Securing SAP Cloud Environments

Migrating Hana and other SAP applications to a cloud environments is a complicated process, even with the tools and services SAP provides. For many organizations security was primary barrier to adoption. But SAP and other cloud service vendors have closed many security gaps, so now we can trust that the environment and applications are at least as secure as an on-premise installation – provided you leverage appropriate security models for the cloud. But that’s where we often see a breakdown: enterprises are not taking sufficient advantage of cloud security. Additionally, because there is no single model for SAP cloud security, transitioning other business applications to the cloud often results in greater cost, less scalability, and decreased security. From the paper: “Proper implementation is tricky – if you simply ‘lift and shift’ your old model into the cloud, we know from experience that it will be less secure and cost more to operate. To realize the advantages of the cloud you need to leverage its new features and capabilities – which demands a degree of reengineering for architecture, security program, and process,” said Adrian Lane, Analyst and CTO, Securosis. “We have been receiving an increasing number of questions on SAP cloud security, so this research paper is intended to tackle major security issues for SAP cloud deployments. When we originally scoped this research project we were going to focus on the top five questions people had, and quickly realized that grossly under-served the audience needs for a more comprehensive security plan,” continued Lane. “Securing SAP Clouds” covers the division of responsibility between an organization and the cloud vendor, which tools and approaches are viable, changes to the security model and advice for putting together a cloud security program for SAP. We are very happy to announce that Onapsis is licensing this research to help educate customers and Hana users. We thank them for their support, and for their ongoing security research! Download a copy of the paper here Share:

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Security Analytics Team of Rivals

Given the challenges in detecting attackers, clearly existing approaches to threat detection aren’t working well enough. As such, innovative companies are bringing new products to market to address the perceived issues with existing technologies. These security analytics offerings basically use better math to detect attackers, leveraging techniques that didn’t exist when existing tools hit the market 10 years ago. The industry’s marketing machinery is making these new analytics tools akin to the Holy Grail, but per usual the hype far outstrips the reality. Security analytics is not a replacement for SIEM — at least today. For some time you will need both technologies. The role of a security architect is basically to assemble a set of technologies to generate actionable alerts on specific threat vectors relevant to the business, investigate attacks in process and after the fact, and generate compliance reports to streamline audits. These technologies compete to a degree, so we like the analogy of a Team of Rivals working together to meet requirements. This paper focuses on how to align your security monitoring technologies with new security analytics alternatives to better identify attacks, which we can all agree is sorely needed. We’d like to thank McAfee for licensing the content. We are grateful security companies like McAfee and many others appreciate the need to educate their customers and prospects with objective material built in a Totally Transparent manner. This allows us to do impactful research, and protect our integrity. You can download the paper (PDF) Attachments Securosis_SATeamofRivals_FINAL.pdf [648KB] Share:

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Assembling A Container Security Program

Our paper, Assembling a Container Security Program, covers a broad range of topics around how to securely build, manage, and deploy containers. During our research we learned that issues often arise early in the software development or container assembly portion of the build process, so we cover much more than merely runtime security – the focus of most container security research. We also discovered that operations teams struggle with getting control over containers, so we also cover a number of questions regarding monitoring, auditing, and management. To give you a flavor for the content, we cover the following: IT and Security teams lack visibility into containers and have trouble validating them – both before placing them into production, and when running in production. Their peers on the development team are often disinterested in security, and cannot be bothered to provide reports and metrics. This is essentially the same problem we have for application security in general: the people responsible for the code are not incentivized to make security their problem, and the people who need to know what’s going on lack visibility. Containers are scaring the hell out of security pros because of their lack of transparency. The burden of securing containers falls across Development, Operations, and Security teams – but these groups are not always certain how to tackle the issues. This research is intended to aid security practitioners, developers, and IT operations teams in selecting container security tools and approaches. We will not go into great detail on how to secure apps in general here – we are limiting ourselves to build, container management, deployment, platform, and runtime security issues that arise with the use of containers. We will focus on Docker as the dominant container model, but the vast majority of our security recommendations also apply to Cloud Foundry, Rocket, Google Pods, and the like. If you worry about container security this is a good primer on all aspects of how code is built, bundled, containerized, and deployed. We would like to thank Aqua Security for licensing this research and participating in some of our initial discussions. As always, we welcome comments and suggestions. If you have questions, please feel free to email us, info at Download a copy of the paper here Share:

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Maximizing WAF Value

We talk frequently about the importance of having the right people and processes to make security effective. This is definitely true for Web Application Firewalls (WAF), a fairly mature technology which has been fighting perception issues for years. This quote from the paper nets it out: Our research shows that WAF failures result far more often from operational failure than from fundamental product flaws. Make no mistake — WAF is not a silver bullet — but a correctly deployed WAF makes it much harder to successfully attack an application, and for attackers to avoid detection. The effectiveness of WAF is directly related to the quality of people and processes maintaining them. The most serious problems with WAF are with management and operational processes, rather than the technology. Our Maximizing WAF Value paper discusses the continuing need for Web Application Firewall technologies, and address the ongoing struggles to run WAF. We also focus on decreasing time to value for WAF, with updated recommendations for standing up a WAF for the first time, what it takes to get a basic set of policies up and running, and new capabilities and challenges facing customers. We would like to thank Akamai for licensing the content in this paper. As always, we performed the research using our Totally Transparent Research methodology. You can download the paper (PDF). Share:

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Managed Security Monitoring

Nobody really argues any more about whether to perform security monitoring. Compliance mandates answered that question, and the fact is that without granular security monitoring and analytics you don’t have much chance to detect attacks. But there is an open question about the best way to monitor your environment, especially given the headwinds facing your security team. Given the challenges of finding and retaining staff, the increasingly distributed nature of data and systems that need to be monitored, and the rapid march of technology, it’s worth considering whether a managed security monitoring service makes sense for your organization. Under the right circumstances a managed service presents an interesting alternative to racking and stacking another set of SIEM appliances. This paper covers the drivers for managed security monitoring, the use cases where a service provider can offer the most value, and some guidance on how to actually select a service provider. It’s a comprehensive look at what it takes to select a security monitoring service. We’d like to thank IBM Security, who licensed this content and enables us to provide it to you for, well, nothing. The paper was built using our Totally Transparent Research methodology, to make sure we are writing what needs to be written rather than what someone else wants us to say. You can download the paper (PDF). Share:

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Collected Cloud Security and DevOps Posts

Below are our top cloud security and DevOps posts, ordered as we suggest you read them rather than by posting data. This is just the start. The list will grow nearly daily as we write a ton of new content. We will also include links to our external content, including code on GitHub. Cloud Security Getting Started Cloud Best Practice: Limit Blast Radius with Multiple Accounts Your Cloud Consultant Probably Sucks How to Start Moving to Cloud Seven Steps to Secure Your AWS Root Account Cloud Networking Bastion (Transit) Networks Are the DMZ to Protect Your Cloud from Your Datacenter DevOps More to come. Code Coming soon. (I think we are running out of ways to say that, but needed to start this page with something.) Share:

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Understanding and Selecting RASP

So what is RASP? Runtime Application Self-Protection (RASP) is an application security technology which embeds into an application or application runtime environment, examining requests at the application layer to detect attacks and misuse in real time. RASP functions in the application context, which enables it to monitor security – and apply controls – very precisely. This means better detection because you see what the application is being asked to do, and can also offer better performance, as you only need to check the relevant subset of policies for each request. From the paper: There is no lack of data showing that applications are vulnerable to attack. Many applications are old and simply contain too many flaws to fix. You know, that back-office application that should never have been allowed on the Internet to begin with. These applications are often unsupported, with the engineers who developed them no longer available, or the platforms so fragile that they become unstable if security fixes are applied. In most cases it would be cheaper to re-write the application from scratch than patch all the issues, but economics seldom justify (or even permit) the effort. Other application platforms, even those considered ‘secure’, are frequently found to contain vulnerabilities after decades of use. Heartbleed, anyone? New classes of attacks, and even new use cases, have a disturbing ability to unearth previously unknown application flaws. We see two types of applications: those with known vulnerabilities today, and those which will have known vulnerabilities in the future. But the real audience for this technology is developers who want to build security into their applications. As more and more software development shops embrace automation, RESTful APIs are no longer optional. Security products that only offer partial functionality from their API interface, or only provide SOAP-based APIs, fail to meet current market requirements. To add value for development teams, security needs to be fully integrated with the application and the build process that constructs it. As applications leverage the cloud and virtualization, and embrace micro-service architectures, it has become clear that security needs to function as, auto-scale with, and replicate alongside, applications. RASP meets these requirements as few other security products can. Its key value is that users who need it can fully integrate it into the context of their environment, with their particular needs and process. We would like to heartily thank Immunio for licensing this content. As always, if you have comments or questions, you can either post them on our blog as a comment or email us at info at Securosis, appending dot com. Download here: Understanding and Selecting RASP Share:

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Building a Threat Intelligence Program

Threat Intelligence has made a significant difference in how organizations focus resources on their most significant risks. We concluded our Applied Threat Intelligence paper by pointing out that the industry needs to move past tactical TI use cases. Our philosophy demands a programmatic approach to security. The time has come to advance threat intelligence into the broader and more structured TI program to ensure systematic, consistent, and repeatable value. The program needs to address the dynamic changes in indicators and other signs of attacks, while factoring in the tactics the adversaries. Our Building a Threat Intelligence Program paper offers guidance for designing a program and systematically leveraging threat intelligence. This paper is all about turning tactical use cases into a strategic TI capability to enable your organization to detect attacks faster. We would like to thank our awesome licensees, Anomali, Digital Shadows, and BrightPoint Security for supporting our Totally Transparent Research. It enables us to think objectively about how to leverage new technology in systematic programs to make your security consistent and reproducible. Download: Building a Threat Intelligence Program Share:

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Incident Response in the Cloud Age

The good news for incident responders is that you no longer need to make the case for what you do and why it’s important. Everyone is watching. Here is a quote from the paper: Not that mature security organizations didn’t focus on responding to incidents before 2012, but since then a lot more resources and funding have shifted away from ineffective prevention towards detection and response. Which is awesome! Additionally, responding is far more complicated today due to the increased skill of adversaries, mobile devices which have democratized access and and locations of data, and an infrastructure that increasingly embraces the cloud – impacting visibility and requiring fundamentally different thinking. That doesn’t even mention the challenges of finding, hiring, and retaining skilled responders. As the need to respond to incidents increases, you cannot scale by throwing people at the problem, because they don’t exist. But the news is not all bad – the tools available to aid responders have improved significantly. There is far more telemetry available, from both the network and endpoints, enabling far more granular incident analysis. You also have access to threat intelligence, which offers improved understanding of attackers and their tactics, narrowing the aperture you need to investigate. As with everything in security, we need to evolve and adapt our processes to address the current reality. Our Incident Response in the Cloud Age paper digs into impacts of the cloud, faster and virtualized networks, and threat intelligence on your incident response process. Then we discuss how to streamline response in light of the lack of people to perform the heavy lifting of incident response. Finally we bring everything together with a scenario to illuminate the concepts. We would like to thank SS8 for licensing this paper. Our Totally Transparent Research method provides you with access to forward-looking research without paywalls. Download: Incident Response in the Cloud Age Share:

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Shining a Light on Shadow Devices

Being a security professional certainly was easier back in the day before all these newfangled devices had Internet connections. I’m not sure how we became the get off my lawn! guys, but here we are. You probably scan for PCs. Maybe you even have a program to find and monitor mobile devices on your networks (though probably not). But what about printers, physical security devices like cameras, control systems, healthcare devices, and the two dozen or so other types of devices on your networks? There will be billions of devices connected to the Internet over the next few years. They all present attack surface on your technology infrastructure. And you cannot fully know what is exploitable in your environment, because you don’t know about these devices living in the ‘shadows’. Visible devices are only some of the network-connected devices in your environment. There are hundreds, quite possibly thousands, of other devices you don’t know about on your network. You don’t scan them periodically, and you have no idea of their security posture. Each one can be attacked, and might provide an adversary with opportunity to gain presence in your environment. Your attack surface is much larger than you thought. In our Shining a Light on Shadow Devices paper, we discuss the attacks on these devices which can become an issue on your network, along with some tactics to provide visibility and then control to handle all these network-connected devices. These devices are infrequently discussed and rarely factored into discovery and protection programs. It’s another Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell approach, which never seems to work out well. We would like to thank ForeScout Technologies for licensing the content in this paper. Our unique Totally Transparent Research model enables us to think objectively about future attack vectors and speculate a bit on the impact to your organization, without paywalls or other such gates restricting access to research you may need. Download Shining a Light on Shadow Devices (PDF). Share:

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