Research

Back in the comments to one of my posts on Database Activity Monitoring, Rani asked the question of who should own DAM? I’m going to expand the question to cover all of database security. This is a pretty tough question we can take in a couple of directions. Out at Oracle OpenWorld last week it was pretty clear that database professionals and security professionals don’t overlap nearly as much as we really need for efficient database security. It’s not a failing of any particular group, just the reality that people who do different jobs have different skill sets, even when they come from the same background. Come January I’ll be having an orthopedic surgeon fixing my bum shoulder, not my dermatologist. Security experts don’t necessarily know the difference between DML or DDL, or how to write an outside join, just as DBAs don’t necessarily know the difference between AES and 3DES. Eventually we’ll have a growing cadre of security-aware DBAs and database-aware security professionals. Until then we need to slice up the functions a bit and I highly recommend cross-training when you can. I’m not saying that long term we’ll have some uber-DBA/security experts running all database security without outside influence, but some of the functions might consolidate a bit once those skills are easier to find. Here’s how I slice it: DBAs are responsible for secure design and configuration of the database management system. A security architect can assist with security design review, but this is an ideal area to increase the security knowledge of the DBA. IT Security performs configuration and vulenrability scanning of the database. Results are passed to the database team for remediation, and if a policy violation can’t be fixed for some operational reason, security and the database team need to come up with a joint risk remediation plan that’s documented as an exception. Native database auditing is the responsibility of the DBAs. Management of those logs can be either security or the database team, depending on the purpose of the logs. If separation of duties is required, security becomes responsible for log aggregation and maintenance. Database Activity Monitoring is another joint process. DBAs are involved with the installation, database-side configuration, and maintenance of any database-resident components. Security owns the DAM tool and its ongoing operation. For this to work well, someone on the security team needs basic database training. In summary, DBAs are responsible for securely designing and configuring their systems, and installing and locally managing (just to keep them running) any database-resident security components that affect the database. Security is responsible for external monitoring and ongoing scanning of deployed systems. This creates a good separation of duties and allows each side to do what they’re best at. It relies on any DBA-installed components sending regular health checks/heartbeats back to security to make sure they aren’t disabled. I realize cross-team responsibilities like this can be difficult, but I don’t see any other better approach. In some cases I’ve seen someone on the database team be designated as being responsible for database security, but just remember you’ll lose separation of duties if that individual also has operational database duties. Share:

As most of you have probably figured out by now I tend to expend a lot of hot air trying to define DLP/CMF/CMP (Data Loss Prevention, Content Monitoring and Filtering, or Content Monitoring and Protection). I often take vendors to task for abusing the terms, since they are just increasing market confusion. As Rothman points out it won’t be me, or any particular vendor, that really defines DLP. Only the market defines the market, although some of us influential types occasionally get to nudge it in our preferred direction. While I took Postini/Google to task for calling regular expressions on a single channel (email) DLP, the dirty little secret of DLP is that probably 80-90% of deployments today rely mostly, or totally, on regex for content analysis. Barely anyone deploys the fancy advanced features that I spend so much time talking about, and that the vendors spend so much time developing. So why do I spend so much time fighting for the purity of DLP? It’s because most organizations, in the long run, will only get a fraction of the value of their investment in terms of risk reduction and operational efficiencies without us pushing the products forward with new features and more advanced analysis. But if all you want to do is detect on credit card and Social Security Numbers, and you find that the false positives are manageable, something with a regex engine is probably good enough for you. At least for now. Share:

Apple just released an update to Leopard, version 10.5.1. The support document says the following: Addresses a code signing issue; third-party applications can now run when included in the Application Firewall or when whitelisted in Parental Controls. In Security preferences’ Firewall tab, the “Block All” option is now called “Allow Only essential services” Well, I suppose that’s some kind of progress. At least it’s labelled accurately. I’ve been really slammed this week, but Chris and I should have the instructions for using WaterRoof in combination with our template ipfw rule set and the Application Firewall soon (hopefully today). I’ve tested the update and the application firewall still signs applications, but instead of just failing to launch modified applications, we’re now prompted to allow access manually again if they change. Code signing can be rough because of issues like this, and I think the prompt is a reasonable solution. However, I would prefer it to say, “This application has been modified since its last use; please click to allow network access” so we know that it’s a real change to the application and not just a random prompt to approve again. In a separate document, Apple details some additional security updates to the application firewall. Most notably, the firewall will now block processes running as root if you specify them in the application firewall. Based on these updates I’m now running the application firewall with ipfw, and will try and get those instructions posted soon. Not that any of this matters much since there are no network attacks on Macs in the wild right now, but we all know that can’t last… Share:

While I was off traveling, Martin posted the latest episode of the Network Security Podcast. Rather than posting the show notes here, I’d like to redirect you to our new site: NetSecPodcast.com. This is where we’ll be posting all the show notes, taking feedback on episodes, and posting any content and updates directly related to the show. This week we covered a few quick issues, then we spent 10 minutes playing Mystery Science Theater on Martin’s very first episode. Oh, I didn’t mention this is the 2 year anniversary of the show? Congrats Martin, and thanks for bringing me on- hopefully I’m not dragging the show down too fast… Share:

I’ve been invited to give the keynotes at both the SANS Data Leakage Summit and the Mobile Encryption Summit. Both are at the Dolphin hotel at Disney in Orlando. The DLP event is on December 3rd and 4th, and the encryption event on the 5th and 6th. Here’s my affiliate link to SANS if you’re interested in the events. At the DLP event I’ll be presenting Three Steps To Selecting A DLP Product And The Top Five Features To Look For. I’ll also be releasing Understanding And Selecting A Data Loss Prevention Solution as a white paper, which will also be distributed online by SANS and sponsored by Websense. Over at the encryption event I’m presenting Understanding and Preventing Data Breaches. It’s a general presentation, not specific to just encryption. These conferences are designed for those in the planning or implementation phases for DLP or mobile encryption. There are a couple of presentations like mine, but most of the event is panels with users with real experience using the products. As a preview, here’s a QuickTime movie of the DLP pitch’s opening. I hope to see you there… Share:

Rules revised. As suggested by windexh8er, here’s a set of ipfw rules to customize for your own Macs or FreeBSD systems. Note that your private home network should have a non-standard IP range, both to support VPN across standard IP ranges, and for improved security, so your personal allow rules don’t match other networks you may find yourself wandering through. The rules are below, but you’ll probably have an easier time if you download the rule file from http://securosis.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/11/ipfw-securosis.txt. In WaterRoof, you can import these rules with “Tools > Rules Configuration > Import rules from file..”. To check your ipfw rules, use “sudo ipfw list”. When you’re satisfied with your rules, install them for future reboots with “Tools > Rules Configuration > Save to startup configuration” and “Tools > Startup Script > Install Startup Script”. # DO NOT USE THESE RULES without customizing them first! # Version: 2007/11/15 # For more information, see http://securosis.com/2007/11/15/ipfw-rules/ # These rules *MUST* be customized to your requirements. # In particular, if you have a private home network (behind an AirPort # Base Station, Linksys WRT54G, etc.), change “10.42.24.0/24” below to # your private network range. # Additionally, allow only ports you actually use; other ports should be # blocked by the ipfw firewall. # Thanks to: # Rich Mogull http://securosis.com # windexh8er: http://www.slash32.com/ # Lee: http://thnetos.wordpress.com/ # Chris Pepper http://www.extrapepperoni.com/ # Apple (Server Admin is a good way to create an ipfw ruleset) # http://www.apple.com/server/macosx/ # FreeBSD (where Apple got ipfw) http://www.freebsd.org/ # We don’t really want this, but it’s unavoidable on Mac OS X Server, so # document it here (serialnumberd) # 100 allow udp from any 626 to any dst-port 626 # Let me talk to myself over the loopback add 200 allow ip from any to any via lo0 # Loopback addresses on non-loopback interfaces are bogus add 300 deny log logamount 1000 ip from any to 127.0.0.0/8 add 310 deny log logamount 1000 ip from 224.0.0.0/4 to any in # Block multicast if you don’t use it # add 400 deny log ip from 224.0.0.0/4 to any in # Accept responses to my client programs add 500 check-state # If we let the conversation begin, let it continue add 600 allow tcp from any to any established # Let my programs get out. add 700 allow tcp from any to any out keep-state add 710 allow udp from any to any out keep-state # Change this to DENY fragments if you don’t need them. add 800 allow udp from any to any in frag # Block bogus inbounds that claim they were established # add 900 deny log tcp from any to any established in # add 1000 allow icmp from 10.9.7.0/24 to any icmptypes 8 # Server Admin provides these by default add 1100 allow icmp from any to any icmptypes 0 add 1110 allow igmp from any to any # mDNS (Bonjour) from trusted local networks (fill in your own, # preferably non-standard, networks after ‘from’) # For Back to My Mac, you might need this from ‘any’ # add 5000 allow udp from 10.42.24.0/24 to any dst-port 5353 # add 5010 allow udp from 10.42.24.0/24 5353 to any dst-port 1024-65535 in # DNS (note TCP is required, but this one should scare you — much # better to only allow packets from your trusted nameservers, if you # always use the same ones) add 5100 allow tcp from any to any dst-port 53 add 5110 allow udp from any to any dst-port 53 add 5120 allow tcp from any to any dst-port 53 out keep-state add 5130 allow udp from any to any dst-port 53 out keep-state # ssh add 5200 allow tcp from any to any dst-port 22 # iTunes music sharing #add 5300 allow tcp from 10.42.24.0/24 to any dst-port 3689 # AFP #add 5400 allow tcp from 10.42.24.0/24 to any dst-port 548 # HTTP (Apache); HTTPS # add 5500 allow tcp from any to any dst-port 80 # add 5510 allow tcp from any to any dst-port 443 # L2TP VPN # add 5600 allow udp from any to any dst-port 1701 # add 5610 allow esp from any to any # add 5620 allow udp from any to any dst-port 500 # add 5630 allow udp from any to any dst-port 4500 # iChat: local #add 5700 allow tcp from 10.42.24.0/24 to any dst-port 5298 #add 5710 allow udp from 10.42.24.0/24 to any dst-port 5298 #add 5720 allow udp from 10.42.24.0/24 to any dst-port 5297,5678 # Server Admin SSL (Mac OS X Server only) # add 5800 allow tcp from 10.42.24.0/24 to any dst-port 311 # add 5810 allow tcp from 10.42.24.0/24 to any dst-port 427 # add 5820 allow udp from 10.42.24.0/24 to any dst-port 427 # syslog # add 5900 allow udp from 10.42.24.0/24 to any dst-port 514 # ipp (CUPS printing) # add 6000 allow tcp from 10.42.24.0/24 to any dst-port 631 # MTU discovery add 10000 allow icmp from any to any icmptypes 3 # Source quench add 10100 allow icmp from any to any icmptypes 4 # Ping out; accept ping answers add 10200 allow icmp from any to any icmptypes 8 out add 10210 allow icmp from any to any icmptypes 0 in # Allow me to traceroute add 10300 allow icmp from any to any icmptypes 11 in # My default policy: log and drop anything that hasn’t matched an allow # rule above add 65534 deny log logamount 1000 ip from any to any # Hard-coded default allow rule (compiled into Darwin kernel) add 65535 allow ip from any to any Share:

I was quite bemused today to read this article in NetworkWorld that Google’s Postini is jumping into DLP. Google”s Postini division today announced that its e-mail-content-filtering service has been enhanced to detect “logical expressions,” such as credit-card data and Social Security numbers. … Adam Swidler, Postini senior product manager, says the e-mail security service includes filtering of more “sophisticated expressions” that extend beyond Postini”s earlier limits to keywords. “This is for compliance and content-policy management, with content-based inspection for inbound and outbound traffic,” he says. “Today it’s for companies using Gmail, but we expect to extend this to instant messaging, the Web and the rest of Google Apps, like Google Spreadsheets.” I don’t see why they can’t just call it regular expressions like everyone else. This is a great example of a vendor hopping on the bandwagon by adding a small part of DLP functionality to a product line. Knowing the problems even established, dedicated DLP vendors have with false positives I suspect this will be a bit more challenging than Google/Postini realizes. Not that a basic DLP feature or two don’t have value in lower-risk environments; something as basic as this might work for some of you out there, as long as you manage your expectations. If anything, I think this, combined with the Vontu acquisition, might finally nudge DLP to the peak of the Hype Cycle. Share:

I’ll be on the “Threats Jeopardy” panel at 11:15 over in Yerba Buena Theater. Meetings are booked up for the day, but I’ll be back in the area on the 29th. Share:

Amrit Williams dropped a post on some of the new cases, and new penalties, for certain kinds of cybercrime. In it he states: The risk/reward for committing cybercrime is shifting, which will not result in less cybercrime only more sophisticated criminal activity. So more evidence that hostile actors will become more organized, more sophisticated, and much harder to detect with traditional security measures. I tend to agree slightly- as you raise the stakes the potential reward needs to increase at least proportionally to the risk, but Amrit’s missing the main point. Mike Rothman gets us closer: … but I’m not sure they are going to behave differently whether they are subject to 10 years or 3 years in the pokey. Whether the fine is $250,000 or $10 million. I don’t know much, but I suspect that most bad guys don’t want to get caught. … The folks know what’s at stake, but they don’t think they’ll be caught. And there’s the rub. The biggest penalties in the world are totally ineffective as a deterrent if they aren’t enforced. From compliance, like PCI, HIPAA, and SOX, to cybercrime, a law isn’t a law until someone goes to jail for it. Rothman nails it- right now the bad guys act with near impunity because they know the odds of getting caught are low. If all we do is improve enforcement of existing laws, and learn how to better enforce cybercrime laws across international boundaries (that’s a biggie) we’ll do FAR more to reduce cybercrime than increasing the penalties. Share:

This isn’t a shopping holiday. It’s time to give thanks to those who defend us all, regardless of your feelings towards any officials (elected or otherwise). I read recently that 1 in 4 homeless are veterans, yet vets are only 11% of the population (sorry, no link). That’s a travesty, and instead of looking for a sale, consider donating to a vet-friendly charity. I’ll be donating to the Fisher House today. Share: