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Applied Network Security Analysis: The Breach Confirmation Use Case

As our last use case in Applied Network Security Analysis, it’s time to consider breach confirmation: confirming and investigating a breach that has already happened. There are clear similarities to the forensics use case, but breach confirmation takes forensic analysis to the next level: you need to learn the extent of the breach, determining exactly what was taken and from where. So let’s revisit our Forensics scenario to look at how that can be extended to confirm a breach. In that scenario, a friend at the FBI gave you a ring to let you know they found some of your organization’s private data during a cybercrime investigation. In the initial analysis you found the compromised devices and the attack paths, as part of isolating the attack and containing the damage. You cleaned the devices and configured IPS rules to ensure those particular attacks will be blocked in the future. You also added some rules to the network security analysis platform to ensure you are watching for those attack traffic patterns moving forward – just in case the attackers evade the IPS. But you still can’t answer the question: “What was stolen?” with any precision. We know the attackers compromised a device and used it to pivot within your environment to get to the target: a database of sensitive information. We can’t assume that was the only target, and if your attack was like any other involving a persistent attacker, they found multiple entry points and have a presence on multiple devices. So it’s time to head back into your analysis console to figure out a few more things. What other devices were impacted: Start by figuring out how many other machines were compromised by the perimeter device. By searching all traffic originating from the compromised DMZ server, you can see which devices were scanned and possibly owned. Then you can confirm using either the configuration data you’ve been collecting, or by analyzing the machine using an endpoint forensics tool. You may already have some or all of this information already when trying to isolate the attack path. What was taken: Next you need to figure out what was taken. You already know at least one egress path, identified during the initial forensic analysis. Now you need to dig deeper into the egress captures to see if there were any other connections or file transfers to unauthorized sites. The attackers continue to improve their exfiltration techniques, so it’s likely they’ll use both encrypted protocols and encrypted files to make it hard to figure out what was actually stolen. Having the full packet stream allows you to analyze the actual files, though depending on the sophistication of your attacker, you might need specialized help (from third party experts or law enforcement) to break the crypto. Remember that the first wave of forensic investigation focuses on determining the attack paths and gathering enough information to do an initial damage assessment and remediation. From there it’s all about containing the immediate damage as best you can. This next level of forensic analysis is more comprehensive: determine the true extent of the compromise and inventory what was taken. As you can imagine, without having the network packet capture it’s impossible to do this analysis. You would be stuck with log files telling you what happened, but not what, how, or how much was taken. That’s why we keep harping on the need for more comprehensive data on which to base network security analysis. Clearly you can’t capture all the data flowing around your networks, so it’s likely you’ll miss something. But you will have a lot more useful information for responding to attacks than organizations which do not capture traffic. Summary To wrap up our Applied Network Security Analysis series let’s revisit some of the key concepts we’ve covered. First of all, in today’s environment, you can’t assume you will be able to stop a targeted attacker. It is much smarter and more realistic to assume your devices are compromised, and to act accordingly. This assumption puts a premium on detecting successful attacks, preventing breaches, and containing damage. All those functions require data collection to be able to understand what is happening in your environment. Log Data Is Not Enough: Most organizations start by collecting their logs, which is clearly necessary for compliance purposes. But it’s not sufficient – not by a long shot. Additional data – including configuration, network flow, and even the full network packet stream, is key to understanding what is happening in your environment. Forensics: We walked through how these additional data sources can be instrumental in a forensic investigation, ultimately resulting in a breach confirmation (or not). The key objective of forensics is to figure out what happened, and the ability to replay attacks and monitor egress points (using the actual traffic) replaces forensic interpretation with tested fact. And forensics folks like facts much better. Security: These additional data sources are not just useful after an attack has happened, but also to recognize issues earlier. By analyzing the traffic in your perimeter and critical network segments, you can spot anomalous behavior and investigate preemptively. To be fair, the security use cases are predicated on knowledge of what to look for, which is never perfect. But in light of the number of less sophisticated attackers using known attacks, making sure you don’t get hit by the same attack twice is very useful. We all know there are always more projects than your finite resources and funding will allow. So why is network security analysis something that should bubble up to the top of your list? The answer is about what we don’t know – we cannot be sure what the attack will be in the future, but we know it will be hard to detect, and it will steal critical information. We built the Securosis security philosophy on Reacting Faster and Better, by focusing on gathering as much data as possible, which requires an institutional commitment to data collection and analysis.

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A Public Call for eWallet Design Standards

Last week StorefrontBacktalk ran an article on Mobile Wallets. It underscored my personal naivete in assuming that anyone who designed and built a digital wallet for ecommerce would first and foremost protect customer payment data and other private information. Reading this post I had one of those genuine “Oh $&!#” moments – what if the wallet provider was not interested in my security or privacy? Duh! A wallet is a small data store for your financial, personal, and shopping information. Think about that for a minute. If you buy stuff on your computer or from your phone via an eWallet app, over time it will collect a ton of information. Transaction receipts. Merchant lists. Merchant relationship information such as passwords. Buying history. Digital coupons. Pricing information. Favorites and wish lists. Private keys. This is all in addition to “payment instruments” such as credit cards, PayPal accounts, and bank account information. Along with personal data including phone number, address, and (possibly) Social Security Number for antitheft/identity verification. It’s everything about you and your buying history all in one spot – effectively a personal data warehouse, on you. And it’s critical that you control your own data. This is a really big deal! To underscore why, let me provide a similar example from an everyday security product. For those of you in security, wallets are effectively personal equivalents to key management servers and Hardware Security Modules (HSMs). Key management vendors do not have full access to their customers’ encryption keys. You do not and would not give them a backdoor to the keys that secure your entire IT infrastructure. The whole point of an HSM is to secure the data from everyone who is not authorized to use it. And only the customer who owns the HSM gets to decide who gets keys. For those of you not in security, think of the eWallet as a combination wallet and keychain. It’s how you gain access to your home, your car, your mailbox, your office, and possibly your neighbors’ houses for when you catsit. And it holds your cash (technically more like a blank checkbook, along with your electronic signature), credit cards, debit card, pictures of your kids, and that Post-It with your passwords. You don’t hand this stuff out to third parties! Heck, when your kid wants to borrow the car, you only give them one key and forty bucks for gas – they don’t get everything! But the eWallet systems described in that article don’t belong to you – they are the property of third parties, who would naturally want the ability to rummage through them for useful (marketing and sales) data – what you might consider your data. Human history clearly shows that if someone can abuse your trust for financial gain, they will. Seriously, people – don’t give your wallet to strangers. Let’s throw a couple design principles out there for people who are building these apps: If the wallet does not secure all the user’s content – not just credit card data – it’s insecure and the design is a failure. If the wallet’s author does not architect and implement controls for the user to select what they wish to share with third parties, they have failed. If the wallet does not programatically protect one ‘pocket’, or compartment inside the wallet, from other compartments, it is untrustworthy (as is its creator). If the wallet has a vendor backdoor, it has failed. If the wallet does not use secure and publicly validated communications protocols, it has failed. Wallet designers need to consider the HSM / key management security model. It must protect user data from all outsiders first and foremost. If sharing data/coupons/trends/transaction receipts, easy shopping, “loyalty points”, providing location data, or any other objective supersedes security: the wallet needs to be scrapped and re-engineered. Security models like iOS compartmentalization could be adapted, but any intra-wallet communication must be tightly controlled – likely forcing third parties to perform various actions outside the wallet, if the wallet cannot enable them with sufficient security and privacy. I’ll follow up with consider the critical components of a wallet, as a general design framework; things like payment protocols, communications protocols, logging, authentication, and digital receipts should all be standardized. But more important: the roles of buyer, seller, and any mediators should be defined publicly. Just because some giant company creates an eWallet does not mean you should trust it. Share:

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