higher than what they are saying because of the following: MSDE 2000 and SQL Server Express 2005 are often bundled/embedded into applications and so their presence is not immediately apparent. There may be copies around that most IT staff are not fully aware of, and/or these applications may be delivered with open permissions because the developer of the application was not concerned with these functions. Second, replication is an administrative function. sp_replwritetovarbin, along with other stored procedures like sp_resyncexecutesql and sp_resyncexecute functions run as DBO, or Database Owner, so if they are compromised they expose permissions as well as function. Finally, as MSDE 2000 and SQL Server Express 2005 get used by web developers who run the database on the same machine with the same OS/DBA credentials, you server could be completely compromised with this one. So follow their advice and run the command: “use master deny execute on sp_replwritetovarbin to public” A couple more recommendations, assuming you are a DBA (which is a fair assumption if you are running the suggested workaround) check the master.dbo.sysprotects and master.dbo.sysobjects for public permissions in general. Even if you are patched for this specific vulnerability, or if you are running an unaffected version of the database, you should have this procedure locked down otherwise you remain vulnerable. Over and above patching the known servers, if you have a scanning and discovery tool, run a scan across your network for the default SQL Server port to see if there are other database engines. That should spotlight the majority of undocumented databases. Share:

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There Are No Trusted SItes: AMEX Edition

Remember our first post that there are no trusted sites? Followed by our second one? Now I suppose it’s time to start naming names in the post titles, since this seems to be a popular trend. American Express is our latest winner. From Dark Reading: Researchers have been reporting vulnerabilities on the Amex site since April, when the first of several cross-site scripting (XSS) flaws was reported. However, researcher Russell McRee caused a stir again just a week ago when he reported newly discovered XSS vulnerabilities on the Amex site. The vulnerability, which is caused by an input validation deficiency in a get request, can be exploited to harvest session cookies and inject iFrames, exposing Amex site users to a variety of attacks, including identity theft, researchers say. McRee was tipped off to the problem when the Amex site prompted him to shorten his password – an unusual request in today’s security environment, where strong passwords are usually encouraged. … McRee says American Express did not respond to his warnings about the vulnerability. However, in a report issued by The Register on Friday, at least two researchers said they found evidence that American Express had attempted to fix the flaw – and failed. “They did not address the problem,” says Joshua Abraham, a Web security consultant for Rapid7, a security research firm. “They addressed an instance of the problem. You want to look at the whole application and say, ‘Where could similar issues exist?’” No, we don’t intend on posting every one of these we hear about, but some of the bigger ones serve as nice reminders that there really isn’t any such thing as a “safe” website. Share:

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MIT Students Now Helping MBTA- Like They Always Should Have

Remember our guest post from Jesse Krembs on the MIT students put under a gag order during DefCon this year for hacking the rail system? And I quote: Please grow up; in the connected world there are very few ogres in caves any more, and they don’t let you ride their trains. The difference between black hats and white hats is a line, and it’s a gray one. But occasionally it gets a little contrast. When you treat the person or organization with a security problem like a victim or an enemy, then you’re the bad guy. You’re basically fucking them over, sometimes hard, sometimes gently, but it’s still a screw job. When you treat them like a partner, then everyone wins. Sure, sometimes they don’t want partners, and sometimes you have to go public because they put the rest of the world at risk, but you don’t know that until you try talking to them. Finally I should note that in the end the only people winning in this case are the lawyers; the kids won’t win in the way they want, nor will the MBTA. The lawyers, on the other hand, always get paid Looks like Superman just spun the Earth backwards and turned back time (sort of): The announcement brings to a close a high profile case that pitted the rights of security researchers to freely discuss their findings against the concerns of one of the country’s largest transit systems, which worried that this type of information could lead to widespread ticket fraud. “I’m really glad to have it behind me. I think this is really what should have happened from the start,” said Zack Anderson, one of the students sued by the MBTA. … The settlement ends the matter in an amicable way. “For professional reasons and for public interest reasons, the students wanted to help the MBTA,” said Jennifer Granick, a lawyer with the Electronic Frontier Foundation who represents the students. The case against the three was finally settled on Oct. 7, but this was not publicly announced until Monday, because it took two months for all parties to schedule a public announcement of the settlement, Granick said. The researchers met with MBTA technical staff on Oct. 21 to discuss their findings and are working to improve the transit authority’s fare collection system, she added. And all is good in the world again. Share:

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