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Security Analytics with Big Data [New Series]

Big Data is being touted as a ‘transformative’ technology for security event analysis – promised to detect threats in the ever-increasing volume of event data generated from in-house, mobile, and cloud-based services. But a combination of PR hype, vendor positioning, and customer questions has pushed it to the top of my research agenda. Many customers are asking “Wait, don’t I already have SIEM for event analysis?” Yes, you do. And SIEM is designed and built solve the same problems – but 7-8 years ago – and it is failing to keep up with current problems. It’s not just that we’re trying to scale up to a much larger set of data, but we also need to react to events an order of magnitude faster than before. Still more troubling is that we are collecting multiple types of data, each requiring new and different analysis techniques to detect advanced attacks. Oh, and while all that slows down SIEM and log management systems, you are under the gun to identify attacks faster than before. This trifecta of issues limit the usefulness of SIEM and Log Management – and makes customers cranky. Many SIEM platforms can’t scale to the quantity of data they need to manage. Some are incapable of even storing basic data as fast as it comes in – forget about storing and analyzing non-standard data types. ‘Real-time’ analysis is a commonly cited as SIEM feature but after collection, storage, normalization, correlation, and enrichment, you are lucky to access new events within an hour – much less within a minute. The good news is that big data, correctly deployed, can solve these issues. In this paper we will examine how big data addresses scalability and performance, improves analysis, can accommodate multiple data types, and will be leveraged with existing environments. Or goal is to help users differentiate reality from wishful thinking, and to provide enough information to make informed purchasing decisions. To do this we need to demystify big data and contrast how it differs from traditional data management systems. We will offer a clear and unique definition of big data and explain how it helps overcome current technical limitations. We will offer a pragmatic way for customers to leverage big data, enabling them to select a solution strategically. We will highlight the limitations of SIEM and Log Management, key areas of customer dissatisfaction, areas where big data excels in comparison. We will also discuss some changes required for big data analysis and data management, as well as a change in mindset necessary to take full advantage. This is not all theory and speculation – big data is currently being employed to detect security threats, address new requirements for IT security, and even help gauge the effectiveness of other security investments. Big data natively addresses ever-increasing event volume and the rate at which we need to examine new events. There is no question that it holds promise for security intelligence, both in the numerous ways it can parse information and through its native capabilities to sift proverbial needles from monstrous haystacks. Cloud and mobile architectures force us to reexamine how we manage security data, and to scale across broader sets of systems and events – neither of which mesh with the structured data repositories on which most organizations rely. But most IT and security practitioners do not yet fully understand big data or how to employ it so they are unable to weed through all the hype, FUD, and hyperbole. To take full advantage, however, requires both a deeper understanding of the technology and a subtle shift in mindset to enable informed decisions on incorporate big data into existing IT systems, perhaps by shifting to newer big data platforms. This research paper will highlight several areas: Use Cases: We will discuss issues customers cite with performance and scalability, particularly for security event analysis. We will discuss in detail how SIEM, Log Management, and event-centric systems struggle under new requirements for data velocity and data management, and why existing technologies aren’t cutting it. We will also discuss the inflexibility of pre-BD analysis, alerting, and reporting – and how they demand a new approach to security and forensics, as we struggle to keep pace with the evolution of IT. New Events and Approaches: This post will explain why we need to consider additional data types that go beyond events. Existing technologies struggle to meet emerging needs because threat data does not conform to traditional syslog and netflow event types. There is a clear trend toward broader data analysis to detect advanced attacks and better understand risks. What is Big Data and how does it work? This post will offer a basic definition of big data, along with a discussion of the native capabilities that make big data different than traditional analysis tools. We will discuss how features like HDFS, MapReduce, Hive, and Pig work together to address issues of scale, velocity, performance, and multiple data types. The promise of big data: We will explain why big data is viewed as a disruptive technology for security analytics. We will show how big data solutions mitigate problems and change security and event analysis. We will discuss how big data platforms handle collecting and parsing event data, and cover different queries and reports that support new threat analyses. How big data changes security platforms: This post will discuss how to supplement existing systems – through standalone instances, partial integration of big data with existing systems, systems that natively leverage big data infrastructure, or fully integrated systems that run atop NoSQL structures. We will also discuss operational changes to SIEM usage, including the growing importance of data scientists to security. Integration roadmap and planning: In this section we will address the common concerns, limitations, and realities of merging big data into your IT systems. Specifically, we will discuss: Integration and deployment issues Platform selection (diversity of platforms and data) Policy and report development Data privacy and sharing Big data platform security basics Our next post will cover use cases, the key areas where SIEM needs to improve,

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The CISO’s Guide to Advanced Attackers: Mining for Indicators

The key to dealing with advanced attackers is not closing off every window of vulnerability. As we have discussed throughout this series, advanced attackers will figure out a way to gain a foothold in your environment. Actually they will find multiple ways into your environment. So if you hope for any semblance of success, your goal cannot be to stop them – instead you need to work on shorteneing the window between compromise and detection. We have called that Reacting Faster and Better for years. 5 years to be exact, but who’s counting? The general concept is that you want to monitor your environment, gathering key security information that can either identify typical attack patterns as they are happening (yes, a SIEM-like capability), or more likely searching for indicators identified via intelligence activities. Collecting All the Security Data We say “all the security data” a bit tongue-in-cheek, but not too much. We have been saying Monitor Everything almost as long as we have been talking about Reacting Faster, because if you fail to collect data you won’t have an opportunity to get it later. Unfortunately most organizations don’t realize their security data collection leaves huge gaps until the high-priced forensics folks let you know they can’t truly isolate the attack, or the perpetrator, or the malware, or much of anything, because you just don’t have the data. Most folks only need to learn that lesson once. So the first order of business is to lay down a collection infrastructure to store all your security data. The good news is that you have likely been collecting security data for quite some time, and your existing investment and infrastructure should be directly useful for dealing with advanced attackers. This means existing log management system may be useful after all. But perhaps not – you might have tools that aren’t at all suited to helping you find advanced attackers in your midst. One step at a time – now let’s delve into the data you need to collect. Network Security Devices: Your firewalls and IPS devices generate huge logs of what’s blocked, what’s not, and which rules are effective. You will receive intelligence that typically involves port/protocol/destination combinations or application identifiers for next-generation firewalls, which can identify potential attack traffic. Configuration Data: One key area to mine for indicators is the configuration data from your devices. It enables you to look for very specific files and/or configurations that have been identified as indicators of compromise. Identity: Similarly information about logins, authentication failures, and other identity-related data is useful for matching against attack profiles from third-party threat intelligence providers. NetFlow: This is another data type commonly used in SIEM environments; it provides information on protocols, sources, and destinations for network traffic as it traverses devices. NetFlow records are similar to firewall logs but far smaller, making them more useful for high-speed networks. Flows can identify lateral movement by attackers, as well as large exfiltration file transfers. Network Packet Capture: The next frontier for security data collection is actually to capture all network traffic on key segments. Forensics folks have been doing this for years during investigations, but proactive continuous full packet capture – for the inevitable incident responses which haven’t even started yet – is still an early market. For more detail on how full packet capture impacts security operations check out our Network Security Analytics research. Application/Database Logs: Application and database logs are generally less relevant, unless they come from standard applications or components likely to be specifically targeted by attackers. But you might be able to discover unusual application and/or database transactions – which might represent bulk data removal, injection attempts, or efforts to attack your critical data. Vulnerability Scans: This is another information source with limited value, detailing which devices are vulnerable to specific attacks. They help eliminate devices from your search criteria to streamline search activities. Of course this isn’t an exhaustive list, and you are likely already capturing much of this data. That’s a good thing, but capturing and analyzing data within the context of a compliance audit is fundamentally different than trying to detect advanced attacker activity. We are sticking to the CISO view for this series so we won’t dig into the technical nuances of the collection infrastructure. But they must be built on a strong analytical foundation which provides a threat-centric view of the world rather than one a focused on compliance reporting. More advanced organizations may already have a Security Operations Center (SOC) leveraging a SIEM platform for more security-oriented correlation and forensics to pinpoint and investigate attacks. That’s a start, but you will likely require some kind of Big Data thing, which should be clear after we discuss what we need this detection platform to do. Attack Patterns FTW As much as we have talked about the futility of blocking every advanced attack, that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t learn from both the past and the misfortune of others. We spent a time early in this process on sizing up the adversary for some insight into what is likely to be attacked, and perhaps even how. That enables you to look for those attack patterns within your security data – the promise of SIEM technology for years. The ultimate disconnect with SIEM was the hard truth that you needed to know what you were looking for. Far too many vendors forgot to mention that little requirement when selling you a bill of goods. Perhaps they expected attackers to post their plans on Facebook or something? But once you do the work to model the likely attacks on your key information, and then enumerate those attack patterns in your tool, you can get tremendous value. Just don’t expect it to be fully automated. The best case is that you receive an alert about a very likely attack because it’s something you were looking for. But the quickest way to get killed is to plan for the best case. So we also need to ensure we are ready for the worst case. That is advanced attackers using attacks you haven’t seen before, in ways you don’t expect. That’s when

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