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As we started exploring when we began Building a Vendor IT Risk Management Program, modern integrated business processes have dramatically expanded the attack surface of pretty much every organization. You can no longer ignore the risk presented by vendors or other business partners, even without regulatory bodies pushing for formal risk management of vendors and third parties. As security program fanatics we figure it’s time to start documenting such a program. Defining a Program First we have never really defined what we mean by a security program. Our bad. So let’s get that down, and then we can tailor it to vendor IT risk management. The first thing a program needs is to be systematic, which means you don’t do things willy-nilly. You plan the work and then work the plan. The processes involved in the program need to be predictable and repeatable. Well, as predictable as anything in security can be. Here are some other hallmarks of a program: Executive Sponsorship: Our research shows a program has a much higher chance of success if there is an executive (not the CISO) who feels accountable for its success. Inevitably security involves changing processes, and maybe not doing things business or other IT groups want because of excessive risk. Without empowerment to make those decisions and have them stick, most security programs die on the vine. A senior sponsor can break down walls and push through tough decisions, making the difference between success and failure. Funding: Regardless of which aspect of security you are trying to systematize, it costs money. This contributes to another key reason programs fail: lack of resources. We also see a lot of organizations kickstart new programs by just throwing new responsibilities at existing employees, with no additional compensation or backfill for their otherwise overflowing plates. That’s not sustainable, so a key aspect of program establishment is allocating money to the initiative. Governance: Who is responsible for operation of the program? Who makes decisions when it needs to evolve? What is the escalation path when someone doesn’t play nice or meet agreed-upon responsibilities? Without proper definition of responsibilities, and sufficient documentation so revisionist history isn’t a factor, the program won’t be sustainable. These roles need to be defined when the program is being formally established, because it’s much easier to make these decisions and get everyone on board before it goes live. If it does not go well people will runn for cover, and if the program is a success everyone will want credit. Operations: This will vary greatly between different kinds of programs, but you need to define how you will achieve your program goals. This is the ‘how’ of the program, and don’t forget about an ongoing feedback and improvement loop so the program continues to evolve. Success criteria: In security this can be a bit slippery, but it’s hard to claim success without everyone agreeing what success means. Spend some time during program establishment to focus on applicable metrics, and be clear about what success looks like. Of course you can change your definition once you get going and learn what is realistic and necessary, but if you fail to establish it up front, you will have a hard time showing value. Integration points: No program stands alone, so there will be integration points with other groups or functions within the organization. Maybe you need data feeds from the security monitoring group, or entitlements from the identity group. Maybe your program defines actions required from other groups. If the ultimate success of your program depends on other teams or functions within the organization (and it does, because security doesn’t stand alone), then making sure everyone is crystal clear about integration points and responsibilities from the beginning is critical. The V(IT)RM Program To tailor the generic structure above to vendor IT risk management you need to go through the list, make some decisions, and get everyone on board. Sounds easy, right? Not so much, but doing this kind of work now will save you from buying Tums by the case as your program goes operational. We cannot going to tell you exactly what governance and accountability needs to look like for your program because that is heavily dependent on your culture and organization. Just make sure someone is accountable, and operational responsibilities are defined. In some cases this kind of program resides within a business unit managing vendor relationships, other times it’s within a central risk management group, or it could be somewhere else. You need to figure out what will work in your environment. One thing to pay close attention to, particularly for risk management, is contracts. You enter business agreements with vendors every day, so make sure the contract language reflects your program objectives. If you want to scan vendor environments for vulnerabilities, that needs to be in your contracts. If you want them to do an extensive self-survey or provide a data center tour, that needs to be there. If your contracts don’t include this kind of language, look at adding an addendum or forcing a contract overhaul at some point. That’s a decision for the business people running your vendors. Defining Vendor Risk: The first key requirement of a vendor risk management program is actually defining categories in which to group your vendors. We will dig into this in our next post, but these categories define the basis for your operation of the entire program. You will need to categorize both vendors and the risks they present so you know what actions to take, depending on the importance of the vendor and the type of risk. Operations: How will you evaluate the risk posed by each vendor? Where will you get the information and how will you analyze it? Do you reward organizations for top-tier security? What happens when a vendor is a flaming pile of IT security failure? Will you just talk to them and inform them of the issues? Will you lock them out of your systems? It will be controversial if you take a vendor off-line, so you need to have had all these

Outsourcing is nothing new. Industries have been embracing service providers for functions they either couldn’t or didn’t want to perform for years. This necessarily involved integrating business systems and providing these third-party vendors with access to corporate networks and computer systems. The risk was generally deemed manageable and rationalized by the business need for those integrated processes. Until it wasn’t. The post-mortem on a recent very high-profile data breach indicated the adversary got into the retailer’s network, not through their own systems, but instead through a trusted connection with a third-party vendor. Basically the attacker owned a small service provider, and used that connection to gain a foothold within the real target’s environment. The path of least resistance into your environment may no longer be through your front door. It might be through a back door (or window) you left open for a trading partner. Business will continue to take place, and you will need to provide access to third parties. Saying ‘no’ is not an option. But you can no longer just ignore the risks vendors present. They dramatically expand your attack surface, which now includes the environments of all the third parties with access to your systems. Ugh. This could be thousands of different vendors. No, we aren’t forgetting that most of you don’t have the skills or resources to stay on top of your own technology infrastructure – not to mention critical data moving to cloud resources. Now you also need to worry about all those other organizations you can neither control nor effectively influence. Horrifying. This is when you expect Tom Cruise to show up, because this sounds like the plot to the latest Mission: Impossible sequel. But unfortunately this is your lot in life. Yet there is hope, because threat intelligence services can now evaluate the IT risk posed by your trading partners, without needing access to their networks. Our new Building a Vendor Risk Management Program series we will go into why you can no longer ignore vendor risk, and how these services can actually pinpoint malicious activity on your vendors’ networks. But just having that information is (no surprise) not enough. To efficiently and effectively manage vendor risk you need a systematic program to evaluate dangers to your organization and objectively mitigate them. We would like to thank our friends at BitSight Technologies, who have agreed to potentially license the content in this series upon completion. As always, we will write the series using our Totally Transparent Research methodology in a totally objective and balanced way. Regulation You know something has been a problem for a while when regulators establish guidance to address the problem. Back in 2013 the regulators overseeing financial institutions in the US seemed to get religion about the need to assess and monitor vendor risk, and IT risk was a subset of the guidance they produced. Of course, as with most regulation, enforcement has been spotty and didn’t really offer a prescriptive description of what a ‘program’ consists of. It’s not like the 12 (relatively) detailed requirements you get with the PCI-DSS. In general, the guidance covers some pretty straightforward concepts. First you should actually write down your risk management program, and then perform proper due diligence in selecting a third party. I guess you figure out what ‘proper’ means when the assessor shows up and lets you know that your approach was improper. Next you need to monitor vendors on an ongoing basis, and have contingency plans in case one screws up and you need to get out of the deal. Finally you need program oversight and documentation, so you can know your program is operational and effective. Not brain surgery, but also not very specific. The most detail we have found comes from the OCC (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency), which recommends an assessment of each vendor’s security program in its Risk Management Guidance. Information Security Assess the third party’s information security program. Determine whether the third party has sufficient experience in identifying, assessing, and mitigating known and emerging threats and vulnerabilities. When technology is necessary to support service delivery, assess the third party’s infrastructure and application security programs, including the software development life cycle and results of vulnerability and penetration tests. Evaluate the third party’s ability to implement effective and sustainable corrective actions to address deficiencies discovered during testing. No problem, right? Especially for those of you with hundreds (or even thousands) of vendors within the scope of assessment. We’ll add our standard disclaimer here, that compliance doesn’t make you secure. It cannot make your vendors secure either. But it does give you a reason to allocate some funding to assessing your vendors and making sure you understand how they affect your attack surface and exploitability. The Need for a Third-Party Risk Program Our long-time readers won’t be surprised that we prescribe a program to address a security need. Managing vendor IT risk is no different. In order to achieve consistent results, and be able to answer your audit committee about vendor risk, you need a systematic approach to plan the work, and then work the plan. Here are the key areas of the program we will dig into in this series: Structuring the V(IT)RM Program: First we’ll sketch out a vendor risk management program, starting with executive sponsorship, and defining governance and policies that make sense for each type of vendor you are dealing with. In this step you will also define risk categories and establish guidelines for assigning vendors to each category. Evaluating Vendor Risk: When assessing vendors you have limited information about their IT environments. This post will dig into how to balance the limitations of what vendors self-report against external information you can glean regarding their security posture and malicious activity. Ongoing V(IT)R Monitoring and Communication: Once you have identified the vendors presenting the greatest risk, and taken initial action, how do you communicate your findings to vendors and internal management? This is especially important for vendor which present significant

As we wrap up this series on SIEM Kung Fu, we have discussed SIEM Fundamentals and some advanced use cases to push your SIEM beyond its rather limited out-of-the-box capabilities. To make the technology more useful over time, you should revisit your SIEM operation process. Many failed SIEM projects over the past 10 years have not been technology failures. More stumble over a lack of understanding of the amount of time and resources needed to get value from the SIEM in early deployments and over time, the amount of effort required to keep them current and tuned. So a large part of SIEM Kung Fu is just making sure you have the people and process in place to leverage the technology effectively and sustainably. Getting Started As a matter of practice you should be focused on getting quick value out of any new technology investment, and SIEM is no exception. Even if you have had the technology in place for years, it’s useful to take a fresh look at the implementation to see if you missed any low-hanging fruit that’s there for the taking. Let’s assume you already have the system up and running, are aggregating log and event sources (including things like vulnerability data and network flows), and have already implemented some out-of-the-box policies. You already have the system in place – you are just underutilizing it. Adversaries For a fresh look at SIEM we recommend you start with adversaries. We described adversary analysis in detail in the CISO’s Guide to Advanced Attackers (PDF). Start by determining who is most likely to attempt to compromise your environment. Defining a likely attacker mission. Then profile potential adversaries to determine the groups most likely to attack you. At that point you can get a feel for the most likely Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for adversaries to use. This information typically comes from a threat intelligence service, although some information sharing groups can also offer technical indicators to focus on. Armed with these indicators you engage your SIEM to search for them. This is a form of hunting, which we will detail later in this post, and you may well find evidence of active threat actors in your environment. This isn’t a great outcome for your organization, but it does prove the value of security monitoring. At that point you can triage the alerts you have received from SIEM searches to figure out whether you are dealing with false positives or a full-blown incident. We suggest you start with the attacks of your most likely adversaries, among the millions of indicators you can search for. And odds are you’ll find lots of things, if you search for anything and everything. By initially focusing on adversaries you are restricting your search to the attack patterns most likely to be used against you. Two Tracks Once you have picked the low-hanging fruit from adversary analysis, focus shifts toward putting advanced use cases into a systematic process that is consistent and repeatable. Let’s break up the world into two main categories of SIEM operations to describe the different usage models: reactive and proactive. Reactive Reactive usage of SIEM should be familiar because that’s how most security teams function. It’s the alert/triage/respond cycle. The SIEM fires an alert, your tier 1 analyst figure out whether it’s legitimate, and then you figure out how to respond – typically via escalation to tier 2. You can do a lot to refine this process as well, so even if you are reacting you can do it more efficiently. Here are a few tips: Leverage Threat Intel: As we described above under adversary analysis, and in our previous post, you can benefit from the misfortune of others by integrating threat intelligence into your SIEM searches. If you see evidence of a recent attack pattern (provided by threat intel) within your environment, you can get ahead of it. We described this in our Leveraging Threat Intel in Security Monitoring paper. Use it – it works. User Behavioral Analytics (UBA): You can also figure out the relative severity of a situation by tracking the attack to user activity. This involves monitoring activity (and establishing the baselines/profiles described in our last post) not just by device, but also aggregating data and profiling activity for individuals. For example, instead of just monitoring the CEO’s computer, tablet, and smartphone independently, you can look at all three devices to establish a broader profile of the CEO’s activity. Then if you see any of her devices acting outside that baseline, that would trigger an alert you can triage/investigate. Insider Threat: You can also optimize some of your SIEM rules around insiders. During many attacks an adversary eventually gains a foothold in your environment and becomes an insider. You can optimize your SIEM rules to look for activity specifically targeting things you know would be valuable to insiders, such as sensitive data (both structured and unstructured). UBA is also useful here because you are profiling an insider and can watch for them doing strange reconnaisance, or possibly moving an uncharacteristially large amount of data. Threat Modeling: Yes, advanced SIEM users still work through the process of looking at specific, high-value technology assets and figuring out the best ways to compromise them. This is predominately used in the “external stack attack” use case described last post. By analyzing the ways to break an application (or technology stack), SOC analysts can build SIEM rules from those attack patterns, to detect evidence an asset is being targeted. Keep in mind that you need to consistently look at your SIEM ruleset, add new attack patterns/use cases, and prune rules that are no longer relevant. The size of your ruleset correlates to the performance and responsiveness of your SIEM, so you need to balance looking for everything (and crushing the system) against your chance of missing something. This is a key part of the ongoing maintenance required to keep your SIEM relevant and valuable. Whether you get new rules from a threat intelligence vendor, drinking buddies, or conferences, new rules require time to refine thresholds and determine relevance to your organization. So we reiterate that SIEM

Everything is a game nowadays. Not like Words with Friends (why yes, since you ask – I do enjoy getting my ass kicked by the women in my life) or even Madden Mobile (which the Boy plays constantly) – I’m talking about gamification. In our security world, the idea is that rank and file employees will actually pay attention to security stuff they don’t give a rat’s ass about… if you make it all into a game. So get departments to compete for who can do best in the phishing simulation. Or give a bounty to the team with the fewest device compromises due to surfing pr0n. Actually, though, it might be more fun to post the link that compromised the machine in the first place. The employee with the nastiest NSFW link would win. And get fired… But I digress. I find that I do play these games. But not on my own device. I’m kind of obsessed with Starbucks’ loyalty program. If you accumulate 12 stars you get a free drink. It’s a great deal for me. I get a large brewed coffee most days. I don’t buy expensive lattes, and I get the same star for every drink I buy. And if I have the kids with me, I’ll perform 3 or 4 different transactions, so I can get multiple stars. When I get my reward drink, I get a 7 shot Mocha. Yes, 7 shots. I’m a lot of fun in the two hours after I drink my reward. And then Starbucks sends out promotions. For a while, if you ordered a drink through their mobile app, you’d get an extra star. So I did. I’d sit in their store, bust open my phone, order the drink, and then walk up to the counter and get it. Win! Extra star! Sometimes they’d offer 3 extra stars if you bought a latte drink, an iced coffee, and a breakfast sandwich within a 3-day period. Well, a guy’s gotta eat, right? And I was ordering the iced coffee anyway in the summer. Win! Three bonus stars. Sometimes they’d send a request for a survey and give me a bunch of stars for filling it out. Win! I might even be honest on the survey… but probably not. As long as I get my stars, I’m good. Yes, I’m gaming the system for my stars. And I have two reward drinks waiting for me, so evidently it’s working. I’m going to be in Starbucks anyway, and drinking coffee anyway – I might as well optimize for free drinks. Oh crap, what the hell have I become? A star whore? Ugh. Let’s flip that perspective. I’m the Star Lord. Yes! I like that. Who wants to be Groot? Pretty much every loyalty program gets gamed. If you travel like I do, you have done the Dec 30 or 31 mileage run to make the next level in a program. You stay in a crappy Marriott 20 miles away from your meeting, instead of the awesome hotel right next to the client’s office. Just to get the extra night. You do it. Everyone does. And now it’s a cat and mouse game. The airlines change their programs every 2-3 years, to force customers to find new ways to optimize milage accumulation. Starbucks is changing their program to reward customers based on what they spend. The nerve of them. Now it will take twice as long to get my reward drinks. Until I figure out how to game this version of the program. And I will, because to me gaming their game is the game. –Mike Photo credit: “Star-Lord ord” from Dex We’ve published this year’s Securosis Guide to the RSA Conference. It’s our take on the key themes you’ll see at this year’s conference (which is really a proxy for the industry), as well as deep dives on cloud security, threat protection, and data security. And there is a ton of meme goodness… Check out the blog post or download the guide directly (PDF). The fine folks at the RSA Conference posted the talk Jennifer Minella and I did on mindfulness at the 2014 conference. You can check it out on YouTube. Take an hour. Your emails, alerts, and Twitter timeline will be there when you get back. Securosis Firestarter Have you checked out our video podcast? Rich, Adrian, and Mike get into a Google Hangout and… hang out. We talk a bit about security as well. We try to keep these to 15 minutes or less, and usually fail. Feb 17 – RSA Conference – The Good, Bad and Ugly Dec 8 – 2015 Wrap Up and 2016 Non-Predictions Nov 16 – The Blame Game Nov 3 – Get Your Marshmallows Oct 19 – re:Invent Yourself (or else) Aug 12 – Karma July 13 – Living with the OPM Hack May 26 – We Don’t Know Sh–. You Don’t Know Sh– May 4 – RSAC wrap-up. Same as it ever was. March 31 – Using RSA March 16 – Cyber Cash Cow March 2 – Cyber vs. Terror (yeah, we went there) February 16 – Cyber!!! February 9 – It’s Not My Fault! January 26 – 2015 Trends Heavy Research We are back at work on a variety of blog series, so here is a list of the research currently underway. Remember you can get our Heavy Feed via RSS, with our content in all its unabridged glory. And you can get all our research papers too. Securing Hadoop Architectural Security Issues Architecture and Composition Security Recommendations for NoSQL platforms SIEM Kung Fu Advanced Use Cases Fundamentals Building a Threat Intelligence Program Success and Sharing Using TI Gathering TI Introduction Recently Published Papers Threat Detection Evolution Building Security into DevOps Pragmatic Security for Cloud and Hybrid Networks EMV Migration and the Changing Payments Landscape Applied Threat Intelligence Endpoint Defense: Essential Practices Cracking the Confusion: Encryption & Tokenization for Data Centers, Servers & Applications Security and Privacy on the Encrypted Network Monitoring the Hybrid Cloud Best Practices for AWS Security The Future of Security Incite 4 U An expensive lie: Many organizations don’t really take security seriously. It has never been proven that breaches cause

Given the advance of SIEM technology, the use cases described in the first post of our SIEM Kung Fu series are very achievable. But with the advent of more packaged attack kits leveraged by better organized (and funded) adversaries, and the insider threat, you need to go well beyond what comes out of the [SIEM] box, and what can be deployed during a one-week PoC, to detect real advanced attacks. So as we dig into more advanced use cases we will tackle how to optimize your SIEM to both a) detect advanced attacks and b) track user activity, to identify possible malicious insider behavior. There is significant overlap between these two use cases. Ultimately, in almost every successful attack, the adversary gains presence on the network and therefore is technically an insider. But let’s take adversaries out of play here, because in terms of detection, whether the actor is external or internal to your organization doesn’t matter. They want to get your stuff. So we’ll break up the advanced use cases by target. It might be the application stack directly (from the outside), to establish a direct path to the data center, without requiring any lateral movement to achieve the mission. The other path is to compromise devices (typically through an employee), escalate privileges, and move laterally to achieve the mission. Both can be detected by a properly utilized SIEM. Attacking Employees The most prominent attack vector we see in practice today is the advanced attack, which is also known as an APT or a kill chain, among other terms. But regardless of what you call it, this is a process which involves an employee device being compromised, and then used as a launching point to systematically move deeper within an organization – to find, access, and exfiltrate critical information. Detecting this kind of attack requires looking for anomalous behavior at a variety of levels within the environment. Fortunately employees (and their devices) should be reasonably predictable in what they do, which resources they access, and their daily traffic patterns. In a typical device-centric attack an adversary follows a predictable lifecycle: perform reconnaissance, send an exploit to the device, and escalate privileges, then use that device as a base for more reconnaissance, more exploits, and to burrow further into the environment. We have spent a lot of time on how threat detection needs to evolve and how to catch these attacks using network-based telemetry. Leveraging your SIEM to find these attacks is similar; it involves understanding the trail the adversary leaves, the resulting data you can analyze, and patterns to look for. An attacker’s trail is based specifically on change. During any attack the adversary changes something on the device being attacked. Whether it’s the device configuration, creating new user accounts, increasing account privileges, or just unusual traffic flows, the SIEM has access to all this data to detect attacks. Initial usage of SIEM technology was entirely dependent on infrastructure logs, such as those from network and security devices. That made sense because SIEM was initially deployed to stem the flow of alerts streaming in from firewalls, IDS, and other network security devices. But that offered a very limited view of activity and eventually become easy for adversaries to evade. So over the past decade many additional data sources have been integrated into the SIEM to provide a much broader view of your environment. Endpoint Telemetry: Endpoint detection has become very shiny in security circles. There is a ton of interest in doing forensics on endpoints, and if you are trying to figure out how the proverbial horse left the barn, endpoint telemetry is great. Another view is that devices are targeted in virtually every attack, so highly detailed data about exactly what’s happening on an endpoint is critical – not just to incident response, but also to detection. And this data (or the associated metadata) can be instrumental when watching for the kind of change that may indicate an active threat actor. Identity Information: Inevitably, once an adversary has presence in your environment, they will go after your identity infrastructure, because that is usually the path of least resistance for access to valuable data. So you need access to identity stores; watch for new account creation and new privilege entitlements, which are both likely to identify attacks in process. Network Flows: The next step in the attack is to move laterally within the environment, and move data around. This leaves a trail on the network that can be detected by tracking network flows. Of course full packet capture provides the same information and more granularity, with a greater demand for data collection and analytics. Threat Intelligence: Finally, you can leverage external threat data and IP reputation to pinpoint egress network traffic that may headed places you know are bad. Exfiltration now typically includes proprietary encryption, so you aren’t likely to catch the act through content analysis; instead you need to track where data is headed. You can also use threat intelligence indicators to watch for specific new attacks in your environment, as we have discussed ad nauseum in our threat intelligence and security monitoring research. The key to using this data to find advanced attacks is to establish a profile of what’s normal within your environment, and then look for anomalous activity. We know anomaly detection has been under discussion in security circles for decades, but it is still one of the top ways to figure out when attackers are doing their thing in your environment. Of course keeping your baseline current and minimizing false positives are keys to making a SIEM useful for this use case. That requires ongoing effort and tuning. Of course no security monitoring tool just works – so go in with your eyes open regarding the amount of work required. Multiple data points Speaking of minimizing false positives, how can you do that? More SIEM projects fail due to alert exhaustion than for any other reason, so don’t rely on any single data point to produce a verdict that an alert is legitimate and demands investigation. Reduction of false positives is even more critical because of the skills gap which

Today is leap day, the last day of February in a leap year. That means the month of February has 29 days. It happens once every 4 years. I have one friend (who I know of) with a birthday on Leap Day. That must have been cool. You feel very special every four years. And you just jump on the Feb 28 bandwagon to celebrate your birthday in non-leap years. Win/win. The idea of a four-year cycle made me curious. What was I doing during leap day in 2012? Turns out I was doing the same thing I’ll be doing today – running between meetings at the RSA Conference. This year, leap day is on Monday, and that’s the day I usually spend at the America’s Growth Capital Conference, networking with CEOs and investors. It’s a great way to take the temperature of the money side of the security industry. And I love to moderate the panels, facilitating debate between leaders of the security industry. Maybe I’ll even interject an opinion or two during the event. That’s been known to happen. Then I started looking back at my other calendar entries for 2012. The boy was playing baseball. Wow, that seems like a long time ago since it seems like forever he’s been playing lacrosse. The girls were dancing, and they had weekend practices getting ready for their June Disney trip. XX1 was getting ready for her middle school orientation. Now she’s in high school. The 4 years represent less than 10% of my life. But a full third of the twins’ existence. That’s a strange thought. And have I made progress professionally? I think so. Our business has grown. We’ll have probably three times the number of people at the Disaster Recovery Breakfast, if that’s any measure of success. The cloud security work we do barely provided beer money in 2012, and now it’s the future of Securosis. I’ve deepened relationships with some clients and stopped working with others. Many of my friends have moved to different gigs. But overall I’m happy with my professional progress. Personally I’m a fundamentally different person. I have described a lot of my transformation here in the Incite, or at least its results. I view the world differently now. I was figuring out which mindfulness practices worked for me back in 2012. That was also the beginning of a multi-year process to evaluate who I was and what changes I needed for the next phase of my life. Over the past four years, I have done a lot of work personally and made those changes. I couldn’t be happier with the trajectory of my life right now. So this week I’m going to celebrate with many close friends. Security is what I do, and this week is one of the times we assemble en masse. What’s not to love? Even cooler is that I have no idea what I’ll be writing about in 2020. My future is unwritten, and that’s very exciting. I do know that by the next time a leap year comes along, XX1 will be midway through college. The twins will be driving (oy, my insurance bill!). And in all likelihood, I’ll be at the RSA Conference hanging out with my friends at the W, waiting patiently for a drink. Most things change, but some stuff stays the same. And there is comfort in that. –Mike Photo credit: “60:366” from chrisjtse We’ve published this year’s Securosis Guide to the RSA Conference. It’s our take on the key themes you’ll see at this year’s conference (which is really a proxy for the industry), along with deep dives into cloud security, threat protection, and data security. And there is a ton of meme goodness… Check out the post or download the guide directly (PDF). It’s that time of year again! The 8th annual Disaster Recovery Breakfast will once again happen at the RSA Conference. Thursday morning, March 3 from 8 – 11 at Jillians. Check out the invite or just email us at rsvp (at) securosis.com to make sure we have an accurate count. The fine folks at the RSA Conference posted the talk Jennifer Minella and I did on mindfulness at the 2014 conference. You can check it out on YouTube. Take an hour. Your emails, alerts, and Twitter timeline will be there when you get back. Securosis Firestarter Have you checked out our video podcast? Rich, Adrian, and Mike get into a Google Hangout and… hang out. We talk a bit about security as well. We try to keep these to 15 minutes or less, and usually fail. Dec 8 – 2015 Wrap Up and 2016 Non-Predictions Nov 16 – The Blame Game Nov 3 – Get Your Marshmallows Oct 19 – re:Invent Yourself (or else) Aug 12 – Karma July 13 – Living with the OPM Hack May 26 – We Don’t Know Sh–. You Don’t Know Sh– May 4 – RSAC wrap-up. Same as it ever was. March 31 – Using RSA March 16 – Cyber Cash Cow March 2 – Cyber vs. Terror (yeah, we went there) February 16 – Cyber!!! February 9 – It’s Not My Fault! January 26 – 2015 Trends January 15 – Toddler Heavy Research We are back at work on a variety of blog series, so here is a list of the research currently underway. Remember you can get our Heavy Feed via RSS, with our content in all its unabridged glory. And you can get all our research papers too. Securing Hadoop Architectural Security Issues Architecture and Composition Security Recommendations for NoSQL platforms SIEM Kung Fu Fundamentals Building a Threat Intelligence Program Success and Sharing Using TI Gathering TI Introduction Recently Published Papers Threat Detection Evolution Building Security into DevOps Pragmatic Security for Cloud and Hybrid Networks EMV Migration and the Changing Payments Landscape Applied Threat Intelligence Endpoint Defense: Essential Practices Cracking the Confusion: Encryption & Tokenization for Data Centers, Servers & Applications Security and Privacy on the Encrypted Network Monitoring the Hybrid Cloud Best Practices for AWS Security The Future of Security Incite 4 U Phisherman’s dream: Brian Krebs has written a lot about small and mid-sized companies being targets for scammers over the last

Apparently the RSA Conference folks failed to regain their senses after letting us have free reign last year to post our RSA Conference Guide to the conference blog. We changed the structure this year, and here is how we explained it in the introductory post of the Guide. In previous years the RSAC-G followed a consistent format. An overview of top-level trends and themes you would see at the show, a deep dive into our coverage areas, and a breakout of what’s on the show floor. We decided to change things up this year. The conference has grown enough that our old format doesn’t make as much sense. And we are in the middle of shaking up the company, so might as well update the RSAC-G while we’re at it. This year we’ll still highlight main themes, which often set the tone for the rest of the security presentations and marketing you see throughout the year. But instead of deep dives into our coverage areas, we are focusing on projects and problems we see many clients tackling. When you go to a conference like RSA, it isn’t really to learn about technology for technology’s sake–you are there to learn how to solve (or at least manage) particular problems and projects. This year our deep dives are structured around the security problems and projects we see toping priority lists at most organizations. Some are old favorites, and others are just hitting the radar for some of you. We hope the new structure is a bit more practical. We want you able to pop open the Guide, find something at the top of your list, jump into that section, and know where to focus your time. Then we take all that raw content and format it into a snazzy PDF with a ton of meme goodness. So you can pop the guide onto your device and refer to it during the show. Without further ado, we are excited to present the entire RSA Conference Guide 2016 (PDF). Just so you can get a taste of the meme awesomeness of the published Guide, check out this image. That’s right. We may be changing the business a bit, but we aren’t going to get more politically correct, that’s for sure. And it’s true. Most n00b responders soil their pants a bit until they get comfortable during incidents. And in case you want to check out the posts on the RSAC blog: Introduction The Securosis Guide to the RSA Conference 2016: The FUD Awakens! Key Themes Yes, all the key themes have a Star Wars flavor. Just because we can. Threat Intelligence & Bothan Spies R2DevOps Escape from Cloud City The Beginning of the End(point) for the Empire Training Security Jedi Attack of the (Analytics) Clones Deep Dives Cloud Security Threat Protection Data Security Share:

[Note: We received some feedback on the series that prompted us to clarify what we meant by scale and context towards the end of the post. See? We do listen to feedback on the posts. – Mike] We started documenting how to build a Threat Intelligence program in our first post, so now it’s time to dig into the mechanics of thinking more strategically and systematically about how to benefit from the misfortune of others and make the best use of TI. It’s hard to use TI you don’t actually have yet, so the first step is to gather the TI you need. Defining TI Requirements A ton of external security data available. The threat intelligence market has exploded over the past year. Not only are dozens of emerging companies offering various kinds of security data, but many existing security vendors are trying to introduce TI services as well, to capitalize on the hype. We also see a number of new companies with offerings to help collect, aggregate, and analyze TI. But we aren’t interested in hype – what new products and services can improve your security posture? With no lack of options, how can you choose the most effective TI for you? As always, we suggest you start by defining your problem, and then identifying the offerings that would help you solve it most effectively. Start with your the primary use case for threat intel. Basically, what is the catalyst to spend money? That’s the place to start. Our research indicates this catalyst is typically one of a handful of issues: Attack prevention/detection: This is the primary use case for most TI investments. Basically you can’t keep pace with adversaries, so you need external security data to tell you what to look for (and possibly block). This budget tends to be associated with advanced attackers, so if there is concern about them within the executive suite, this is likely the best place to start. Forensics: If you have a successful compromise you will want TI to help narrow the focus of your investigation. This process is outlined in our Threat Intelligence + Incident Response research. Hunting: Some organizations have teams tasked to find evidence of adversary activity within the environment, even if existing alerting/detection technologies are not finding anything. These skilled practitioners can use new malware samples from a TI service effectively, then can also use the latest information about adversaries to look for them before they act overtly (and trigger traditional detection). Once you have identified primary and secondary use cases, you need to look at potential adversaries. Specific TI sources – both platform vendors and pure data providers – specialize in specific adversaries or target types. Take a similar approach with adversaries: understand who your primary attackers are likely to be, and find providers with expertise in tracking them. The last part of defining TI requirements is to decide how you will use the data. Will it trigger automated blocking on active controls, as described in Applied Threat Intelligence? Will data be pumped into your SIEM or other security monitors for alerting as described in Threat Intelligence and Security Monitoring? Will TI only be used by advanced adversary hunters? You need to answer these questions to understand how to integrate TI into your monitors and controls. When thinking about threat intelligence programmatically, think not just about how you can use TI today, but also what you want to do further down the line. Is automatic blocking based on TI realistic? If so that raises different considerations that just monitoring. This aspirational thinking can demand flexibility that gives you better options moving forward. You don’t want to be tied into a specific TI data source, and maybe not even to a specific aggregation platform. A TI program is about how to leverage data in your security program, not how to use today’s data services. That’s why we suggest focusing on your requirements first, and then finding optimal solutions. Budgeting After you define what you need from TI, how will you pay for it? We know, that’s a pesky detail, but it is important, as you set up a TI program, to figure out which executive sponsors will support it and whether that funding source is sustainable. When a breach happens, a ton of money gets spent on anything and everything to make it go away. There is no resistance to funding security projects, until there is – which tends to happen once the road rash heals a bit. So you need to line up support for using external data and ensure you have got a funding source that sees the value of investment now and in the future. Depending on your organization security may have its own budget to spend on key technologies; in that case you just build the cost into the security operations budget because TI is be sold on a subscription basis. If you need to associate specific spending with specific projects, you’ll need to find the right budget sources. We suggest you stay as close to advanced threat prevention/detection as you can because that’s the easiest case to make for TI. How much money do you need? Of course that depends on the size of your organization. At this point many TI data services are priced at a flat annual rate, which is great for a huge company which can leverage the data. If you have a smaller team you’ll need to work with the vendor on lower pricing or different pricing models, or look at lower cost alternatives. For TI platform expenditures, which we will discuss later in the series, you will probably be looking at a per-seat cost. As you are building out your program it makes sense to talk to some TI providers to get preliminary quotes on what their services cost. Don’t get these folks engaged in a sales cycle before you are ready, but you need a feel for current pricing – that is something any potential executive sponsor needs to know. While we are discussing money, this is a good point to start thinking about how to quantify the

A few weeks ago I spoke about dealing with the inevitable changes of life and setting sail on the SS Uncertainty to whatever is next. It’s very easy to talk about changes and moving forward, but it’s actually pretty hard to do. When moving through a transformation, you not only have to accept the great unknown of the future, but you also need to grapple with what society expects you to do. We’ve all been programmed since a very early age to adhere to cultural norms or suffer the consequences. Those consequences may be minor, like having your friends and family think you’re an idiot. Or decisions could result in very major consequences, like being ostracized from your community, or even death in some areas of the world. In my culture in the US, it’s expected that a majority of people should meander through their lives; with their 2.2 kids, their dog, and their white picket fence, which is great for some folks. But when you don’t fit into that very easy and simple box, moving forward along a less conventional path requires significant courage. I recently went skiing for the first time in about 20 years. Being a ski n00b, I invested in two half-day lessons – it would have been inconvenient to ski right off the mountain. The first instructor was an interesting guy in his 60’s, a US Air Force helicopter pilot who retired and has been teaching skiing for the past 25 years. His seemingly conventional path worked for him – he seemed very happy, especially with the artificial knee that allowed him to ski a bit more aggressively. But my instructor on the second day was very interesting. We got a chance to chat quite a bit on the lifts, and I learned that a few years ago he was studying to be a physician’s assistant. He started as an orderly in a hospital and climbed the ranks until it made sense for him to go to school and get a more formal education. So he took his tests and applied and got into a few programs. Then he didn’t go. Something didn’t feel right. It wasn’t the amount of work – he’d been working since he was little. It wasn’t really fear – he knew he could do the job. It was that he didn’t have passion for a medical career. He was passionate about skiing. He’d been teaching since he was 16, and that’s what he loved to do. So he sold a bunch of his stuff, minimized his lifestyle, and has been teaching skiing for the past 7 years. He said initially his Mom was pretty hard on him about the decision. But as she (and the rest of his family) realized how happy and fulfilled he is, they became OK with his unconventional path. Now that is courage. But he said something to me as we were about to unload from the lift for the last run of the day. “Mike, this isn’t work for me. I happened to get paid, but I just love teaching and skiing, so it doesn’t feel like a job.” It was inspiring because we all have days when we know we aren’t doing what we’re passionate about. If there are too many of those days, it’s time to make changes. Changes require courage, especially if the path you want to follow doesn’t fit into the typical playbook. But it’s your life, not theirs. So climb aboard the SS Uncertainty (with me) and embark on a wild and strange adventure. We get a short amount of time on this Earth – make the most of it. I know I’m trying to do just that. Editors note: despite Mike’s post on courage, he declined my invitation to go ski Devil’s Crotch when we are out in Colorado. Just saying. -rich –Mike Photo credit: “Courage” from bfick It’s that time of year again! The 8th annual Disaster Recovery Breakfast will once again happen at the RSA Conference. Thursday morning, March 3 from 8 – 11 at Jillians. Check out the invite or just email us at rsvp (at) securosis.com to make sure we have an accurate count. The fine folks at the RSA Conference posted the talk Jennifer Minella and I did on mindfulness at the 2014 conference. You can check it out on YouTube. Take an hour. Your emails, alerts, and Twitter timeline will be there when you get back. Securosis Firestarter Have you checked out our video podcast? Rich, Adrian, and Mike get into a Google Hangout and… hang out. We talk a bit about security as well. We try to keep these to 15 minutes or less, and usually fail. Dec 8 – 2015 Wrap Up and 2016 Non-Predictions Nov 16 – The Blame Game Nov 3 – Get Your Marshmallows Oct 19 – re:Invent Yourself (or else) Aug 12 – Karma July 13 – Living with the OPM Hack May 26 – We Don’t Know Sh–. You Don’t Know Sh– May 4 – RSAC wrap-up. Same as it ever was. March 31 – Using RSA March 16 – Cyber Cash Cow March 2 – Cyber vs. Terror (yeah, we went there) February 16 – Cyber!!! February 9 – It’s Not My Fault! January 26 – 2015 Trends January 15 – Toddler Heavy Research We are back at work on a variety of blog series, so here is a list of the research currently underway. Remember you can get our Heavy Feed via RSS, with our content in all its unabridged glory. And you can get all our research papers too. Securing Hadoop Architectural Security Issues Architecture and Composition Security Recommendations for NoSQL platforms SIEM Kung Fu Fundamentals Building a Threat Intelligence Program Success and Sharing Using TI Gathering TI Introduction Recently Published Papers Threat Detection Evolution Building Security into DevOps Pragmatic Security for Cloud and Hybrid Networks EMV Migration and the Changing Payments Landscape Applied Threat Intelligence Endpoint Defense: Essential Practices Cracking the Confusion: Encryption & Tokenization for Data Centers, Servers & Applications Security and Privacy on the Encrypted Network Monitoring the Hybrid Cloud Best Practices for AWS Security * The Future of Security Incite 4 U Evolution visually: Wade Baker posted a really awesome

Once again Securosis and friends are hosting our RSA Conference Disaster Recovery Breakfast. It’s really hard to believe this is the eighth year for this event. Regardless of San Francisco’s February weather, we expect to be seeing clouds all week. But we’re happy to help you cut through the fog to grab some grub, drinks, and bacon. Kidding aside, we are grateful that so many of our friends, clients, and colleagues enjoy a couple hours away from the show that is now the RSAC. By Thursday we’re all disasters, and it’s very nice to have a place to kick back, have some conversations at a normal decibel level, and grab a nice breakfast. Did we mention there will be bacon? With the continued support of Kulesa Faul, we’re honored to bring two new supporters in this year. If you don’t know our friends at CHEN PR and LaunchTech, you’ll have a great opportunity to say hello and thank them for helping support your habits. As always the breakfast will be Thursday morning from 8-11 at Jillian’s in the Metreon. It’s an open door – come and leave as you want. We will have food, beverages, and assorted non-prescription recovery items to ease your day. Yes, the bar will be open – Mike has acquired a taste for Bailey’s in his coffee. Please remember what the DR Breakfast is all about. No marketing, no spin, no t-shirts, and no flashing sunglasses – it’s just a quiet place to relax and have muddled conversations with folks you know, or maybe even go out on a limb and meet someone new. After three nights of RSA Conference shenanigans, we are confident you will enjoy the DRB as much as we do. See you there. To help us estimate numbers, please RSVP to rsvp (at) securosis (dot) com. Share: