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Cycling, Baseball, and Known Unknowns

This morning, not even thinking about security, I popped off a tweet on cycling:   I have been annoyed lately, as I keep hearing people write off cycling while ignoring the fact that, despite all its flaws, cycling has a far more rigorous testing regimen than most other professional sports – especially American football and baseball. (Although baseball is taking some decent baby steps). Then I realized this does tie to security, especially in our very current age of selective information sharing. The perception is that cycling has more cheating because more cheaters are caught. Even in Lance’s day, when you really did have to cheat to compete, there was more testing than in many of today’s pro sports. Anyone with half a brain knows that cheating via drugs is rampant in under-monitored sports, but we like to pretend it is cleaner because players aren’t getting caught and going on Oprah. That is willful blindness. We often face the same issue in security, especially in data security. We don’t share much of the information we need to make appropriate risk decisions. We frequently don’t monitor what we need to, in order to really understand the scope of our problems. Sometimes it’s willful, sometimes it is simply cost and complexity. Sometimes it’s even zero-risk bias: we can’t use DLP because it would miss things, even though it would find more than we see today. But when if comes to information sharing I think security, especially over the past year or so, has started to move much more in the direction of addressing the known unknowns. Actually, not just security, but the rest of the businesses and organizations we work for. This is definitely happening in certain verticals, and is trickling down from there. It’s even happening in government, in a big way, and we may see some of the necessary structural changes for us to move into serious information sharing (more on that later). Admitting the problem is the first step. Collecting the data is the second, and implementing change is the third. For the first time in a long time I am hopeful that we are finally, seriously, headed down this long path. Share:

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Directly Asking the Security Data

We have long been fans of network forensics tools to provide a deeper and more granular ability to analyze what’s happening on the network. But most of these network forensics tools are still beyond the reach (in terms of both resources and expertise) of mass markets at this point. Rocky D of Visible Risk tackles the question, “I’m collecting packets, so what now?” in his Getting Started with Network Forensics Tools post. With these tools we can now ask questions directly of the data and not be limited to or rely on pre-defined questions that are based on an inference of subsets of data. The blinders are off. To us, the tools themselves aren’t the value proposition – the data itself and the innovation in analytical techniques is the real benefit to the organization. It always gets back to the security data. Because any filtered and/or normalized view of the data (or metadata, as the case may be) is inherently limited because it’s hard to go back and ask the question(s) you didn’t know to ask at the beginning of the investigation, query, etc. When investigating a security issue, you often don’t know what to ask ahead of time. But that pretty much breaks the model of SIEM (and most security, by the way) because you need to define the patterns you are looking for. Of course we know attackers are unpredictable by nature, so it is getting harder and harder to isolate attacks based on what we know attacks look like. When used properly, network forensic tools can fundamentally change your security organization from the broken alert-driven model into a more effective data-driven analytic model. It’s hard not to agree with this position, but the details remain squishy. Conceptually we buy this analytics-centric view of the world, where you pump a bunch of security data through a magic machine that finds patterns you didn’t know where there – the challenge is to interpret what those patterns really mean in the context of your problem. And that’s not something that will be automated any time soon, if ever. But unless you have the data the whole discussion is moot anyway. So start collecting packets now, and figure out what to do with them later. Share:

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RSA Conference Guide 2013: Cloud Security

2012 was a tremendous year for cloud computing and cloud security, and we don’t expect anything slowdown in 2013. The best part is watching the discussion slowly march past the hype and into the operational realities of securing the cloud. It is still early days, but things are moving along steadily as adoption rates continue to chug along. On the downside, this steady movement is a total buzzkill when it comes to our tendency toward pithy deconstruction. Much of what you see on the show floor (and in all marketing materials for the next couple quarters) represent mere incremental advancements of the trends we identified last year. Cloudwashing is alive and well, the New Kids on the Cloud Security Block are still chugging along patiently waiting for the market to pop (though their investors may not be so patient), data security is still a problem for cloud computing, and ops is handling more security than you realize. What is old is new again. Again. SECaaS: Good for More Than Cheap Laughs We realize we sometimes push the edge of acceptable language during our presentations and blog posts, but nothing seems to garner a laugh better this year than saying ‘SECaaS’. The thing is, Security as a Service is maturing faster than security for cloud services, with some very interesting offerings hitting the market. Some security operations, including inbound email security, web filtering, and WAF, demonstrate clear advantages when implemented outside your perimeter and managed by someone else. You can provide better protection for mobile users and applications, reduce overhead, and keep the easily identified crud from ever hitting your network by embracing SECaaS. One of the most interesting aspects of SECaaS (we know, so juvenile!) is the far-reaching collection of security data across different organizations, and the ability to feed it into Big Data Analytics. Now that we’ve attained our goal of writing Big Data Analytics at least a few times each day, this isn’t all smoke and mirrors – especially for threat intelligence. Pretty much every anti-malware tool worth a darn today relies on cloud-based information sharing and analysis of some sort, along with most of the monitoring and blocking tools with cloud components. We will also touch on this tomorrow for endpoint security. We all know the limitations of sitting around and only getting to see what’s on your own network, but cloud providers can pull data from their entire customer base, so they get a chance to recognize the important bits and react faster. Admittedly, a few neighbors need to get shot before you can figure out who pulled the trigger and what the bullet looked like, but as long as it’s not you, the herd benefits, right? Other areas, such as network monitoring (including forensics), configuration management, and key management, all demonstrate creative uses for the cloud. The trick when looking at SECaaS providers is to focus on a few key characteristics to see if they are really cloud-based, and if they provide benefits over more traditional options. The first acid test is whether they are truly architected for multi-tenancy and security. Throwing some virtual appliances into a few colocation data centers and billing the service monthly isn’t quite good enough to make our personal SECaaS list. Also make sure you understand how they leverage the cloud to benefit you, the customer. Some things don’t make sense to move to the cloud – for example certain aspects of DLP work in the cloud but many others don’t. Will moving a particular function to the cloud make your life easier without reducing security? Skip the marketing folks and sales droids (wearing suits) and find the most anti-social-looking guy or girl you can in a scruffy logo shirt. That’s usually a developer or engineer – ask them what the service does and how it works. SecDevOps or SecByeBye DevOps refers to the operational model of increasing the communications and agility between operations and development to increase overall responsiveness and technology velocity. It relies heavily on cloud computing, agile/iterative development processes, automation, and team structures to reduce the friction normally associated with creating, managing, and updating software applications (internal or external). DevOps is growing quickly, especially in organizations leveraging cloud computing. It is the reason, for example, that many self-service private clouds start as tools for developers. DevOps is more than just another overhyped management trend. Cloud computing, especially IaaS and PaaS, with APIs to manage infrastructure, draw DevOps like a moth to flame. One benefit is that developers don’t need to ask IT ops to provision a server for a new project, and it is irresistible to many developers. If it reduces developer and operations overhead, what’s not to love? Oh, right. Security. Security has a reputation for slowing things down, and while at times that is the right approach, it is often the wrong one. For example, it just doesn’t work well if security has to manually update the firewall for every cloud instance a dev spins up for external testing. Fortunately DevOps also brings some security advantages, such as extensive use of automated configuration scripts and pre-set platforms and applications that can start from a secure state. But what does this all have to do with the RSA Conference? Keep an eye out for security options that tie into agile DevOps approaches if you are evaluating cloud security. These products will typically consume, and even deliver, APIs for automation and scripting. They rely on security policies more than manual operations. Frequently they tie directly into the leading cloud platforms, such as your private cloud or something up on Amazon, Rackspace, Microsoft Azure, or HP. When looking at security tools for cloud computing, definitely talk DevOps with reps on the show floor to see if the tool is as agile as what it’s protecting. Otherwise it’s deader than a red shirt on Walking Dead. (We like to mix analogies). And don’t forget to register for the Disaster Recovery Breakfast if you’ll be at the show on Thursday morning. Where else can you kick your hangover, start a new one, and

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