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DDoS Attack Overblown

Sam Biddle at Gizmodo says: This guy, Prince said, could back up CloudFlare’s claims. This really was Web Dresden, or something. After an inquiry, I was ready to face vindication. Instead, I received this note from a spokesperson for NTT, one of the backbone operators of the Internet: “Hey Sam, nice to hear from you. I’m afraid that we don’t have anything we can share that substantiates global effects. I’m sure you read the same 300gbps figure that I did, and while that’s a massive amount of bandwidth to a single enterprise or service provider, data on global capacities from sources like TeleGeography show lit capacities in the tbps range in most all regions of the world. I side with you questioning if it shook the global internet. Chris” Bad for SpamHaus, but unnoticeable to everyone else. Share:

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Estimating Breach Impact

Russell Thomas and a bunch of his friends recently posted a research paper called How Bad Is It? – A Branching Activity Model to Estimate the Impact of Information Security Breaches, which attempts to provide a structure for estimating the impact of a breach. This work is necessary – we have no benchmarks, or even consensus, about what breached organizations should even be counting. This is an academic research paper, and to be honest I am not a big fan of academic papers. I have pretty bad TL;DR syndrome. But I did check out the introduction, and noted some interesting tidbits. Empirical research on breach losses often use ad hoc taxonomies for “quantified” and “non-quantified” costs as part of surveys or interviews of subject matter experts. There is no theoretical basis for these taxonomies, which limits their generality and research significance. Finally, several consulting firms publish survey-based studies. Most notable is the “Cost of a Data Breach” reports by Ponemon Institute (Ponemon Institute 2012). These survey results are widely publicized and widely quoted, even in policy discussions, but they have no foundation in theoretical or empirical academic research, and they have very serious methodological flaws (Thomas 2011a) In summary, without some reliable and robust breach impact estimation methods, quantified information security will continue to be a “weak hypothesis” (Verendel 2009). This is true. It warms my cockles (can I say that out loud?) that these guys are calling out survey monkeys like Ponemon because the industry seems set on using those numbers to justify what we do. But I have to say I’m a little disappointed by Russell’s attempt to jump on the indicators of compromise bandwagon in his New School blog post on the paper. He unnecessarily concocts a meaningless description of this breach impact estimation model by mentioning Indicators of Impact. Huh? Total non-sequitur, though I do understand the desire to capitalize on the popularity and momentum of the phrase Indicators of XXX. But let’s call this what it is. An attempt to build an academically rigorous model to estimate the cost of a breach, based upon factors that can be reasonably estimated and quantified. It would be nice to see this kind of stuff added to GRC platforms and the like, to enable us to track and estimate these costs. Ultimately I believe that as we mature as a profession we will need this kind of research to help define a common vernacular for estimating loss. Photo credit: “Impact Hoodie Design for 2006” originally uploaded by Will Foster Share:

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Defending Cloud Data: How IaaS Storage Works

Infrastructure as a Service storage can be insanely complex when you include operational and performance requirements. First you need to create a resource pool, which might itself be a pool of virtualized and abstracted storage, and then you need to tie it all together with orchestration to support the dynamic requirements of the cloud – such as moving running virtual machines between servers, instantly snapshotting multi-terabyte virtual drives, and other insanity. For security we don’t need to know all the ins and outs of cloud storage, but we do need to understand the high-level architecture and how it affects our security controls. And keep in mind that the implementations of our generic architecture vary widely between different public and private cloud platforms. Public clouds are roughly equivalent to provider-class private clouds, except that they are designed to support multiple external tenants. We will focus on private cloud storage, with the understanding that public clouds are about the same except that customers have less control. IaaS Storage Overview Here’s a diagram to work through: At the lowest level is physical storage. This can be nearly anything that satisfies the cloud’s performance and storage requirements. It might be commodity hard drives in commodity rack servers. It could be high-performance SSD drives in high-end specialized datacenter servers. But really it could be nearly any storage appliance/system you can think of. Some physical storage is generally pooled by a virtual storage controller, like a SAN. This is extremely common in production clouds but isn’t limited to traditional SAN. Basically, as long as you can connect it to the cloud storage manager, you can use it. You could even dedicate certain LUNs from a larger shared SAN to cloud, while using other LUNs for non-cloud applications. If you aren’t a storage person just remember there might be some sort of controller/server above the hard drives, outside your cloud servers, that needs to be secured. That’s the base storage. On top of that we then build out: Object Storage Object storage controllers (also called managers) connect to assigned physical or virtual storage and manage orchestration and connectivity. Above this level they communicate using APIs. Some deployments include object storage connectivity software running on distributed commodity servers to tie the servers’ hard drives into the storage pool. Object storage controllers create virtual containers (also called buckets) which are assigned to cloud users. A container is a pool of storage in which you can place objects (files). Every container stores each bit in multiple locations. This is called data dispersion, and we will talk more about it in a moment. Object storage is something of a cross between a database and a file share. You move files into and out of it; but instead of being managed by a file system you manage it with APIs, at an abstracted layer above whatever file systems actually store the data. Object storage is accessed via APIs (almost always RESTful HTTP APIs) rather than classic network file protocols, which offers tremendous flexibility for integration into different applications and services. Object storage includes logic below the user-accessible layer for features such as quotas, access control, and redundancy management. Volume Storage Volume storage controllers (also called managers) connect to assigned physical (or virtual) storage and manage orchestration and connectivity. Above this level they communicate using APIs. The volume controller creates volumes on request and assigns them to specific cloud instances. To use traditional virtualization language, it creates a virtual hard drive and connects it to a virtual machine. Data dispersion is often used to provide redundancy and robustness. A volume is essentially a persistent virtual hard drive. It can be of any size supported by the cloud platform and underlying resources, and a volume assigned to a virtual machine exists until it is destroyed (note that tearing down an instance often automatically also returns the associated volume storage back to the free storage pool). Physical servers run hypervisors and cloud connectivity software to tie them into the compute resource pool. This is where instances (virtual machines) run. These servers typically have local hard drives which can be assigned to the volume controller to expand the storage pool, or used locally for non-persistent storage. We call this ‘ephemeral’ storage, and it’s great for swap files and other higher-performance operations that don’t require the resiliency of a full storage volume. If your cloud uses this model, the cloud management software places swap on these local drives. When you move or shut down your instance this data is always lost, although it might be recoverable until overwritten. We like to discuss volumes as if they were virtual hard drives, but they are a bit more complex. Volumes may be distributed and data dispersed across multiple physical drives. There are also implications which we will consider later for considering volumes in the context of your cloud, and how they interact with object storage and things like snapshots and live migrations. How object and volume storage interact Most clouds include both object and volume storage, even if object storage isn’t available directly to users. Here are the key examples: A snapshot is a near-instant backup of a volume that is moved into object storage. The underlying technology varies widely and is too complex for my feeble analyst brain, but a snapshot effectively copies a complete set of the storage blocks in your volume, into a file stored in an object container which has been assigned to snapshots. Since every block in your volume is likely stored in multiple physical locations, typically 3 or more times, taking a snapshot tells the volume controller to copy a complete set of blocks over to object storage. The operation can take a while but it looks instantaneous because the snapshot accurately reflects the state of the volume at that point in time, while the volume is stil fully usable – running on another set of blocks while the snapshot is moved over (this is a (major oversimplification of something that makes my head hurt). Images are pre-defined storage volumes in object storage, which contain operating systems or other virtual hard drives used to launch instances. An

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