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Be Careful What You Wish for…Now You’re CISO

Hat tip to our pals at TripWire, who do a good job of leveraging the security community to generate interesting and entertaining content. They have a guy named David Spark who roams around the floor at trade shows like RSA and captures video. A recent video asked, What would you do if you became CISO? Responses ranged from “fall off the wagon and drink heavily” to “ask for more budget” to “give myself a big-ass raise.” I definitely like that last one. But an ongoing theme involved updating your resume. That’s pretty funny. Who said security folks are pessimists? Of course the first thought that entered my mind was to grab the hemlock. But after that faded I’d go buy some guy’s book on being a Pragmatic CSO (hint, hint). I guess my advice is to forget almost everything you knew about technology. The position you’re now in is about persuasion and influence. It’s not about configuring firewalls or squeezing another $2-3 per device out of your endpoint protection vendor. There are some entertaining responses in the video, so check it out and get a few laughs. Then get back to work. Things don’t protect themselves, do they? Share:

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Announcing the CCSK UK Train the Trainer Class in April

Clearly the world is not enough. So I’ll be getting my 007 on in the UK in early April to deliver our Cloud Security Training. We have recently updated the curriculum to the Cloud Security Alliance Guidance V3.0, and I have to say it kicks butt. Many of the hands-on exercises have been overhauled, and if you are looking to get familiar with cloud security you will want to check out this class. I am personally training because part of this class will be a third day to train the next group of CCSK curriculum instructors. As authors of the training curriculum, we are the only folks who can train and certify instructors, so a couple times a year we deliver the courses ourselves, live and in person. The CSA is making a fairly serious investment in the CCSK, as evidenced by their recent announcement naming HP as a Master Training Partner. So if you do training, or would like cloud security to be a larger part of your business, getting certified as a CCSK trainer would be a good thing. If you want to become certified to teach, you need to attend one of these courses. And even if you aren’t interested in teaching, it’s also a good opportunity to get trained by the folks who built the course. You can get details and sign up for the training in Reading, UK, April 8-10. Here is the description of each of the 3 days of training: There is a lot of hype and uncertainty around cloud security, but this class will slice through the hyperbole and provide students with the practical knowledge they need to understand the real cloud security issues and solutions. The Certificate of Cloud Security Knowledge (CCSK) – Basic class provides a comprehensive one day review of cloud security fundamentals and prepares them to take the Cloud Security Alliance CCSK certification exam. Starting with a detailed description of cloud computing, the course covers all major domains in the latest Guidance document from the Cloud Security Alliance, and the recommendations from the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA). The Basic class is geared towards security professionals, but is also useful for anyone looking to expand their knowledge of cloud security. (We recommend attendees have at least a basic understanding of security fundamentals, such as firewalls, secure development, encryption, and identity management). The CCSK-Plus class builds upon the CCSK Basic class with expanded material and extensive hands-on activities with a second day of training. The Plus class (on the second day) enhances the classroom instruction with real world cloud security labs! Students will learn to apply their knowledge as they perform a series of exercises, as they complete a scenario bringing a fictional organization securely into the cloud. This second day of training includes additional lecture, although students will spend most of their time assessing, building, and securing a cloud infrastructure during the exercises. Activities include creating and securing private clouds and public cloud instances, as well as encryption, applications, identity management, and much more. The CCSK Instructor workshop adds a third day to train prospective trainers. More detail about how to teach the course will be presented, as well as a detailed look into the hands-on labs, and an opportunity for all trainers to present a portion of the course. Click here for more information on the CCSK Training Partner Program (PDF). We look forward to seeing you there. Share:

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New Paper: Network-based Threat Intelligence

Hot on the heels of our Building an Early Warning System paper, we have taken a much deeper look at the network aspect of threat intelligence in Network-based Threat Intelligence. We have always held to the belief that the network never lies (okay – almost never), and that provides a great basis on which to build an Early Warning System. This excerpt from the first section sums it up pretty nicely: But what can be done to identify malicious activity if you don’t have the specific IoCs for the malware in question? That’s when we look at the network to yield information about what might be a problem, even if controls on the specific device fail. Why look at the network? Because it’s very hard to stage attacks, move laterally within an organization, and accomplish data exfiltration without using the network. This means attackers leave a trail of bits on the network, which can provide a powerful indication of the kinds of attacks you are seeing, and which devices on your network are already compromised. This paper will dig into these network-based indicators, and share tactics to leverage them to quickly identify compromised devices. Hopefully shortening this detection window will help to contain the damage and prevent data loss. Hit the landing page or you can download the paper directly (PDF) We would like to thank Damballa for licensing the content in this paper. Obviously we wouldn’t be able to do the research we do, or offer it to you folks for this most excellent price, without clients licensing our content. Share:

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Friday Summary, RSA Edition: March 1, 2012

Rich here, I need to apologize a bit for sending the Summary out a day late. As most of you know, this week is the big annual RSA Conference and we, Securosis, were busy as heck with conference activities. Between e10+, the Security Blogger’s Meetup, the Securosis Disaster Recovery Breakfast, and tons of conference meetings, it is the busiest week of our year. Well, except for me. As many of you know I spent the week here in Phoenix waiting for the birth of my next child. The due date was Monday, and there was no way in hell I was going to take the risk of missing that for a conference. But as you might guess based on the tone of this post, the kid is a no show. It was weird to miss RSA for the first time in many years. I was prepared to miss the social side of the show; as much as I enjoy seeing everyone, a conference is for work and I frequently dodge parties for meetings, to finish slides, or to stay rested. On the business development front I’m the first to admit Mike is a lot better at BD, and he probably closed more business for me than I could have closed myself. It was really nice to sit back and wait for the text messages of people I need to follow up with (thanks Mike!). What I didn’t expect was how much I miss the energy boost. You see, one thing about the nature of our business is that we often work in a vacuum. We advise users and vendors, and maybe get to see the outcomes someday, but we don’t get a lot of direct feedback on our work. This is important not only to ensure we that are on the right track, but it also helps keep us motivated. I don’t get a performance evaluation and bonus at the end of the year if I did well. I am extremely internally motivated. Anyone who works at home, for themselves, has to be or they don’t survive very long. But I’m also human, and we are social creatures. At RSA we get to engage with a much wider range of people than we do in our day-to-day work, and we get face-to-face feedback from people who use our research but don’t necessarily leave comments or feedback. Based on reports from the guys who were out there we are definitely on track, but hearing it isn’t the same as shaking the person’s hand or having breakfast with them. I can’t lie – I really missed that this year. I missed the feedback, good and bad, instead of talking to a blank screen or a captive audience before running to catch a plane. I don’t regret my decision in the slightest – my family is far more important than any of what i just talked about. I like the way Chris Hoff put it during the session we would have presented together had the baby come early, “the cost of missing RSA is a lot less than the cost of a divorce”. And one advantage is that I was here to get the Cloud Security Alliance Nexus launched. The CSA Nexus is a branded version of the Nexus platform we have been developing for two years. We launched with the CSA first because, at our annual internal planning meeting, we decided we needed to rework our content a bit before we go live for Securosis customers. It’s exciting to have actual, paying customers, and to get this thing out of the lab. It’s also weird to be a product manager, not just an analyst. We are going to open up our beta test again after we get a little more server work done, and we are still working out the dates for our official Securosis Nexus launch, but it should be soon. We are making a big bet on this platform, and I suspect getting actual customers in there will more than compensate for missing a few handshakes, head nods, and spilled beers. Note: since everyone was out this week and I was focused on the Nexus launch, this week’s Summary is missing most of the usual sections. Securosis in the news Rich on passwords in Digital Trends. Securosis posts Shattered Windows – the Impact of Attack Automation. Go buy Take Control of Your Passwords. Bit9 Details Breach. About the Security Blogger’s Meetup. Looky here. Adaptive Authentication works… When is a Hack a Breach? The Nexus Is Live with the Cloud Security Alliance! Everything I need to know about security, I learned in kindergarten. The end of MDM (as we know it). Or not. Attribution Meh. Indicators YEAH! Other news More Java 0-day. We are now adding this to the Summary with a weekly script. Botnet shut down live at RSA. AirWatch grabs $200M in funding. We don’t normally cover these things, but that is an insane amount of money. An interview with a ski patroller. Because I really miss ski patrol. Share:

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Shattered Windows: the Impact of Attack Automation

In 2011, our friend Josh Corman codified “HD Moore’s Law”: Casual Attacker power grows at the rate of Metasploit For those who don’t know, Metasploit, created by HD Moore, is a free penetration testing framework (it is now owned by Rapid7, who also sells a commercial version). Metasploit allows an attacker to rapidly combine an exploit with a payload and initiate attacks, dramatically reducing the complexity compared to hand-coding an attack yourself. Unlike other commercial tools such as Immunity Canvas and Core Impact, Metasploit has a large community, and when new vulnerabilities or exploits become public they are typically converted into Metasploit modules extremely quickly (sometimes within hours). Once a module is published, anyone using Metasploit can leverage that attack. But Metasploit isn’t the only automated attack tool. Criminals have their own toolsets and markets, some of which advertise inclusion of 0-day vulnerabilities (for a price) and include better support than most of the security tools on the market. Being profitable, they fund their own research teams or acquire new exploits on the open market. Some software vendors have started talking about this in public, as Microsoft outlined in their RSA talk on their response to Flame. Brad Arkin from Adobe has also talked about this and presented hard data on their patch times and public disclosures and exploits. In the article Microsoft didn’t call out Metasploit or the criminal attack tools, but the inference is clear. There is no longer a window to patch when a vulnerability or exploit is discovered, in public or private.* If it isn’t public, it has already been used in attacks or – thanks to changes in the exploit market – sold to someone who intends to use it in attacks. If it is public, it will be included in attack tools (good and bad) faster than most vendors can create and distribute a patch, or most users can deploy even if the patch is available. Some vulnerabilities are still reported privately to vendors, but we can no longer assume this is the norm, especially for some of the most serious vulnerabilities with high market value. Cloud computing also affects this in both good and bad ways, but the core principle is the same. If a cloud service is a target they have nearly no time to patch, but when they do they can patch for all users at once (for public clouds). To be clear, I don’t consider Metasploit or other penetration testing tools ‘bad’. They are extremely important for security professionals to understand and use, but that doesn’t mean they can’t be misused. Share:

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Go buy Take Control of Your Passwords

Joe Kissell, with whom I ‘work’ over at TidBITS, just published Take Control of Your Passwords. Joe asked me to review the book ahead of time, and it should be mandatory reading (no, I don’t get a cut – that’s my honest opinion). Joe covers the range of password issues I have ranted on before, then includes specific strategies for managing them. Many of you who read this site might not need the book, but I guarantee nearly everyone you know will get something out of it, even if they only read some sections. Seriously, it is extremely pragmatic and informative. Share:

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Bit9 Details Breach

Bit9 released more details of how they were hacked. The level of detail is excellent, and there seems to be minimal or no spin. There are a couple additional details it might be valuable to see (specifics of the SQL injection and how user accounts were compromised), but overall the post is clear, with a ton of specifics on some of what they are finding. More security vendors should be open and disclose with at least this level of detail. Especially since we know many of you cover up incidents. When we are eventually breached, I will strive to disclose all the technical details. I gave Bit9 some crap when the breach first happened (due to some of their earlier marketing), but I can’t fault how they are now opening up. Share:

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Looky here. Adaptive Authentication works…

It’s funny how some technologies fall out of the hype cycle and folks kind of forget about them. But that doesn’t mean these technologies don’t work any more. Au contraire, it usually means a technology works too well, and just isn’t exciting to talk about any more. Let’s take the case of adaptive authentication: using analytics to determine when to implement stronger authentication. It appears Google has started taking an adaptive approach to authentication for Gmail over the past 18 months: Every time you sign in to Google, whether via your web browser once a month or an email program that checks for new mail every five minutes, our system performs a complex risk analysis to determine how likely it is that the sign-in really comes from you. In fact, there are more than 120 variables that can factor into how a decision is made. If a sign-in is deemed suspicious or risky for some reason–maybe it’s coming from a country oceans away from your last sign-in–we ask some simple questions about your account. Yeah, man. Not that a targeted attacker won’t have those answers based on some rudimentary recon. Obviously there are ways to beat this approach, but for run-of-the-mill attackers, more challenging authentication provides enough of a bar to get them looking elsewhere. Remember, these folks chase the path of least resistance, and there are tons of cloud-based email services to chase that don’t perform this kind of sophisticated analytics on authentication requests. And amazingly enough, it works. Using security measures like these, we’ve dramatically reduced the number of compromised accounts by 99.7 percent since the peak of these hijacking attempts in 2011. Good on Google. Maybe they are evil, but at least they are trying to improve security. Share:

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About the Security Blogger’s Meetup

Seven years ago I had recently started blogging and emailed a few other bloggers to see if we should get together at the RSA Conference. Some of these people I knew, many I didn’t, and I thought it would be fun to have face to face arguments with a beer in hand, instead of behind a keyboard (with a beer in hand). Very very quickly we received offers to sponsor, and we turned it into an actual invite-only event organized by myself, Martin McKeay, and Alan Shimel, with Jennifer Leggio doing, literally, all the hard work. This year I’m missing the event (and the Securosis Disaster Recovery Breakfast tomorrow morning) since my wife is about to have a baby. Maybe; these things seem somewhat unpredictable. A lot has changed about the Meetup. The RSA Conference itself is an official sponsor thanks to Jeanne Friedman. There is a waiting list for sponsors. And the number of attendees is now hitting a couple hundred, not the few dozen of that first year when we hopped cabs to a dodgy part of town for a nice dinner. We have entertainment, an effectively unlimited beverage budget, and the Social Security Awards. What hasn’t changed is what this event is all about, and based on feedback we are getting, a lot of people miss the point. The SBM is by security bloggers for security bloggers. This isn’t merely another RSA event that anyone can get into if they know the right person. The only people admitted, to the best of our ability to manage, are bloggers. No plus-ones, no friends, no marketing managers (even if they manage your blog). It doesn’t matter if you do a lot for the blogger community – you need to be a member of the community. That means someone who writes (or podcasts) and is a subject matter/technical expert (and yes, we use that term loosely) and contributes to the security community dialog. Your ticket is your name on a byline of a security blog (not a security company blog, depending on the content). Look, those of us running this thing for the past 7 years are volunteers. We do our best, and that means we sometimes make mistakes. But this isn’t run by a company or even the sponsors – it’s run by the handful of people who started it out of nowhere. We are going to make some changes next year. A bigger venue, some changes in sponsorship, and maybe a few other tweaks (like letting spouses in, which we can’t do this year due to capacity). But the one thing that won’t change is who this event is for, and why we hold it. It is the Security Blogger’s Meetup, and those words pretty clearly define the event. You can get into a lot of RSA parties based on who you know, but this one is based on what you do, and the choice is yours. Share:

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When is a Hack a Breach?

As the hubbub over Apple, Twitter, and Facebook being hacked with the Java flaw slowly ebbs, word hit late last week that Microsoft was also hit in the attack. Considering the nature of the watering hole attack, odds are that many many other companies have been affected. This begs the question: does it matter? The headlines screamed “Apple and Facebook Hacked”, and technically that’s true. But as I wrote in the Data Breach Triangle, it isn’t really a breach unless the attacker gets in, steals or damages something, and gets out. Lockheed uses the same principle with its much-sexier-named Kill Chain. Indications are that Apple and Microsoft, and possibly Facebook, all escaped unscathed. Some developers’ computers were exploited, the bad guys got in, they were detected, and nothing bad happened. I do not know if that was the full scope of the exploits, but it isn’t unrealistic, and successful hacks that aren’t full-on breaches happen all the time. I care about outcomes. And someone bypassing some controls but being stopped is what defense in depth is all about. But you rarely see that in the headlines, or even in many of our discussions in the security world. It is the exact reason I didn’t really write about the hacks here before – from what I could tell some of the vendors disclosed only because they knew it probably would have come out once the first disclosure happened, because their use of the site was public. Share:

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