I saw an interesting news item: the NSA has changed their mindset and approach to data security. Their new(?) posture is that Security Has Always Been Compromised. Debora Plunkett of the NSA’s “Information Assurance Directorate” stated:

There’s no such thing as ‘secure’ any more. The most sophisticated adversaries are going to go unnoticed on our networks. We have to build our systems on the assumption that adversaries will get in. We have to, again, assume that all the components of our system are not safe, and make sure we’re adjusting accordingly.

I started thinking about how I would handle this problem and it became mind-boggling. I assume compartmentalization and recovery is the strategy, but the details are of course the issue. Just the thought of going through the planning and reorganization of a data processing facility the size of what the NSA (must) have in place sent chills down my spine. What a horrifically involved process that must be! Just the network and security technology deployment would be huge; the disaster recovery planning and compartmentalization – especially what to do in the face of incomplete forensic evidence – would be even more complex.

How would you handle it? Better forensics? How would you scope the damage? How do you handle source code control systems if they are compromised? Are you confident you could identify altered code? How much does network segmentation buy you if you are not sure of the extent of a breach?

To my mind this what Mike has been covering with his ‘Vaults’ concept of segmentation, part of the Incident Response Fundamentals. But the sheer scope and complexity casts those recommendations in a whole new light. I applaud the NSA for the effort: it’s the right approach. The implementation, given the scale and importance of the organization, must be downright scary.