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Best Practices for DLP Content Discovery: Part 5

In our last post we finished our review of DLP content discovery best practices by discussion rolling out and maintaining your deployment. Today we’re going to focus on a couple of use cases that illustrate how it all works together. I’m writing these as fake case studies, which is probably really obvious considering my lack of creativity in the names. DLP Content Discovery for Risk Reduction and to Support PCI Audit RetailSportsCo is a mid-sized online and brick-and-mortar sporting goods retailer, with about 4,000 headquarters employees and another 2,000 retail employees, across 50 locations. They classify as a Level 2 merchant due to their credit card transaction volume and are currently PCI complaint, but struggled through the process and ended up getting a series of compensating controls approved by their auditor, but only for their first year. During the audit it was discovered that credit card information had proliferated uncontrolled throughout the organization. It was scattered through hundreds of files on dozens of servers; mostly Excel spreadsheets and Access databases used, and later ignored, by different business units. Since storage of unencrypted credit card numbers is prohibited by PCI, their auditor required them to remove or secure these files. Audit costs for the first year increased significantly due to the time spent by the auditor validating that the information was destroyed or secured. RetailSportsCo purchased a DLP solution and created a discovery policy to locate credit card information across all storage repositories and employee systems. The policy was initially deployed against the customer relations business unit servers, where over 75 files containing credit card numbers were discovered. After consultation with the manager of the department and employee notification, the tool was switched into enforcement mode and all these files were quarantined back into an encrypted repository. In phase 2 of the project, DLP endpoint agents were installed on the laptops of sales and customer relations employees (about 100 employees). Users and managers were educated, and the tool discovered and removed approximately 150 additional files. Phase 3 added coverage of all known storage repositories at corporate headquarters. Phase 4 expanded scanning to storage at retail locations, over a period of 5 months. The final phase will add coverage of all employee systems in the first few months of the coming year, leveraging their workstation configuration management system for a scaled deployment. Audit reports were generated showing exactly which systems were scanned, what was found, and how it was removed or protected. Their auditor accepted the report, which reduced audit time and costs materially (more than the total cost of the DLP solution). One goal of the project is to scan the entire enterprise at least once a quarter, with critical systems scanned on either a daily or weekly basis. RetailSportsCo has improved security and reduced risk by reducing the potential number of targets, and reduced compliance costs by being able to provide auditors with acceptable reports demonstrating compliance. DLP Content Discovery to Reduce Competitive Risk (Industrial Espionage) EngineeringCo is a large high-technology manufacturer of consumer goods with 51,000 employees. In the past they’ve suffered from industrial espionage, when the engineering plans for new and existing products were stolen. They also suffered a rash of unintentional exposures and product plans were accidentally placed in public locations, including the corporate website. EngineeringCo acquired a DLP content discovery solution to reduce these exposure risks and protect their intellectual property. Their initial goal was to reduce the risk of exposure of engineering and product plans. Unlike RetailSportsCo, they decided to start with endpoints, then move into scanning enterprise storage repositories. Since copies of all engineering and product plans reside in the enterprise content management system, they chose a DLP solution that could integrate and continuously monitor selected locations and automatically build partial-document matching policies for all documents. The policy was tested and refined to ignore common language in the files, such as corporate headers and footers, which initially caused every document using the corporate template to register in the DLP tool. EngineeringCo started with a phased deployment to install the DLP endpoint discovery agent on all corporate systems. In phase 1, the tool was rolled out to 100 systems per week, starting with product development teams. The initial policy allowed those teams access to the sensitive information, but documented what was on their systems. Those reports were later mated to their encryption tool to ensure that no unencrypted laptops hold the sensitive data. Phase 2 expanded deployment to the broader enterprise, initially in alerting mode. After 90 days the product was switched into enforcement mode and any identified content outside of the product development teams was quarantined with an alert sent to the user, who could request an exemption. Initial alert rates were high, but user education reduced levels to only a dozen or so “violations” a week during the 90-day grace period. In the coming year EngineeringCo plans to refine their policy to restrict product development employees from placing registered documents onto portable storage. The network component of their DLP tool already restricts emailing and other file transfers outside of the enterprise. They also plan on adding policies to protect employee healthcare information and customer account information. These are, of course, fictional best practices examples, but they’re drawn from discussions with dozens of DLP clients. The key takeaways are: Start small, with a few simple policies and a limited scanning footprint. Grow deployments as you reduce incidents/violations to keep your incident queue under control and educate employees. Start with monitoring/alerting and employee educations, then move on to enforcement. This is risk reduction, not risk elimination. Use the tool to identify and reduce exposures but don’t expect it to magically solve all your data security problems. When you add new policies, test first with a limited audience before rolling them out to the entire scope, even if you are already covering the entire enterprise with other policies. Share:

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Back from Washington D.C. (No thanks to SuperShuttle)

This past Monday, I had the privilege of speaking (along with several peers) to the Commission on Cyber Security for the 44th Presidency about issues on identity theft, breach disclosure and personal privacy in general. It was an honor to present with such a great group of folks. There were some great discussions/debates and I look forward to the opportunity to present again as the Commission works to streamline its recommendations. My written testimony is below. A special thanks to the folks at Emergent Chaos and to Rich for their comments, which made this a much better piece. Any errors or logical fallacies are, of course, my own. Thank you for the opportunity to present to you today on the issue of identity theft. Since the advent of CA1386, we have seen 41 other states pass similar legislation mandating to some degree or another that companies must notify customers or the government when they believe they have suffered a loss of personal data. Unfortunately, each and every state has created slightly different criteria for what constitutes personal information, what a loss is, when notification needs be sent and, to whom it must be sent. As a result there are huge disparities among companies on what they do when they discover they’ve suffered a breach. As much as I prefer to not have even more legislation, I believe that the only solution to this dilemma is to have a uniform federal law that covers the loss of personal information. Rather than preempt state laws, this law should set baseline requirements of: a) Notification to all customers in a timely fashion. b) Notification to a central organization. c) The gathered data about companies suffering breaches must be a matter of public record and un-anonymized. d) Include notification of any personal information that is not a matter of public record. e) Not have a “get out of jail free” card. This last point is key. One of the great weaknesses of CA1386 (and several other states’ legislation as well) is that companies don’t have to notify in case the information was encrypted. Unfortunately, the mere use of encryption does not mean the data was actually obfuscated at the time it was stolen, for instance in cases where a laptop is stolen while the user is logged in. Don’t get me wrong- encryption is important. A well-written law will provide a safe harbor for a company that has lost data. If they can establish that it was encrypted following best practices and that key material was not also lost, the company should be protected from litigation as a result of the breach disclosure. Similarly, many state laws allow companies to choose to not disclose if they believe the data has not been misused. Given that the companies lost the data to begin with, should we really trust their assessment of the risk of misuse, especially when many executives believe it is not in their best interest to not disclose? It is worth noting that following a breach, stock prices do not suffer in the long run and customer loss is approximately 2%. On the other side of the coin from breach disclosure, we have the problem that people don’t know what personal information companies have about them. Part of the outrage behind the ChoicePoint debacle of several years ago was that people didn’t know that this data was even being collected about them to begin with, and had no real way to find out what ChoicePoint might or might not have collected. In Europe as well as in Australia and parts of Asia such as Japan, companies have to both tell customers what data they have and allow them the opportunity to correct any errors. Additionally, there are strict restrictions on what collected personal information may be used for. I believe that it is time that similar protections be available to Americans as well. Share:

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