Research

Detecting malware feels like a losing battle. Between advanced attacks, innovative attackers, and well-funded state-sponsored and organized crime adversaries, organizations need every advantage they can get to stop the onslaught. We first identified and documented Network-Based Malware Detection (NBMD) devices as a promising technology back in early 2012, and they have made a difference in detecting malware at the perimeter. Of course nothing is perfect, but every little bit helps. But nothing stays static in the security world so NBMD technology has evolved with the attacks it needs to detect. So we updated our research to account for changes in scalability, accuracy, and deployment: The market for detecting advanced malware on the network has seen rapid change over the 18 months since we wrote the first paper. Compounding the changes in attack tactics and control effectiveness, the competition for network-based malware protection has dramatically intensified, and every network security vendor either has introduced a network-based malware detection capability or will soon. This creates a confusing situation for security practitioners who mostly need to keep malware out of their networks, and are uninterested in vendor sniping and trash talking. Accelerating change and increasing confusion usually indicate it is time to wade in again and revisit findings to ensure you understand the current decision criteria – in this case of detecting malware on your network. So this paper updates our original research to make sure you have the latest insight for your buying decisions. The landing page is in our Research Library. You can also download Network-based Malware Detection 2.0: Assessing Scale, Accuracy and Deployment (PDF) directly. We would like to thank Palo Alto Networks for licensing the content in this paper. Obviously we wouldn’t be able to do the research we do, or offer it to you without cost, without companies supporting our research. Share:

Payment gateways and payment processors have to pass PCI requirements just like merchants do. And they don’t like it any more than you do, as evidenced by recent post by Stephen Ames of Shift4. He is pissed about a new interpretation of PA-DSS, provided to his QSA outside the officially published guidance and standards, which places PA-DSS section 4.2.7 always in scope. From the post: However, my PA-QSA stated that PA-DSS Requirement 4.2.7 is now always in scope, regardless of whether or not there is a user database within the application. … I’ve searched the PA-DSS for a security requirement that aligns with PCI DSS 11.5 – File Integrity Monitoring – and there are none. I’m certain that most application vendors would not take responsibility for file integrity monitoring at merchant sites. And I’m unable to understand why the SSC is forcing that upon application vendors, when they don’t even have that requirement written into the PA-DSS. I searched the PCI FAQ database and found no reference to a reinterpretation of PA-DSS Requirement 4.2.7 requiring vendors to take responsibility for file integrity monitoring of their PA-DSS applications running in merchant environments. Once again, PA-DSS Requirement 4.2.7 aligns with DSS Requirement 10.2 and user access, not DSS Requirement 11.5. … and … “The SSC sends out compliance guidance to the assessor community.” … it now appears the PCI SSC has fallen back into its old ways of keeping participating organizations in the dark. While file activity monitoring – and database activity monitoring as well – are often used as compensating controls for PCI-DSS section 10.2, they are not prescribed in the standard. But rather than accept an ‘always-on’ requirement – and what policies would be appropriate without a database to monitor? – Mr. Ames is trying to engage the community to devise a rational policy for when to apply monitoring and when not to. But Stephen is not going to get a better response than “those assessors are drinking the PCI Kool-Aid”. No matter whether his arguments make sense or not. They cannot. Several assessors I know have received phone calls from the PCI Council after writing blog posts or comments that interpreted – or worse, ameliorated – PCI scripture. They were reminded that they must always frame the PCI standard in a positive light or forfeit their ability to remain an assessor. So no frank public discussion will take place. This sort of thing has been going on for a long time without signs of getting better. The PCI publishes the PCI standards, which are insulated from public critique by the mandatory requirements signed by assessors and participating organizations. So even the most knowledgable parties who advised the council can’t speak out because that would break their agreements! That’s why, when things like non-guidance guidance are published, there is little subsequent discussion. By design, information only flows in one direction: downhill. Share:

From Declan McCullagh at CNet: Google has begun experimenting with encrypting Google Drive files, a privacy-protective move that could curb attempts by the U.S. and other governments to gain access to users’ stored files. Two sources told CNET that the Mountain View, Calif.-based company is actively testing encryption to armor files on its cloud-based file storage and synchronization service. One source who is familiar with the project said a small percentage of Google Drive files is currently encrypted. Tough technical problem for usability, but very positive if Google rolls this out to consumers. I am uncomfortable with Google’s privacy policies but their security team is top-notch, and when ad tracking isn’t in the equation they do some excellent work. Chrome will encrypt all your sync data – the only downside is that you need to be logged into Google, so ad tracking is enabled while browsing. Share:

If you want a feel for how long 80 years is, here are a few facts. In 1933, the President was Herbert Hoover until March, when FDR became President. The Great Depression was well underway in the US and spreading around the world. Hitler first rose to power in Germany. And Prohibition was repealed in the US. I’ll certainly drink to that. Some famous folks were born in 1933 as well. Luminaries such as Joan Collins, Larry King, and Yoko Ono. Have you seen Larry or Yoko lately? Yeah, 80 seems pretty old. Unless it’s not. My father-in-law turned 80 this year. In fact his birthday was yesterday and he looks a hell of a lot better than most 80-year-olds. He made a joke at his birthday party over the weekend that 80 is the new 60. For him it probably is. He has been both lucky and very healthy. We all think his longevity can be attributed to his outlook on life. He has what we call jokingly _the Happy Gene.. In the 20 years I have been with the Boss I have seen him mad twice. Twice. It’s actually kind of annoying – I probably got mad twice already today. But the man is unflappable. He’s a stockbroker, and has been for 35 years, after 20 years in retail. Stocks go up, he’s cool. Stocks go down, he’s cool. Clients yell at him, he’s cool. He just doesn’t get bent out of shape about anything. He does get fired up about politics, especially when I intentionally bait him, because we see things from opposite sides. He gets excited about baseball and has been known to scream at the TV during Redskins games. But after the game is done or the discussion is over, he’s done. He doesn’t hold onto anger or perceived slights or much of anything. He just smiles and moves on. It is actually something I aspire to. The Boss said a few words at his party and summed it up perfectly. She had this entire speech mapped out, but when I heard her first sentence I told her to stop. It’s very hard to sum up a lifestyle and philosophy in a sentence, but she did it. And anything else would have obscured the beauty of her observation. Worry less, enjoy life more. That’s it. That’s exactly what he does, and it has worked great for 80 years. It seems so simple yet it’s so hard to do. So. Hard. To. Do. But for those, like my father-in-law, who can master worrying less… a wonderful life awaits. Even when it’s not so wonderful. Happy Birthday, Sandy. I can only hope to celebrate many more. –Mike Photo credit: “Dad’s 80th Birthday Surprise” originally uploaded by Ron and Sandy with Kids Heavy Research We are back at work on a variety of blog series, so here is a list of the research currently underway. Remember you can get our Heavy Feed via RSS, where you can get all our content in its unabridged glory. And you can get all our research papers too. The Endpoint Security Buyer’s Guide Introduction Continuous Security Monitoring Classification Defining CSM Why. Continuous. Security. Monitoring? Database Denial of Service Attacks Introduction API Gateways Implementation Key Management Developer Tools Security Analytics with Big Data Deployment Issues Integration New Events and New Approaches Use Cases Introduction Newly Published Papers Quick Wins with Website Protection Services Email-based Threat Intelligence: To Catch a Phish Network-based Threat Intelligence: Searching for the Smoking Gun Understanding and Selecting a Key Management Solution Building an Early Warning System Incite 4 U Social responsibility: Before I get too far I need to acknowledge that this is definitely a bit of he said/she said. Now that has been put out there, what we know is that Microsoft released a patch for a bug discovered and released on the full disclosure list by security researcher Tavis Ormandy (who works for Google, but I think that’s incidental here). Microsoft stated last week that the bug is being actively used in targeted attacks after it was disclosed.. Tavis was clear that he didn’t notify Microsoft before posting the details publicly. Here’s what I think: we all have a social responsibility. While MS may have treated Tavis poorly in the past – justified or not – his actions put the rest of us at risk. It’s about users, not Microsoft or the researcher. If Tavis knew the bug was being used in the wild, I support full disclosure. If the vendor doesn’t respond or tries to cover it up and users are at risk, disclose publicly and quickly. But at least give them a chance, which requires thinking about the impact on everyone else first. To be balanced, vendors have a responsibility to respond in a timely fashion, even if it isn’t convenient. But to release a bug with no evidence that anyone else is using it? That doesn’t seem responsible. – RM Identity theft fullz up: Interesting research hit this week from Dell SecureWorks, per a Dark Reading article, about seeing complete packets of stolen information (fullz), including healthcare information, appearing in marketplaces for $1,200 or so. With a full kit an attacker would have everything they need for identity theft, including counterfeit documents such as driver’s licenses and health insurance cards. Also interesting were that credit cards with CVV can be had for $1-2 each, although a prestige card (such as AmEx Black) can cost hundreds. This is Mr. Market at work. Prices for commodities go down but valuable information still demands a premium. It appears online game accounts are a fraud growth market because turning virtual items into real money can be easier due to less stringent fraud detection. – MR Easier than making coffee: Gunnar Peterson’s keynote at CIS2013 was full of valuable witticisms (the entire presentation is on his blog) – but made a particularly profound point regarding code security: it needs to be so easy that a seventeen-year-old can do it time and time again without fail. Gunnar drew a parallel between Five Guys’ recipe for burger success against behemoth competitors:

Threat modeling involves figuring out ways the system can be gamed and your [fill in the blank] can be compromised. Great modelers can take anything and come up with new ways to question the integrity of the system. When it comes to 0-day attacks, many tend to focus on increasingly sophisticated fuzzers and other techniques to find holes in code, like the tactics described in the Confessions of a Cyber Warrior interview. But Jeremiah takes a step back to find yet another logic flaw in our assumptions of our adversaries in this succinct and eye opening tweet. As 0-days go for 6 to 7 figures, imagine the temptation for rogue developers to surreptitiously implant bugs in the software supply chain. I can see it now. The application security marketing engine will get ramped up around the rogue developer threat, which is just another form of the insider attack bogey man, starting in 3, 2, 1… But the threat is real. The real question is whether awareness of this kind of adversary would change how you do application security. I’m sure my partners (and many of you) have opinions about what should be done differently. Share:

I am in a bit over my head here, but take a look at the first two presentations at the Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy. Intel is preparing to introduce a new capability in their processors to support use of secure encrypted memory spaces on commodity CPUs. Their objective is to provide applications with a secure ‘enclave’ (their term) with a protected memory and execution space. It’s called Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX). This could be significant – especially for battling malware and cloud computing. Think secure key management in the cloud with hardware-enforced sandboxes on endpoints. Developers will need to code their software to use the feature, so this isn’t an overnight fix. However… It seems like a powerful tool to battle malware on endpoints, especially if operating system manufacturers leverage the capability in Windows and OS X to further improve their sandboxes. And imagine a version of Java or Flash that’s fully isolated. This could offer material improvements to hypervisor security – for example by eliminating memory parsing attacks. And encrypted memory should mean volatile memory (RAM) is even protected from cloud administrators trying to peek at encryption keys. HSM vendors should also keep an eye on this because it might offer comparable security to hardware-based key managers (but probably not for key generation and a few other important pieces, for those who need them). Think of virtual HSMs and key managers that run within the cloud, without the worry of keys being compromised in memory. It looks extremely interesting but I freely admit that some of it is over my head. But if I am reading right, the long-term potential to improve security is impressive. Share:

A group of us were talking about key takeaways for the 2013 Cloud Identity Summit last week in Napa. CIS 2012 focused on getting rid of passwords; but the conversation centered on infrastructure and identity standards such as OAuth, OpenID Connect, and SAML, which provide tool to authenticate users to cloud services. 2013 was still about minimizing usage of passwords, but focused on the client side where the “rubber meets the road” with mobile client apps. Our discussion highlighted different opinions regarding the two principal models presented at the conference for solving single sign-on (SSO) issues for mobile devices. One model, the Authorization Agent (AZA) is an app that handles authentication and authorization services for other apps. KNOX is a Samsung-specific container that provides SSO to apps in the container. It’s heartening to hear developers stress that unless they get the end user experience right, the solution will not be adopted. No disagreement on that but buyers have other issues of equal importance, and I think we are going to see mobile clients embrace these approaches over the next couple years so it is worth discussing the issues in an open public forum. So I am throwing out the first pitch in this debate. Statement I believe the KNOX “walled garden” mobile app authentication model offers a serious challenge to Authorization Agents (AZA) – not because KNOX is technically superior but because it provides a marginally better user experience while offering IT better management, stronger security, and a familiar approach to mobile apps and data security. I expect enterprises to be much more comfortable with the KNOX approach given the way they prefer to to manage mobile devices. I am not endorsing a product or a company here – just saying I believe the subtle difference in approach is very important to the buyers. Problem User authentication on mobile devices must address a variety of different goals: a good user experience, not passing user IDs and passwords around, single sign-on, support for flexible security tokens, Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) or equivalent, and data security controls – just to name a few. But the priority is to provide single sign-on for corporate applications on mobile devices. Unfortunately the security model in most mobile operating systems is primarily intended to protect apps for other apps, so SSO (which must manage authentication for multiple other apps) is a difficult problem. Today you need to supply credentials for every app you use, and some apps require re-authentication whenever you switch between apps. It gets even worse if you use lengthy passwords and a password manager – the process looks something like this: You start the app you need to run, bounce over to the password manager, log into the password manager, grab credentials, bounce back to the original application, and finally supply credentials (hopefully pasting them in so you don’t forget or make an invisible typo). At best case it’s a pain in the ass. Contrasting Approaches Two approaches were discussed during CIS 2013. I will simplify their descriptions, probably at the expense of precision, so please comment if you believe I mischaracterized either solution. First, let’s look at the AZA workflow for user authentication: The AZA ‘agent’ based solution is essentially an app that acts as a gateway to all other (corporate) apps. It works a bit like a directory listing, available once the user authenticates to the AZA agent. The workflow is roughly: a. The app validates the user name and password (1.). b. The app presents a list of apps which have been integrated with it. c. The user selects the desired app, which requests authentication tokens from an authorization server (2.). d. The tokens enable the mobile application to communicate with the cloud service (Box, Evernote, Twitter, etc). If the service requires two-factor authentication the user may be provided with a browser-based token (3.) to supplement their username and password. e. The user can now use the app (4.). For this to work, each app needs to be modified slightly to cooperate with the AZA. KNOX is also an agent but not a peer to other apps – instead it is a container that manages apps. The KNOX (master) app collects credentials similarly to AZA, and once the container app is opened it also displays all the apps KNOX knows about. The user-visible difference is that you cannot go directly to a corporate app without first validating access to the container. But the more important difference for data security is that the container provides additional protection to its apps and stored data. The container can verify stack integrity, where direct application logins do not. KNOX also requires apps be slightly modified to work within in the container, but it does not require a different authentication workflow. User authentication for KNOX looks like this – but not on iOS: Rationale Both approaches improvement on standalone password managers, and each offers SSO, but AZA is slightly awkward because most users instinctively go directly to the desired app – not the AZA service. This is a minor annoyance from a usability standpoint but a major management issue – IT wants to control app usage and data. Users will forget and log directly into productivity apps rather than through the AZA if they can. To keep this from happening AZA providers need the app vendor to alter their apps to a) check for the presence of an AZA, b) force users through the AZA if present, and c) pass user credentials to the AZA. The more important issue is data security and compliance as drivers for mobile technologies. The vast majority of enterprises use Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI) to manage mobile data and security policy, and the KNOX model mirrors the VDI model. It’s a secure controlled container, rather than a loosely-coupled federation of apps linked to an authorization agent. A container provides a clear control model which security organizations are comfortable with today. A loose confederation of applications cannot guarantee data security or policy enforcement the way containers can. One final point on buying centers: buyers do not look for the ‘best’

Adrian makes a number of excellent points. Enterprises need better usability and management for mobile devices, but co-mingling these goals complicates solutions. Adrian contrasted two approaches: AZA and KNOX, which I also want to discuss. Let me start by saying I think we are in the first or second inning for mobile. I do not expect today’s architectural choices to stick for 10+ years. I think we will see substantial evolution, root and branch, for a while. Here is a good example of a mobile project: The Wall St. Journal just published their 1,000th edition on iPad. It is a great example of a mobile app, works in both offline and online modes, is easy to navigate and packed with information (okay – just ignore the editorial page) – it is a great success. The way they started the project is instructive: Three and a half years ago, The Wall Street Journal locked six people in a windowless room and threw down a secret challenge: Build us an iPad app. You have six weeks. And so we did. We started with a blank slate–no one had ever seen a tablet news app before. This is not uncommon for mobile projects. A few takeaways: We are learning our lessons as we go. There is an architectural vision but it evolves quickly and adapts, and did I mention we are leaning as we go? Evolution today is less about enterprise-level grand architecture (we already have those, called iOS and Android, themselves evolving while we scramble to keep up) – it is incremental improvement. Looking at AZA vs. KNOX from ground level, I see attractive projects for enterprise, with AZA more focused the here and now. KNOX seems to be shooting for DOD today, and enterprise down the road. This all reminds me of how Intel does R&D. They roll out platforms with a tick/tock pattern. Ticks are whole new platforms and tocks are incremental improvements. To me AZA looks like classic tock: it cleans up some things for developers, improves capabilities of existing systems, and connects some dots. KNOX is a tick: it is a new ballgame, new management, and a new way to write apps. That doesn’t mean KNOX cannot succeed, but would the WSJ start a new project by learning a new soup-to-nuts architecture just to handle security requirements (remember: you need to launch in six weeks)? I know we as security people wish they would, but how likely is that in the near term, really? The positive way to look at this choice is that, for a change, we have two interesting options. I may be overly pessimistic. It is certainly possible that soup-to-nuts security models – encompassing hardware, MAC, Apps, Platforms – will rule from here on out. There is no doubt plenty of room for improvement. But the phrase I keep hearing on mobile software projects is MVP: Minimum Viable Product. KNOX doesn’t fit that approach – at least not for most projects today. I can see why Samsung wants to build a platform – they do not want to be just another commoditized Android hardware manufacturer, undifferentiated from HTC or Googorola. But there is more to it than tech platforms – what do customers want? There is at least one very good potential customer for KNOX, with DOD-type requirements. But will it scale to banks? Will KNOX scale to healthcare, manufacturing, and ecommerce? That is an open question, and app developers in those sectors will determine the winner(s). Share:

I was reading Roger Grimes’ interview with an offensive cybersecurity operator, and one key quote really stood out: I wish we spent as much time defensively as we do offensively. We have these thousands and thousands of people in coordinate teams trying to exploit stuff. But we don’t have any large teams that I know of for defending ourselves. In the real world, armies spend as much time defending as they do preparing for attacks. We are pretty one-sided in the battle right now. As much as I enjoy playing offensive security guy once a year at Defcon, I find defense to be a much more interesting challenge. Unfortunately many in our community don’t consider it as ‘sexy’ as penetration testing or vulnerability research. We need to change that. Most of us started our exploration of technology as hackers. I am fully willing to admit I was fascinated by cracking systems, and engaged in activities as a kid that could land me in jail now. Nothing major – I always assumed it was much easier to catch hackers and phreaks than it really was. I mean seriously, it wouldn’t have been all that hard back then. It turns out no one was looking – who knew? That’s what I get for assessing national computer law enforcement capabilities based on repeated viewings of War Games. But breaking things is, in many ways, far less challenging than protecting them. I am sick and tired of seeing researchers and pen testers on various mailing lists brag about how easy it is to get into their clients’ systems. I suspect the ones who understand the complexity of defending complex environments with limited resources keep their mouths shut. Breakers, with very few exceptions, aren’t accountable. Outside of movies, there are no consequences if they fail. Not yet, at least. No guns to the head as you sit in front of 32 widescreen monitors with 8 keyboards spread out in front of you and a coked- megelomaniac watching you waste part of your 60-second window on a visualization so your code looks good for the cameras. Nope. Builders? Defenders? Our lives are nothing but accountability. We are the firefighters, doctors, cops, and engineers all wrapped into one. Without us who would keep the porn flowing? It is a far more complex challenge, with nowhere near enough disciples. Many of our smartest focus on offensive security for obvious economic reasons. If you are good there is more money, less accountability, and more freedom. Smart defenders, even if they come up with a groundbreaking idea, need time and resources to build it – which often means productizing it and dealing with idiotic investors and bureaucracies. There are far fewer opportunities for smart defenders to perform research leading to practical tools and techniques. The only thing that can change this is money. Sure, I’d love to lead a cultural revolution, but that is more my desire to send people to re-education camps than any inherent belief we will all suddenly focus on defense due to some higher calling. (I’m serious about the camps – I have some awesome ideas). We need some serious investment – and not in academic institutions who often fail to remember sh*t needs to work outside a lab. Breaking and offensive research are important. Doing them well is hard. But defending? That is a challenge. I suspect I will be talking about this at Defcon. But with more beer. On to the Summary: Webcasts, Podcasts, Outside Writing, and Conferences Adrian’s DR Post Why Database Assessment. Rich has another article at Macworld on security for switchers. Rich’s DR post: Security Needs More Designers. Mike’s article at Information Week. Dave Lewis on Disaster Recovery at CSO Online Favorite Securosis Posts Mike Rothman: Using Amazon IAM Roles to Distribute Security Credentials (for Chef). Holy crap. A blog post from an analyst with code and screen shots! OMG… See, some analyst have some kung fu after all. David Mortman: Rich’s first post on security automation. Rich: Continuous Security Monitoring: Classification. This is a good series. Other Securosis Posts The Endpoint Security Buyer’s Guide [New Series]. Living to fight another day…. Another Disclosure Debacle, with a Twist. Using cloud-init and s3cmd to Automatically Download Chef Credentials. Incite 7/10/2013: Selfies. Kudos: Microsoft’s App Store Security Policy. How Not to Handle a Malware Outbreak. RSA Acquires Aveksa. Multitenancy is the Least Interesting Security Property of Cloud Computing. Continuous Security Monitoring: Defining CSM. Calendar Bites Google Security in the Ass. Proactive WebAppSec. Why. Continuous. Security. Monitoring? [New Series]. New Paper: Quick Wins with Website Protection Services. Database Denial of Service: Attacks. OpenStack Security Guide Released. Favorite Outside Posts Mike Rothman: Proving the skeptics wrong. You can only achieve true success when you do things for the right reasons. Seth Godin reminds me that proving someone wrong isn’t one of them. At some point you run out of people to rail against… Adrian Lane: Data Leakage In A Google World. People forget that Google is a powerful tool and often finds data companies did not want exposed. It’s a tool to hack with, and yes, a tool to phish with. Chris Pepper: Solaris patching is broken because Oracle is dumb and irresponsible. David Mortman: Dear Speaker, I Loathe You. Sincerely, Your Event Planner. Funny. Rich: No, Hacker Really Does Mean Hacker. Yep. Get over it. Research Reports and Presentations Quick Wins with Website Protection Services. Email-based Threat Intelligence: To Catch a Phish. Network-based Threat Intelligence: Searching for the Smoking Gun. Understanding and Selecting a Key Management Solution. Building an Early Warning System. Implementing and Managing Patch and Configuration Management. Defending Against Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks. Securing Big Data: Security Recommendations for Hadoop and NoSQL Environments. Tokenization vs. Encryption: Options for Compliance. Pragmatic Key Management for Data Encryption. Top News and Posts Google releases fix to OEMs for Blue Security Android security hole. This is seriously ugly. How the US (probably) spied on European allies’ encrypted faxes. Researcher finds way to commandeer any Facebook account from his mobile phone. Crimelords: Stolen credit cards… keep ‘em. It’s all about banking logins now. DEF CON to Feds. Aeroplan Provides Proactive Customer Alerting A Black Hat,

@gepeto42 had a good post: Windows Azure SQL Database, formely known as SQL Azure, is Microsoft’s managed database platform in Azure. While it is based on Microsoft SQL Server, it has various limitations that can impact how you secure and manage it. It also has some features that can help improve security. Helpful details. I am really hunting for more real-world cloud security examples, so please keep them coming… Share: