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Symantec’s Identity Crisis

*Updated:** 8/25/2010 Storefront-Backtalk magazine had an interesting post on Too Much Encrypt = Cyberthief Gift. And when I say ‘interesting’, I mean the topics are interesting, but the author (Walter Conway) seems to have gotten most of the facts wrong in an attempt to hype the story. The basic scenario the author describes is correct: when you encrypt a very small range of numbers/values, it is possible to pre-compute (encrypt) all of those values, then match them against the encrypted values you see in the wild. The data may be encrypted, but you know the contents because the encrypted values match. The point the author is making is that if you encrypt the expiration date of a credit card, an attacker can easily guess the value. OK, but what’s the problem? The guys over at Voltage hit the basic point on the head: it does not compromise the system. The important point is that you cannot derive the key from this form of attack. Sure, you can you confirm the contents of the enciphered text. This is not really an attack on the encryption algorithm, nor the key, but poorly deployed cryptography. It’s one of the interesting aspects of encryption or hashing functions; if you make the smallest of changes to the input, you get a radically different output. If you add randomness (Updated: per Jay’s comments below, this was not clear; Initialization Vector or feedback modes for encryption) or even somewhat random “salting” (for hashing) we have an effective defense against rainbow tables, dictionary attacks, and pattern matching. In an ideal world we would do this. It’s possible some places don’t … in commodity hardware, for example. It did dawn on me that this sort of weakness lingers on in many Point of Sale terminals that sell on speed and price, not security. These (relatively) cheap appliances don’t usually implement the best security: they use the fastest rather than the strongest cryptography, they keep key lengths short, they don’t do a great job at gathering randomness, and generally skimp on the mechanical aspects of cryptography. They also are designed for speed, low cost, and generic deployments: salting or concatenation of PAN with the expiration date is not always an option, or significant adjustments to the outbound data stream would raise costs. But much of the article talks about data storage, or the back end, and not the POS system. The premise of “Encrypting all your data may actually make you more vulnerable to a data breach” is BS. It’s not an issue of encrypting too much, it’s in those rare cases where you encrypt in very small digestible fields. “Encrypting all cardholder data that not only causes additional work but may actually make you more vulnerable to a data breach” is total nonsense. If you encrypt all of the data, especially if you concatenate the data, the resulting ciphertext does not suffer from the described attack. Further, I don’t believe that “Most retailers and processors encrypt their entire cardholder database”, making them vulnerable. If they encrypt the entire database, they use transparent encryption, so the data blocks are encrypted as whole elements. The block contents are random so each has some degree of natural randomness going on because the database structure and pointers are present. And if they are using application layer or field level encryption, they usually salt alter the initialization vector. Or concatenate the entire record. And that’s not subject to a simple dictionary attack, and in no way produces a “Cyberthief Gift”. Share:

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Incite 5/19/2010: Benefits of Bribery

Don’t blink – you might miss it. No I’m not talking about my prowess in the bedroom, but the school year. It’s hard to believe, but Friday is the last day of school here in Atlanta. What the hell? It feels like a few weeks ago we put the twins’ name tags on, and put them on the bus for their first day of kindergarten. The end of school also means it’s summertime. Maybe not officially, but it’s starting to feel that way. I do love the summer. The kids do as well, and what’s not to love? Especially if you are my kids. There is the upcoming Disney trip, the week at the beach, the 5-6 weeks of assorted summer camp(s), and lots of fun activities with Mom. Yeah, they’ve got it rough. Yet we still face the challenge of keeping the kids grounded when they are faced with a life of relative abundance. Don’t get me wrong, I know how fortunate I am to be able to provide my kids with such rich experiences as they grow up. But XX1 got our goats over the weekend, when one of her friends got an iPod touch for her birthday. Of course, her reaction was “Why can’t I have an iPod touch, all my friends have them?” Thankfully the Boss was there, as I doubt I would have responded well to that line of questioning. She calmly told XX1 that with an attitude like that, she’ll be lucky if we don’t take away all her toys. And that she needs to be grateful for what she has, not focused on what she doesn’t. To be clear, not all of her friends have iPod touches. She is prone to exaggeration, like her Dad. What she doesn’t know is our plan to give her a hand-me down iPhone once we upgrade this summer. (Of course I’m upgrading, come on, now!) I think we need to tie it to some kind of achievement. Maybe if she works hard on her school exercises over the summer. Or is nice to her sister (yes, that is a problem). Or whatever kind of behavior we want to incent at any given time. There’s nothing like having a big anchor over her head to drag out every time she misbehaves. That’s right, it’s a bribe. I’m sure there are better ways than bribery to get the kids to do what we want. I’m just not sure what they are, and nothing we’ve tried seems to work like putting that old carrot out there and waiting for Pavlov to work his magic. – Mike. Photo credits: “Unplug for safety” originally uploaded by mag3737 Incite 4 U Where is the Blog Love? – I’m going to break the rules and link to one of my own posts. On Monday I called out the decline of blogging. Basically, people have either moved to Twitter or left the community discussion completely. Twitter is great, but it can’t replace a good blog war. In response, Andy the IT Guy, DanO, and LoverVamp jumped back on the scene. These are 3 sites I used to read every day (and still do, when they are updated) and maybe we can start rebuilding the community. Why is that important? Because blogs provide a more nuanced, permanent archive of knowledge with more reasoned debate than Twitter, however wonderful, can sustain. – RM Critical Infrastructure Condition Critical – We all take uninterrupted power for granted. Yet, we security folks understand how vulnerable the critical infrastructure is to cyber-attacks. Dark Reading has an interesting interview with with Joe Weiss, who has written a book about how screwed we are. A lot of the discussions sound very similar to every other industry that requires the regulatory fist of God to come crashing down before they fix anything. And NERC CIP is only a start, since it exempts the stuff that is really interesting, like networks and the actual control systems. Unfortunately it will take a massive outage caused by an attack to change anything. But we all know that because we’ve seen this movie before. – MR Desktop, The Way You Want It – I am a big fan of desktop virtualization, and I am surprised it has gotten such limited traction. I think people view it ass backwards. The label “dumb terminal” is in the back of people’s minds, and that not a progressive model. But desktop virtualization is much, much more than a refresh of the dumb terminal model. The ability to contain the work environment in a virtual server makes things a heck of a lot easier for IT, and benefits the employee, who can access a fully functional desktop from anywhere inside – and possibly outside – the company. Citrix giving each employee $2,100 to buy their own computer for work is a very smart idea. The benefits to Citrix are numerous. Every employee gets to pick the computer they want, for better or worse, and they are now invested in their choice, rather than considering a work laptop to be a disposable loaner. The work environment is kept safe in a virtual container, and employees still get fully mobile computing. Every user becomes a tester for the company’s desktop virtualization environment, bringing diverse environments under the microscope. And it shows how they can blend work and home environments, without compromising one for the other. This is a good move and makes sense for SMB and enterprise computing environments. – AL Security 5.0 – HTML5 is coming down the pipe, and Veracode has some great advice on what to keep an eye on from a security perspective. Not to show my age, but I remember hand-coding sites in HTML v1, and how exciting it was when things like JavaScript started appearing. Any time we have one of these major transitions we see security issues crop up, and as you start leveraging all the new goodness it never hurtss to start looking at security early in

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How to Survey Data Security Outcomes?

I received a ton of great responses to my initial post looking for survey input on what people want to see in a data security survey. The single biggest request is to research control effectiveness: which tools actually prevent incidents. Surveys are hard to build, and while I have been involved with a bunch of them, I am definitely not about to call myself an expert. There are people who spend their entire careers building surveys. As I sit here trying to put the question set together, I’m struggling for the best approach to assess outcome effectiveness, and figure it’s time to tap the wisdom of the crowd. To provide context, this is the direction I’m headed in the survey design. My goal is to have the core question set take about 10-15 minutes to answer, which limits what I can do a bit. Section 1: Demographics The basics, much of which will be anonymized when we release the raw data. Section 2: Technology and process usage I’ll build a multi-select grid to determine which technologies are being considered or used, and at what scale. I took a similar approach in the Project Quant for Patch Management survey, and it seemed to work well. I also want to capture a little of why someone implemented a technology or process. Rather than listing all the elements, here is the general structure: Technology/Process Not Considering Researching Evaluating Budgeted Selected Internal Testing Proof of Concept Initial Deployment Protecting Some Critical Assets Protecting Most Critical Assets Limited General Deployment General Deployment And to capture the primary driver behind the implementation: Technology/Process Directly Required for Compliance (but not an audit deficiency) Compliance Driven (but not required) To Address Audit Deficiency In Response to a Breach/Incident In Response to a Partner/Competitor Breach or Incident Internally Motivated (to improve security) Cost Savings Partner/Contractual Requirement I know I need to tune these better and add some descriptive text, but as you can see I’m trying to characterize not only what people have bought, but what they are actually using, as well as to what degree and why. Technology examples will include things like network DLP, Full Drive Encryption, Database Activity Monitoring, etc. Process examples will include network segregation, data classification, and content discovery (I will tweak the stages here, because ‘deployment’ isn’t the best term for a process). Section 3: Control effectiveness This is the tough one, where I need the most assistance and feedback (and I already appreciate those of you with whom I will be discussing this stuff directly). I’m inclined to structure this in a similar format, but instead of checkboxes use numerical input. My concern with numerical entry is that I think a lot of people won’t have the numbers available. I can also use a multiselect with None, Some, or Many, but I really hate that level of fuzziness and hope we can avoid it. Or I can do a combination, with both numerical and ranges as options. We’ll also need a time scale: per day, week, month, or year. Finally, one of the tougher areas is that we need to characterize the type of data, its sensitivity/importance, and the potential (or actual) severity of the incidents. This partially kills me, because there are fuzzy elements here I’m not entirely comfortable with, so I will try and constrain them as much as possible using definitions. I’ve been spinning some design options, and trying to capture all this information without taking a billion hours of each respondent’s time isn’t easy. I’m leaning towards breaking severity out into four separate meta-questions, and dropping the low end to focus only on “sensitive” information – which if lost could result in a breach disclosure or other material business harm. Major incidents with Personally Identifiable Information or regulated data (PII, credit cards, healthcare data, Social Security Numbers). A major incident is one that could result in a breach notification, material financial harm, or high reputation damage. In other words something that would trigger an incident response process, and involve executive management. Major incidents with Intellectual Property (IP). A major incident is one that could result in material financial harm due to loss of competitive advantage, public disclosure, contract violation, etc. Again, something that would trigger incident response, and involve executive management. Minor incidents with PII/regulated data. A minor incident would not result in a disclosure, fines, or other serious harm. Something managed within IT, security, and the business unit without executive involvement. Minor incidents with IP. Within each of these categories, we will build our table question to assess the number of incidents and false positive/negative rates: Technology Incidents Detected Incidents Blocked Incidents Mitigated (incident occurred but loss mitigated) Incidents Missed False Positive Detected Per Day Per Month Per Year N/A There are some other questions I want to work in, but these are the meat of the survey and I am far from convinced I have it structured well. Parts are fuzzier than I’d like, I don’t know how many organizations are mature enough to even address outcomes, and I have a nagging feeling I’m missing something important. So I could really use your feedback. I’ll fully credit everyone who helps, and you will all get the raw data to perform your own analyses. Share:

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