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Government Influence

In this week’s Firestarter Rich, Mike, and Adrian (until his computer died) discuss the importance (or lack thereof) of the security industry and community in influencing government. Adrian drops out part-way through due to his frugal laptop choice, but rumor is he whipped out the credit card and payed homage to Apple shortly after the conclusion of this week’s recording. Share:

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Target and Antivirus

In this week’s Firestarter Rich, Mike, and Adrian discuss the latest in the Target relevations and whether over-reliance on antivirus is to blame once again. We aren’t out to blame the victim. We also pick our top prevention strategies for this sort of attack. Ain’t hindsight great? Share:

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Eliminate Surprises with Security Assurance and Testing

We have always been fans of making sure applications and infrastructure are ready for prime time before letting them loose on the world. It’s important not to just use basic scanner functions either – your adversaries are unlikely to limit their tactics to things you find in an open source scanner. Security Assurance and Testing enables organizations to limit the unpleasant surprises that happen when launching new stuff or upgrading infrastructure. Adversaries continue to innovate and improve their tactics at an alarming rate. They have clear missions, typically involving exfiltrating critical information or impacting the availability of your technology resources. They have the patience and resources to achieve their missions by any means necessary. And it’s your job to make sure deployment of new IT resources doesn’t introduce unnecessary risk. In our Eliminating Surprises with Security Assurance and Testing paper, we talk about the need for a comprehensive process to identify issues – before hackers do it for you. We list a number of critical tactics and programs to test in a consistent and repeatable manner, and finally go through a couple use cases to show how the process would work at both the infrastructure and application levels. To avoid surprise we suggest a security assurance and testing process to ensure the environment is ready to cope with real traffic and real attacks. This goes well beyond what development organizations typically do to ‘test’ their applications, or ops does to ‘test’ their stacks. It also is different from a risk assessment or a manual penetration test. Those “point in time” assessments aren’t necessarily comprehensive. The testers may find a bunch of issues but they will miss some. So remediation decisions are made with incomplete information about the true attack surface of infrastructure and applications. We would like to thank our friends at Ixia for licensing this content. Without the support of our clients, our open research model wouldn’t be possible. Direct Download (PDF): Eliminate Surprises with Security Assurance and Testing Attachments Securosis_SecurityAssuranceTesting_FINAL.pdf [1.0MB] Share:

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Crisis Communications

Okay, we have content in this thing. We promise. But we can’t stop staring at our new title video sequence. I mean, just look at it! This week Rich, Mike, and Adrian discuss Target, Snapchat, RSA, and why no one can get crisis communications correct. Sorry we hit technical difficulties with the live Q&A Friday, but we think we have the kinks worked out (I’d blame Mike if I were inclined to point fingers). Our plan is to record Friday again – keep an eye on our Google+ page for the details. Share:

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What CISOs Need to Know about Cloud Computing

One of a CISO’s most difficult challenges is sorting the valuable wheat from the overhyped chaff, and then figuring out what it all means in terms of risk to the organization. There is no shortage of technology or threat trends, and CISOs need to determine which matter and how they impact security. The rise of cloud computing is a legitimate transformation which is fundamentally changing core security practices. Far more than a mere outsourcing model, cloud computing alters the very fabric of our infrastructure, technology consumption, and delivery models. In the long term the cloud and mobile computing are likely to mark a larger shift than the Internet’s apperance. This paper details the critical differences between cloud computing and traditional infrastructure for security professionals, and suggests where to focus security efforts. We show that the cloud doesn’t necessarily increase risks – it shifts them, providing new opportunities for substantial security improvement. There are two versions. The Executive Summary is a two-page overview of the highlights, suitable for passing on to a time-crunched manager. The What CISOs Need to Know About Cloud Computing full report includes the executive summary (formatted differently), followed by the complete paper. We may be biased, but we hope that’s the one you read: Executive Summary: What CISOs Need to Know About Cloud Computing (PDF) Full Report: What CISOs Need to Know About Cloud Computing Special thanks to CloudPassage for licensing this content and making it possible for us to release it for free. Attachments CISO_Cloud_v.1.Complete.pdf [1.7MB] CISO_Cloud_Exec_Summary_v.1.pdf [545KB] Share:

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The NSA and RSA

Hey everyone. It’s a new year and time for new stuff from your pals here at Securosis. We used to run a Monday-morning ‘Firestarter’ post to get people thinking for the week. We decided to revive it with a twist. We are restarting the Firestarter as a weekly short video (15 minutes or so is our target). As we work out the details we also plan to push it out as a podcast, and once every month or so we will run a longer episode to dig deeper into a topic. We pre-recorded this version, but as you’ll see we ran it on Google Hangouts. When possible, we will post our recording times up there so you can participate (sorry, via text only) as we record. This week we decided to cover the NSA/RSA controversy and the… interesting… decision by some to pull out of the RSA conference over it. We will host the videos we post via the blog on Vimeo, but you can also access them directly via the Securosis Google+ page (not this first one because we are still figuring the process out, and I messed up and put it on my personal page). Remember, Google is always watching if you find it there 🙂 We hope you like it, and please let us know what you think… Share:

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Defending Against Application Denial of Service Attacks

Denial of Service attacks can encompass a number of different tactics, all aimed at impacting the availability of your applications and/or infrastructure. In Defending Against Denial of Service Attacks we described both network-based and application-targeting attacks. In this paper we dig much deeper into application DoS attacks. For good reason – as the paper says: These attacks require knowledge of the application and how to break or game it. They can be far more efficient than just blasting traffic at a network, requiring far fewer attack nodes and less bandwidth. A side benefit of requiring fewer nodes is simplified command and control, allowing more agility in adding new application attacks. Moreover, the attackers often take advantage of legitimate application features, making defense considerably harder. We expect a continued focus on application DoS attacks over time, so we offer both an overview of the common types of attacks you will see and possible mitigations for each one. After reading this paper you should have a clear understanding of how your application availability will be attacked – and more importantly, what you can do about it. We would like to thank our friends at Akamai for licensing this content. Without the support of our clients our open research model wouldn’t be possible. To sum up, here are some thoughts on defense: Defending against AppDoS requires a multi-faceted approach that typically starts with a mechanism to filter attack traffic, either via a web protection service running in the cloud or an on-premise anti-DoS device. The next layer of defense includes operational measures to ensure the application stack is hardened, including timely patching and secure configuration of components. Finally, developers must play their part by optimizing database queries and providing sufficient input validation to make sure the application itself cannot be overwhelmed using legitimate capabilities. Keeping applications up and running requires significant collaboration between development, operations, and security. This ensures not only that sufficient defenses are in place, but also that a well-orchestrated response maintains and/or restores service as quickly as possible. It is not a matter of if but when you are targeted by an Application Denial of Service attack. Direct Download (PDF): Defending Against Application Denial of Service Attacks Attachments Securosis_ApplicationDoS_FINAL.pdf [706KB] Share:

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Executive Guide to Pragmatic Network Security Management

Managing network security at scale is not easy, but the organizations that do it best tend to follow a predictable and repeatable pattern. This paper distills those lessons into a pragmatic process designed for larger organizations and those with more complicated networks, such as medium-sized businesses with multiple locations. We don’t claim our process is magical or easy, but it’s certainly easier than any alternatives we are aware of. Even if you only pick out a few tidbits, our process should help you refine and operate your network security more efficiently. This paper for information managers, briefly discusses why network security management can be difficult and highlights the difference between network security management at the program level and managing individual security tools. It details a seven-step pragmatic process to help optimize how you manage network security, especially on large and complex networks. Attachments Pragmatic_Network_Security_Management.pdf [1.0MB] The Executive Guide to Pragmatic Network Security Management (PDF) Share:

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Security Awareness Training Evolution

Everyone has an opinion about security awareness training, and most of them are negative. Waste of time! Ineffective! Boring! We have heard them all. And the criticism isn’t wrong – much of the content driving security awareness training is lame. Which is probably the kindest thing we can say about it. But it doesn’t need to be that way. Actually, it cannot remain this way – there is too much at stake. Users remain the lowest-hanging fruit for attackers, and as long as that is the case attackers will continue to target them. Educating users about security is not a panacea, but it can and does help. It’s not like a focus on security awareness training is the flavor of the day for us. We have been talking about the importance of training users for years, as unpopular as it remains. The main argument against security training is that it doesn’t work. That’s just not true. But it doesn’t work for everyone. Like security in general, there is no 100%. Some employees will never get it – mostly because they just don’t care – but they do bring enough value to the organization that no matter what they do (short of a felony) they are sticking around. Then there is everyone else. Maybe it’s 50% of your folks, or perhaps 90%. Regardless of the number of employees who can be influenced by better security training content, wouldn’t it make your life easier if you didn’t have to clean up after them? We have seen training reduce the amount of time spent cleaning up easily avoidable mistakes. The Security Awareness Training Evolution paper discusses how we believe training needs to evolve. It offers ways to improve training content, and ensure the right support and incentives are in place for training to succeed. Here is the table of contents so you can see how the paper breaks down: We would like to thank our friends at PhishMe for licensing this paper. Remember, it is through the generosity of our licensees that you get to read our stuff for this nifty price. Here is another quote from the paper to sum things up: As we have said throughout this paper, employees are clearly the weakest link in your security defenses, so without a plan to actively prepare them for battle you have a low chance of success. It is not about making every employee a security ninja – instead focus on preventing most of them from falling for simplistic attacks. You will still be exploited, but make it harder for attackers so you suffer less frequent compromise. Security-aware employees protect your data more effectively, it’s as simple as that, regardless of what you hear from naysayers. Download: Security Awareness Training Evolution (PDF) Attachments Securosis_SecurityAwarenessTrainingEvolution_FINAL.pdf [288KB] Share:

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Firewall Management Essentials

We all know and love the firewall. The cornerstone of every organization’s network security defense, firewalls enforce access control policies and determine what can and cannot enter your network. But, like almost every device you have had for a while, you take them for granted and perhaps don’t pay as much attention as you need to. Until a faulty rule change opens up a hole in your perimeter large enough to drive a tanker through. Then you get some religion about more effectively managing these devices. Things are getting more complicated as next-generation functionality brings a need to define and manage application policies; new devices and infrastructure evolution make it difficult to know what is allowed and what isn’t. The issues around managing firewalls can be summed up in an excerpt from our newest paper: Like a closet in your house, if you don’t spend time sorting through old stuff it can become a disorganized mess, with a bunch of things you haven’t used in years and no longer need. This metaphor fits the firewall like a glove, so we decided to get back to our network security roots to document the essentials to automating management of firewalls. We explain the need for a strong automated change management process, the importance of optimizing the rule base, and the benefits of managing access risk. It should serve as a good primer on how to improve the operational excellence of your network security controls. We would like to thank Firemon for licensing the research and supporting what we do. You cannot get rid of firewalls, and if anything their importance is increasing daily. So you might as well get better at managing them, and that’s what this research is all about. Download: Firewall Management Essentials Attachments Securosis_FirewallManagementEssentials_FINAL.pdf [754KB] Share:

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