It seems far too much of security research has become like Mel Gibson in “Conspiracy Theory.” Unbalanced, mostly crazy, but not necessarily wrong. But we created this situation, so we have to deal with it. I’m reacting to the media cycle around the Duqu virus, or Son of Stuxnet, identified by F-Secure (among others).
You see, no one is interested in product news anymore. No one cares about the incremental features of a vendor widget. They don’t care about success stories. The masses want to hear about attacks. Juicy attacks that take down nuclear reactors. Or steal zillions of dollars. Or result in nudie pictures of celebrities stolen from their computers or cell phones. That’s news today, and that’s why vendor research teams focus on giving the media news, rather than useful information.
It started with F-Secure claiming that Duqu was written by someone with access to the Stuxnet source code. Duqu performs reconnaissance rather than screwing with centrifuges, but their message was that this is a highly sophisticated attack, created by folks with Stuxnet-like capabilities. The tech media went bonkers. F-Secure got lots of press, and the rest of the security vendors jumped on – trying to credit, discredit, expand, or contract F-Secure’s findings – anything that would get some press attention. Everyone wanted their moment in the sun, and Duqu brought light to the darkness.
But here’s the thing. Everyone saying Duqu and Stuxnet were related in some way might have been wrong. The folks at SecureWorks released research a week later, making contrary claims and disputing any relation beyond some coarse similarities in how the attacks inject code (using a kernel driver) and obscure themselves (encryption and signing using compromised certificates). The media went bonkers again. Nothing like a spat between researchers to drive web traffic to the media.
So who is right? That is actually the wrong question. It really doesn’t matter who is right. Maybe Duqu was done by the Stuxnet guys. Maybe it wasn’t. Ultimately, though, to everyone aside from page-whoring beat reporters who benefit from another media cycle, who’s right and who’s wrong about Duqu’s parentage aren’t relevant. The only thing that matters is that you, as a security professional, understand the attack; and have controls in place to protect against it. Or perhaps not – analyzing the attack and accepting its risk is another legitimate choice.
This is how the process is supposed to work. A new threat comes to light, and the folks involved early in the cycle draw conclusions about the threat. Over time other researchers do more work and either refute or confirm the original claims. The only thing different now is that much of this happens in public, with the media showing how the sausage is made. And it’s not always pretty.
But success in security is about prioritizing effectively, which means shutting out the daily noise of media cycles and security research. Not that most security professionals do anything but fight fires all day anyway. Which means they probably don’t read our drivel either…
Photo credit: “Tin Foil Hat” originally uploaded by James Provost
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One Reply to “Conspiracy Theories, Tin Foil Hats, and Security Research”
I personally think that the problem with the media hype is that it seems to distract more than inform.
The overall result being that you end up with “experts” arguing over inconsequential details… in the same way passengers on a crashing blimp argue over the best way to use the parachutes instead of just using them.
I don’t care (as a security guy) at the moment if the Duqu coders had access to the original Stuxnet code or if they were all wearing blue shirts when they uploaded it… I just care about what I need to do to detect it and what preventative measures it makes sense to use.
That’s my half-nibble.
Zac
PS: your drivel is at least interesting… and much less reactionary.