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Security Mindset: You Won’t Think of Everything

I’m out on the road this week, right now spending two days at a strategic planning session with a large energy company. This is the kind of trip I actually enjoy- working with an end-user on strategic issues at the executive level where they really want to solve the problem. The theme of the day is major disruptions- how to stay in business in the face of massive disasters that go well beyond disaster recovery. I’m just one of about a dozen outsiders brought in to try and get people thinking in new directions. Someone saw one of my presentations on responding to Katrina (I’m a reservist on a federal team) and thought a little on the ground experience might liven the discussions. I’m more than happy to stay at a nice hotel and tell rescue war stories while drinking fine wine (as opposed to pissing off my friends telling the same damn story for the 50th time after too many drinks). One of the presentations on crisis communications was particularly interesting. No, not ham radios, but how do governments and organizations communicate with the public during a disaster? The academic they brought in had some very compelling examples ranging from nuclear power accidents, to the air quality in lower Manhattan after 9/11, to chemical spills, to product recalls. One message emerged load and clear- liars always get caught… eventually. But they’ll probably get away with it in the short term. I asked him directly if he knows of any successful cases where a corporation or government attempted to spin a situation through obfuscation or outright deception and actually got away with it. His answer? In the long term- no. In the short term- yes, but the long term impact is usually magnified when the truth emerges. The most successful crisis communications? Honesty, transparency, and openness (even if spun a little). Seems like a pretty valuable lesson to us in security. Any security professional will eventually deal with a breach, or on the vendor side with a bad vulnerability. The more we try and cover something up the worse it is for us in the long run. A few quick examples? Look at Cisco and the Mike Lynn situation. I hear there are some job openings at Ohio State. Choicepoint swapped CISOs after their breach, even though it wasn’t an IT security failure. We can go on and on- can anyone think of a single security breach or vulnerability disclosure where the organization involved didn’t get caught in a lie or cover up? Same goes for vendors exaggerating product capabilities. I know one that recently changed their entire management team because the old CEO thought he could fool the market just long enough to get bought. Too bad the board didn’t buy it. He’s out of a job (but I’m sure he got a nice package). The bad news is you can get away with it in the short term, but I’m not sure how that really helps you as an individual, or your company, if eventually you’ll get fired. You see lying is like crack- a short term high, but in the end you’ll end up naked in front of a dumpster with a crack pipe in an uncomfortable orifice. I suppose that’s okay if it’s what you’re into. Personally, I’ll stick to the truth and head downstairs for some free wine. (P.S.- the exception to all of this, of course, is politicians. I think it’s either because we’re lazy as voters, or because they all eventually smell the same. Probably a little of both) Share:

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A City Dedicated to Social Engineering

I have a love-hate relationship with Vegas. As someone who’s not the biggest fan of crowds (after way too many years of events security) this isn’t exactly the most relaxing environment. As someone who hates to lose… well, if you think you can win here you’re fooling yourself. On the other hand I met my wife here (at a Jimmy Buffett concert); and as a security professional this is probably the most fascinating city on the planet (followed closely by Joha esburg). Vegas is a double whammy of security- on one side there’s all the casino security. Cameras everywhere, multiple layers of guards and law enforcement, and the built-in security systems of the games. It’s a great place to challenge yourself and try and find the holes (or catch something before the casino does). On the other hand this is an entire city dedicated to nothing more than manipulating every man, woman, child, and sentient alien on the face of the planet. From the casino design, to the advertisements, to the very structure of the city there’s no better place to come learn social engineering. Amazing. An entire city devoted to leaching every possible dollar out of your pocket through manipulation of every base instinct in your genetic code. It’s just fascinating- from the single deck blackjack tables that make you believe you’re a card counter, to TV shows like Las Vegas that make casinos out to be some altruistic corporation run by locals who care. My favorite on this trip is the “ultra-lounge” here at the Rio (it’s a regular hotel lobby bar with the occasional model posing on a platform). I didn’t bother to check the drink prices. I was once comped a bottle of vodka at one of the lounges. We thought we’d order a second bottle, but I didn’t think $300 for something you could get for $40 in the liquor store down the street was the best deal on the planet, no matter how many “actress/models” serve it. You gotta love Vegas. (Someday I’d love to check out the behind the scenes security- just in case any of you readers have connections.) Share:

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Speaking in Vegas

I’m heading out to Vegas tomorrow morning to speak at the Data Center conference. If any readers are there and want to meet up, just email… Share:

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Take the Latest OS X Disk Image (DMG) Vulnerability and Possible Exploit Seriously

For some reason I think I often end up the middle on some of these vulnerability issues; trying to bring reasonable advice to both technical and less-technical users on hyped security issues. Here’s another one. The Month of Kernel Bugs project released a new flaw affecting Macs- it’s a flaw in disk image files that crashes the system. Right now we don’t know for sure if it could allow someone to take over your computer, but I promise you that this class of attacks will, if not now, eventually let someone else take over your system. There is also an unconfirmed report this may be in the wild. DMG files are, to be blunt, the single most likely vector for a rapidly spreading Mac virus. We talked a little about this in our first post on kernel bugs. Because of how OS X manages disk image files, if you mount a malicious disk image (even if you don’t run anything inside of it) an attacker could take over your system. This is a kernel flaw- so you don’t need to be running as root or with administrator privileges. The attacker will totally own your system, and can use it, just as Windows systems are commonly used, to attack your friends and associates. A really nasty attacker might even do some nasty things like try and identify other Mac users based on their address book settings or by trolling your inbox for Mac-formatted emails. Yep- I’m using hyperbole, because I want you to take this seriously. Matasano has a great write up on this. I disagree that disk images are always a bad idea since I’ve found them really useful, but do agree they are a royal pain in the rear to secure. I also think Gruber is taking this more seriously than they give him credit for, yet considering his influence on the Mac community I hope he takes it even more seriously. Because of how disk images work they are far more likely to allow someone to take over your computer than other file types on a Mac. Here’s my advice for other Mac users: As many recommend, turn off Safari’s “Open safe files after downloading” preference. Don’t download any DMG file from an untrusted source. Never open a DMG file emailed or IMd to you from someone you know unless you were expecting it. That’s how a mass exploit will work. Apple should require admin privileges to open a disk image in future versions of the OS, or design some other mechanism to prevent kernel panics (e.g. virtualization or something similar). Yes, this is an inconvenience, but since we’re talking about a file format that will be nearly impossible to secure, yet is valuable to us as users, additional steps should be taken. There’s no need to panic, but we do need to take this very seriously. This won’t be the last we hear about this kind of problem. Share:

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If a Safe Vulnerability Scan Breaks Stuff, Better Have Good Backups and a Resume

Jim at DCS has this post on scanning SCADA networks. Here’s the thing. If you’re so scared you’ll break your stuff by running a simple Nessus scan with safe settings, you have a serious problem. Just imagine how screwed you’ll be the first time an attacker decides to scan your systems for you. Unless you’re totally sure that network and those systems are totally isolated, you better have a darn good recovery plan. Including a job recovery plan, if you know what I mean. Yes- you can mess up and perform more intrusive scans that break things, but I’d be seriously worried if even this is the case. If stuff dies with typical safe scan settings it falls in the whole “bad” category. Share:

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Disable Storing Passwords in Firefox 2.0

There’s a new bug, which can reveal your password to any other page on the same domain. Even if you have a master password set, you should clear out all your Firefox stored passwords until this is fixed. There are a lot of ways to take advantage of this, especially on Web 2.14.168.42 sites. Yep- I use it, and will miss it. I hope they fix this soon. Share:

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Repost: The Securosis Top 6 Tips for Safe Online Holiday Shopping

Today is the last day some of you will be in front of your computers before the horror of Black Friday. Thus, we are reposting our safe holiday shopping advice. Hey. Let’s be careful out there. Yes folks, Black Friday is less than two weeks away and the silly season is upon us. As someone born and bred in good old North Jersey (until I could legally escape), land of honey and shopping malls, this is a time so deeply ingrained into my subconscious that I’ve occasionally found myself sleepwalking around the nearest parking lot, looking for our old wood-paneled station wagon. These days, thanks to the wonder of the Internet, anyone can experience the hustle and bustle of the Paramus malls from the comfort of their own home. And to help keep your shopping experience authentic, there’s no shortage of cheats and thieves ready to yank your painstakingly chosen gifts right out of the virtual trunk of your web browser. Of course they might take your house with it, which, even in Jersey (despite the legends) is somewhat rare. In the spirit of safe and happy holidays, Securosis presents our top 6 tips for safe online shopping, simply presented for the technical or non-technical consumer. Some of these tips also apply to the real world for those of you who just can’t restrain the draw to the mall. Spread the fun, and feel free to post your own tips in the comments. Use a dedicated credit card (or PayPal account) for holiday shopping. Our first tip is also useful for the physical world- still the origin of most credit card fraud. Take your card with the lowest limit and use it exclusively for holiday shopping. Use one you can monitor online, and check the activity daily through the holidays (weekly at a minimum). Make sure it isn’t a debit card, and turn off any automatic payments (so you can dispute any charges before making payments). Keep tracking activity at least weekly for 12 months after the holidays are over, or cancel the card. DON”T USE A DEBIT CARD!!! These don’t have the same protections as credit cards, and you’re responsible for fraudulent charges. As for PayPal, read on to our second tip. Only use credit cards at major online retailers; use a PayPal debit account for smaller shops . Sure, you might get a better deal from Billy-Bobs-Bait-Shop-And-Diamond-Wholesaler.com, but many smaller retailers don’t follow appropriate security practices. Those hosted with a major service are often okay, but few consumers really want to check the pedigree for specialty shops. Instead, create a dedicated PayPal account that’s not linked to any of your bank accounts or credit cards. Credit it with as much cash as you think you need and use it for those riskier online payments. Worst case, you only lose what’s in that account, and you can easily cancel it anytime. Never, ever, ever ,ever click on ANYTHING in email. It doesn’t matter if your best friend sent you a really good deal in email. It doesn’t matter if it’s your favorite retailer and you’ve always gotten email offers from them. Repeat after me, “I will never click on anything in email.” No special offers. No Ebay member to member emails. No “fraud alerts” to check your account. No nothing. Ever. Nada. Attackers are getting more and more refined in their attacks, some of which are very hard to distinguish from legitimate emails. Spam waves over the holidays are expected to break records this year. When you see an interesting offer in email, and it’s a business you want to deal with, just open your web browser, type in the address manually, and browse to the item, offer, or account area. Email is the single biggest source of online fraud; never click on anything in email! Update your browser- use Firefox 2.0, IE 7, Safari, or Opera. Turn on the highest security settings. Over the past month or so we’ve seen major updates of Firefox and Internet Explorer, both with significant security enhancements. Safari (installed on every Mac) and Opera are also good options. Firefox 2.0 and IE 7 include features to help detect fraudulent sites- if you see a warning, shut down the browser and don’t go back to that site. All of these browsers will ask you before installing any software when you visit a site; when shopping, never allow the site to install anything. Either it’s a fraud or they don’t deserve your business. Most browsers now install with security enabled by default, so we won’t be providing detailed instructions here. Just download them. Now. Then come back and read the rest of this list. We’ll wait. Download and install the Netcraft toolbar if you’re on Windows. This is a free toolbar for Firefox and IE that helps identify phishing sites. Although both browsers include their own anti-phishing technologies (as do many other toolbars), it never hurts to double up during the holiday season. Think of it as the deadbolt lock to enhance the regular lock on your front door. If you don’t want it bothering you all the time, at least use it during your holiday shopping and turn it off later. Keep your antivirus, firewall, antispam, and anti-spyware up to date. I don’t really care which product you use (and truth be told, we don’t really like most of the commercial ones) but as bad as some of these perform they really are essential on a PC. Before the holidays we plan on putting together a list of free, non-geek security tools, but for you non-technical type any of the shrink wrapped major vendors offers at least a modicum of protection. For Windows users, Windows Defender is a good, free additional tool to limit spyware. Right now there’s no known spyware for Macs. These six simple steps won’t stop all fraud, but will significantly reduce both the chances you’ll be a victim, and the damage if you are. Feel free to email them to

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The Best Gift for Non-Geeks That Isn’t On Their List (And They Won’t Appreciate, But Really Need)

Author’s Note: This was originally posted last year, but nothing ever changes: Backup Backup Backup Did I say backup yet? Backing up home computers used to be little more than a convenience to keep you from losing some old college papers. These days our entire family histories find life on our unreliable home computers. From digital photos of junior, to financial records in Quicken, to love letters in email, our computers store items in ephemeral 0s and 1s that used to be on paper in a box. Sure, paper isn’t perfect, but I suspect more of us have experienced hard drive crashes than house fires. Backup is really a pain, so I suggest prioritizing your efforts to focus on the most important stuff and to make it easy and seamless for your non-geek friends and family. In many cases your best bet is to get an external hard drive and some basic backup software (I use SuperDuper on my Mac, not sure what’s good these days on PCs, so recommendations in the comments appreciated). A bunch of the external drives now include basic software for free, and you can plug in the drive, install the software, and just check up on it every now and then. For digital photos I’ve started recommending the archive features of Photoshop Elements, Microsoft Digital Image Suite, and the like. The advantage here is they get a photo tool they can use for other purposes, while getting basic photo backup features. I just grabbed Photoshop Elements for my Father-in-Law and a bunch of blank CDs. My plan is, every few months, to burn an archive of his photos on CD and store them over at my place (we live 20 minutes away). No- backup isn’t fun or sexy, but today it’s very very necessary. I hear all too many stories of people losing valuable family photos due to a basic hard drive crash, virus, or whatever. Imagine losing ALL your baby pics, wedding pics, or Grandpa’s 80th birthday pics where he flashed back and called Grandma by the name of his long-forgotten French mistress from WWII inciting immediate, if lethargic, violence. Ah, Family. Good times. You really don’t want to let your family lose their memories, do you? It’s also a good idea to print really valuable photos. The rumors of paper’s demise are greatly exaggerated. Share:

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Mac vs. Windows Security- It’s a Whole New Game, and Doesn’t Matter

I’m about to tread, yet again, on religious ground. John Gruber, attacking an eWeek article, incited a response by Tom Ptacek over at Matasano. I suggest you read those articles, especially the Matasano response, because they highlight very clearly some of the technical differences between OS X and Windows Vista. I’ve been spending a lot of time, we’re talking a year or two, trying to decide if OS X is inherently more secure. I’m not a vulnerability researcher or OS developer, so I can’t dig in like Ptacek, but as an analyst I’m pretty good at weeding through the BS and I’m geeky enough to know what I’m talking about. OS X is more secure than my XP PC, but Vista changes everything. This is not your usual Windows. Tom’s response to Gruber focuses on Windows Vista, but Tom could have explained that more clearly. Gruber probably hasn’t hammered on a recently-released, barely-production-deployed OS so his arguments are tailored towards Vista. I think all the pundits need to be clear about which OS versions they are talking about. To a very real degree they are debating around each other- Tom focusing on Vista, and John on XP. This was something I was planning to write about after I got my hands on a non-beta copy to play with, but Tom beat me to the punch. OS X is more secure than XP for a variety of reasons, including the user account model, lack of SYSTEM, quiet network profile, some core code signing, and so on. That said, OS X was not designed with a secure development lifecycle, and does not include the advanced security features shipping in Vista. Not that Vista is perfect, but there are clear indications that the game may have changed. (And yes, I’ve simplified a lot) The Secure Development Lifecycle is far more than some marketing campaign. MS hammers their code harder than anyone… ANYONE else in development today. Independent review, multiple security code scanning engines, mandatory training, and dropping beta versions to hackers like free candy. I talk with a lot of vendors; many have good processes, but I haven’t found any major vendor that makes such an effort. Ignore XP- it never went through this process, but look at SQL Server 2005, one of the first major applications to go through this process. No vulnerabilities to date- just one shared-code flaw (XML Core Services). Vista is the first consumer OS to go through this process. Bugs will still be found, but I suspect far fewer than XP. Memory randomization- key code hops around in memory. This makes it incredibly hard for an attacker to point to system code, since the code always moves. No hardcoding addresses. This may be the most significant change in the OS security. C#, which will probably be the most common application language used on the Windows platform, uses memory virtualization, just like Java. Again, nothing’s perfect, but this means C# apps are much less likely to suffer some of the common families of flaws that have crippled Windows so far. The user privilege model is stronger, but not perfect. MS cut back a little here to keep some enterprise customers happy, but the improvements are still very real. Old code demanding admin access runs off virtual registries rather than corrupting the main system registry. Browser isolation- most major malware today on XP comes in email or over the browser (and half the email stuff uses the browser). IE 7 itself is stronger, and the browser runs in a more isolated and less privileged mode. I’m just running off other’s evaluations, so take it or leave it, but the hard-core researchers I know all tell me Vista is not the MS software we’re used to. Everything from the browser, to the kernel, to the programming languages used to build applications is significantly improved. And I haven’t even mentioned all the new security features, like a real 2-way firewall, PatchGuard, and so on. Will it all work? I don’t know, but I do know those who have hacked away at Vista come away impressed. So is Vista more secure than OS X? I think so, but we’ll still see more malware for Windows for a long time to come. And Apple has plenty of time to take some of the same security steps. Heck, with less ties to legacy applications Apple could probably jump ahead if they put their minds to it. Vista might see life on my Mac, but replacing my XP virtual machine. But with Vista now released we all need to be clear about which operating systems we’re discussing. On paper Vista has more security built in at a more fundamental level than OS X. But Vista is brand new, and we’ll have to watch the world kick the tires for a while. Apple needs to respond with similar features, where needed, if they are to compete in the security game. If they want to. The truth is, security is still not a major factor in most people’s OS choice. I’m sitting here saying I think Vista is more secure, but I don’t plan on switching off my Mac. Security is about being “good enough”. As the major target for attacks, “good enough” for Windows is significantly higher than “good enough” for Macs. Until Apple sees the same kinds of exploits on the same scale there will be little motivation for them to invest so deeply in security. The game isn’t over, but it’s definitely a different game than just a few weeks ago. Share:

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