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Attacking The Law With Photing

As a security pro I tend to be a bit paranoid and cynical even outside the domain of technology. Heck, I can’t even get past a nice simple election without picking up on some interesting fraudulent twist. Last night my wife and I were filling out our absentee ballots; never an easy process here in Arizona. Oh, picking candidates is easy enough (Obama for me), but as far as I’m concerned all those ballot initiatives are one of the biggest frauds in our democratic system. I can’t even call it voting, so like any good security researcher I’ll make up a silly word and call it “photing”. Last election cycle we had two competing ballot measures to ban smoking- the real one, put together by a grass roots organization, and the fake one, which pretended to limit smoking but was sponsored by Philip Morris. The goal was simply to confuse the voters, perhaps passing both, and getting to fight it out in the courts. This year we have the worst case of photing I’ve seen since I cast my first ballot at the age of 18. Arizona is home to a ton of migrant labor, and in Phoenix you can’t go a block in certain parts of town without seeing those predatory PayDay loan outfits. A while back, the legislature temporarily suspended the law limiting usury short-term loans, creating this industry. People short on cash can get loans at ridiculous rates (up to 400%) to hold them over until their next paycheck… which clearly won’t go as far. This suspension is due to die in 2010, and the state legislature refuses to extend it. What’s an evil loan shark to do? I mean it isn’t like the voting public would support them? Thus was born Proposition 200 to “crack down on the PayDay loan industry”. There’s even a massive full-court-press ad campaign about how this will lock them down, keep them honest, and protect innocent kittens. One problem- the initiative, and the ad campaign to control these near-criminals, is nearly completely funded… by these even-nearer-criminals. Why? Because without this initiative, the entire industry will be shut down in 2010. Where are Joe Kennedy and Karl Rove when you need them? Share:

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The Five Stages Of Cloud Computing Grief

Denial: There is no cloud. Anger: Why the f&*k is this sales guy trying to sell me a cloud? Bargaining: Can you please just tell me what the f&^k your cloud is? Depression: The sales guy found my CIO. Now I have to by a cloud. Acceptance: There is no cloud. Share:

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The “Good Enough/Woe Is Me” Dissociation Postulate

I don’t get it. I mean I really don’t get it. I can’t possibly imagine why it isn’t so obvious to everyone else!! Don’t you see what’s happening!!! Soylent Green is QSAs!!! One of the more frustrating aspects of our profession is the apparent lack of security prioritization by the rest of the world. We feel like we see things they don’t, and in that context many of their decisions make absolutely no sense. Are we just that much smarter than everyone else? Are they blindfully ignorant? Alan sums up our problem in his post on security gimmicks: Agree or disagree with the gimmicks. You have to ask yourself why. With all that we read and see about data breaches, with all of these compliance regulations and rules around, why can’t people take security seriously enough? Here is one man’s opinion. Security is a bad news generator of an industry. We focus on what happens when things go wrong. We focus on adding to the process. We don’t focus on the positive and the profitable. There is enough bad news in the world for people to focus on right now. They don’t want the bad news that security makes them confront. If we can figure out how to make security a way of bringing a message of good news, we wouldn’t need to resort to gimmicks. My position is a little more zen. Back in physical security/paramedic/firefighter/mountain rescue days I learned we all go through a process of dissociation with mainstream society. When all you see is nasty sh*t and dying people all day, every day, it’s hard to give a rat’s ass about someone getting the cold shoulder at the water cooler. The military, police, nurses, and many other professions suffer the same problem. In that world, there are two ways to handle it- shut up and deal, or isolate yourself into your chosen community. It’s no accident that so many cops are married to nurses. It’s pretty much the same deal for IT security, except we don’t have to wash blood off our shoes quite as often. We see the fragility and danger of our online economy and society. Stolen elections, rampant fraud, and pwned grandmothers. No website is safe, all PCs have trojans, and those damn Macs will all be compromised next week. We need to collectively chill out. Before we blow an aneurysm. As Marcus Ranum said (totally pissing me off because I didn’t say it first): Will the future be more secure? It’ll be just as insecure as it possibly can, while still continuing to function. Just like it is today. We need to do our best to communicate risks to the business and cost effectively keep those risks within tolerance. Then we clean up the mess if the business, after being well informed, decides to accept that risk. If we don’t take risks, we can’t possibly grow. No matter what someone tells us, we sometimes need to touch the hot stove and learn for ourselves. It’s human nature; don’t expect it to change. Security is only good news when it’s no news. Don’t worry. When things get bad enough, we’ll get the call. If you’ve kept your documentation and communication up, you won’t get shafted with the proverbial short end. Don’t end up like I did in college- working as a full time medic on top of being a student wasn’t exactly conducive to my dating life. That uniform didn’t work nearly as well as I expected. (However, a black belt a few years later was very… effective). Share:

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Network Security Podcast, Episode 125

The Skype gods definitely worked against us last night as David Mortman from Debix joined us to to talk about a new study the released on identity theft and children. No, you’re 8 month old is stealing identities like I suspect that creepy kid from the ETrade commercials is, but due to both error and fraud a surprising number of children have financial histories they didn’t know about. We also discuss last week’s Microsoft emergency update, Bono frolicking on MySpace, and the usual TSA foibles. We had some audio issues today so we kept the podcast short to spare your ears as much as possible. The Network Security Podcast, Episode 125 Show Notes: Debix sponsored research into the problem of children and identity theft. They are also hosting a webcast with the FBI on Wednesday, October 29th, at 3pm CDT. Microsoft released an out of cycle patch for a critical vulnerability. Bono showed up on some girl’s MySpace page. Oops. At least he wasn’t driving drunk without underwear and with an infant in his lap, like the usual MySpace divas. Tonight’s music is courtesy of George Thorogood and the Destroyers. Share:

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Minor Online Banking FAIL?

  I was amused today when I logged into my business account bank (Wells Fargo) and they had me set up a new set of security questions. The variety wasn’t bad and the questions were reasonably original. After setting them, I was asked to confirm my contact information. A few minutes later, I received this email: Thank you for taking the time to set up your security questions. If we ever need to confirm your identity, your ability to give the correct answers to these questions will help us verify it’s you. If you did NOT set up security questions recently, please call Wells Fargo Online Customer Service immediately at 1-800-956-4442. Please do not reply to this email. It went right to the email address I could have updated after setting up the security questions. Anyone else notice the problem? Now there’s a chance that had I changed the email address on that screen after the security questions, I would have received notification at the old address. As a test, I changed my email a couple of times using the regular interface- but no notifications yet. UPDATE: Got the email, but at the wrong account (the one I changed to, not from). Is this an exploitable security flaw? Nope, but it’s amusing for us paranoid/cynical types. (For the record, they’ve been a great bank for the business, no complaints at all.) Share:

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A Simple Question The TSA Seems To Refuse To Answer

I just read over at Computerworld that the TSA will start requiring gender and date of birth when we buy plane tickets. This is part of Secure Flight, and meant to increase the accuracy of matches to the terrorist watch list(s). As brought up by Bruce and many others over the years, the TSA has yet to identify a single case where this list… umm… you know… actually caught a terrorist. Yes, they’ve snagged some people with warrants, but this is supposedly the terrorist watch list, not the random dumb-ass criminal watch list. They’ve even been questioned about it in their blog comments multiple times, and have yet to answer. Thus, I think we all know the answer. (A special request to the TSA- when you add the colonoscopies, can we get copies to give to our physicians? I’m almost 40 and that would be a cool way to save on health care costs). Note: I don’t blame the people working hard at the checkpoints (other than the few bad eggs common in all workplaces). They are in a crappy position and we shouldn’t blame them for the idiocy of their superiors. Share:

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Friday Update: It’s 0day Week!

Holy 0day Batman! What started as a quiet week definitely got a little more interesting yesterday as Microsoft released an out-of-band patch for a critical vulnerability affecting most versions of Windows. It’s been a while since MS had to push out an emergency fix like this, and boy was it a whacky vulnerability. For those of you who haven’t kept up on it, it is a flaw in the RPC service that allows remote code execution without authentication. What’s really interesting is that this flaw is in a part of the code base that was patched already for a very similar problem. What’s even more interesting is that this was discovered due to active exploits in the wild. I’ve been known to be a little persnickety about definitions, and I’ve never liked that we call all unpatched vulnerabilities zero-days. In my book, a true 0day is a vulnerability that is being actively exploited but we don’t know about it. The bad guys have information we don’t and are using it against us. When the details are public, but no patch is available, I just consider that an unpatched vulnerability. But who am I to say- I still consider hackers good guys. On a totally different note, I think I found a minor security flaw in the RSA Conference session submission system. It appears that if you submit a session and add a speaker, you can overwrite some of the attributes of that speaker if they are already in the system. Minor, but annoying since I was submitted for something like 10 sessions and part of my bio kept changing while I was submitting my own stuff. On that note, it’s time to head off and start decorating for our annual Evilsquirrel Halloween Party. We have about 13 tubs of decorations we’ve collected since my old roommates and I started holding parties around 1995 or so. I even have homemade animatronics I built using microcontrollers and other geeky stuff. Yeah, I fear for my impending children too, but the neighborhood kids love us. At least the ones who don’t pee themselves when the motion sensor kicks off. Webcasts, Podcasts, and Conferences: The Network Security Podcast, Episode 124. Jacob West from Fortify joined us to rail against electronic voting. If Dick Cheney wins the election, we’ll all know why. I participated in a virtual conference put on by InformationWeek and Dark Reading. I was on Ten Security Threats Your Organization May Be Unable to Prevent, with H D Moore of Metasploit and BreakingPoint and Trey Ford of WhiteHat Security. I felt a little weird talking about XSS and SQL Injection with H D following me, but it was a pretty good panel. Favorite Securosis Posts: Rich: Your Simple Guide to Endpoint Encryption. I’ve been writing a lot about market issues lately, and I really enjoy it when I can give out practical advice. Adrian: WAF vs. Secure Code vs. Dead Fish. Look folks, we’re far too polarized politically in this country to fight out over which of these things solves our problem better, when both are equally good and bad. Favorite Outside Posts: Adrian: Rsnake captures the everyman experience and puts the fun back into Internet browsing. I mean, can’t we all just get along? Rich: Andy reminds us what it’s like to work in the real world. Researchers, analysts, and vendors often forget what it’s like to be in the trenches, even though most of us have been there. I think it’s refreshing to read about Andy’s pain. Er… maybe that wasn’t the best way to say that. Top News: Microsoft Security Patch was released this week. We covered it a bit ourselves. Princeton posts a guide to hacking Sequoia voting machines. Jimmy Buffett for President! FTW! Australian government massively censoring the Internet. I love that country and have spent a lot of time down there, but the government is really whacky. Did you know that hard core pornography is illegal everywhere except the Australian Capital Territory (you know, where all the politicians are). Guess writing censorship bills is boring work. Voting machines flipping votes. Notice a trend? (Thanks to Dave at Liquidmatrix, who does a great daily summary). Blog Comment of the Week: Windexh8er’s comment on the Microsoft vulnerability post: So even though this sort of thing is less common as SDLs mature further (honestly Microsoft is doing a much better job in this space — but legacy code that’s in the OS is still there). This just goes back to the position wherein do corporations really need client side processing? Some may have valid reasoning (i.e. graphics / architecture / modeling / etc), but for the majority of the end users out there in corporate America they really don’t need a fully functional end system. In a Microsoft environment I’d like to see the next iteration of OS go to stripped down systems like you can leverage in Server2k8 – obviously most “work” today from a variety of different locations and the laptop has overwhelmingly displaced the standard desktop workstation for day to day business. With that respect the standard installation should be minimalistic at best. Stripped stack, host based filtering (in and out), no user rights with the exception of approved applications and then strictly managed socket / protocol connections to approved devices. Give them what they need through established connections. At that rate client processing goes way down and visibility and control sky rockets. It’s far too much for any given internal IT / IS departments to manage numerous deployed apps and multiple desktop configurations in the state business as usual is running today. Everyone I know has a corporate laptop (these are big businesses right) but all of these users can pretty much all connect to outside networks and do casual computing – even if it’s restricted, it’s still wide open enough to let the user infect themselves unknowingly. I’d love to do a formal PoC, like this, with one of my large clients. Cost savings

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Microsoft Critical Update Today- **Updated- Details Released**

If you don’t already know, Microsoft is releasing an out of band critical update today. Rumor is it is not related to the TCP DoS issue, and may involve an 0day with remote code execution. Here’s the link to the webcast where they will detail what’s going on. We don’t normally jump on a bandwagon like this, but it sounds like a big one you’ll want to fix ASAP. UPDATE: Woops- literally 2 minutes after I posted this, Ryan Naraine posted details and a link to the official advisory. It’s a nasty vulnerability in the Server service that allows remote code execution without authentication. You should already be blocking TCP ports 139 and 445 at the perimeter, so nothing unusual to change on the firewall. But this is totally wormable, requires no authentication, and allows arbitrary code execution. It’s the evil trinity of vulnerabilities. You should pay extra attention to your mobile users and friends and family- have them update ASAP since the odds are they aren’t blocking those ports. Don’t get too cocky if you have a firewall- like Slammer it will only take one infected sales dude to plug back in at the office and ruin your day. These are the kinds of vulns NAC is made for. Also, don’t forget about those virtual versions of Windows running on your Mac. It looks so easy to exploit, that by the time you read this it’s probably too late 🙂 Share:

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WAF vs. Secure Code vs. Dead Fish

I’ve been slowly catching up on my reading after months of near-nonstop travel, and this post over at Imperviews caught my eye. Ignoring the product promotion angle, it raises one of my major pet peeves these days. I’m really tired of the Web Application Firewall vs. secure coding debate, never mind using PCI 6.6 to justify one over the other for security effectiveness. It’s like two drunk cajuns arguing over the relative value of shrimp or pork in gumbo- you need both, and if either is spoiled the entire thing tastes like sh&t. You also can’t dress up the family dog and fish in a pinch, use them as substitutes, and expect your kids to appreciate either the results or use of resources (resulting gumbo or the loss of Rover). Here’s the real deal- Secure coding is awesome and you need to adopt a formal process if you produce any meaningful volume of code. But it takes a ton of resources to get to the old code (which you should still try to do), and can’t account for new vulnerability classes. Also, people screw up… even when there are multiple layers to detect or prevent them from screwing up. On the other hand, WAFs need to get a hell of a lot better. We’re seeing some positive advancements, as I’ve written about before, but they still can’t stop all vulnerabilities, can’t stop logic flaws and certain other categories of attack, can’t deal with the browser end, and I hear a lot of complaints about tuning (while I think liking WAFs with Vulnerability Assessment is a great start on this problem, we’re just at the start of that race). I absolutely hate to tell you to buy more than you need, but if you have a major web presence you likely need both these days, in the right combination (plus a few other things). If you don’t have the resources for both, I suggest two options. First, if you are really on the low end of resources, use hosted applications and standard platforms as much as possible to limit your custom coding. Then, make sure you have kick ass backups. Finally, absolutely minimize the kinds of information and transaction you expose to the risk of web attacks- drop those ad banners, minimize collecting private information, and validate transactions on the back end as much as possible. If you do have some more resources available, I suggest starting with a vulnerability assessment (not a cheap ass bare-bones PCI scan, but something deeper), and using that to figure out where to go next. Yes- we are eating our own dog food on this one. The blog is hosted using a standard platform. We know it’s vulnerable, so we’ve minimized the attack surface as best we can and make sure we have backups of all the content. I’ve been pleasantly surprised we haven’t been nailed yet, but I expect it to happen eventually. None of our sensitive operations are on that server, and we’ve pulled email and our other important stuff in house. Early next year we’re going to be launching some new things, and we will again go with remote hosting (on a more powerful platform). This time, we are switching to a more secure platform than WordPress (Expression Engine) and will pay for a full vulnerability assessment and penetration test (at least annually, or when any major new components come online). We may perform some financial transactions, and we’ll use an external provider for that. A WAF is out of budget for us, so we’ll focus on minimizing our exposure and manually fixing problems discovered by ongoing assessments. We also plan on using as little custom code as possible. But seriously- I’m tired of this debate. Both options have value, they aren’t exclusionary, and which you need depends on what you are doing and how many resources you have. Eventually we’ll get a better lock on this problem, but that’s a few years out. Share:

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Network Security Podcast, Episode 124

Want to talk about electronic voting? We did. So we invited Jacob West from Fortify to talk with us about a paper he just published with a couple of engineers at Fortify. Guess what- they found electronic voting using DRE voting machines are the least secure way to vote. Makes me feel good going into the election. It’s a good thing we’re fairly self-policing when it comes to time; this is a conversation that could have gone on for a couple of hours. We had a number of technical issues tonight, so be glad we’ve got a podcast up at all. Network Security Podcast, Episode 124, October 21, 2008 Show Notes: Dear Mr. President: Let’s talk tech – We desparately need a geek in the Cabinet! Miley Cyrus Hacker Raided by FBI – Don’t brag to the press when you’re already in the cross-hairs! Flash Suckage: Eat your cookies – Now you can be tracked through Flash too. VeriSign and ICANN square off over the DNS root – Let’s just give it to Dan K. and let him manage it. Judge Suppresses Report on Voting Machine Security – Which brings us to why we’re really here Fortify’s paper on e-voting Share:

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