Could Yahoo!/Microsoft Affect Web 2.0 Security?

It’s no surprise that I’m a big fan of Microsoft’s Trustworthy Computing Initiative- something I was skeptical of when it was first announced. MS proved me wrong, and years later we’ve seen a very positive impact. Vulnerabilities are down, response times are up, and products ship in more secure configurations. Yes, they still screw up every now and then, but it’s overall been a huge improvement. Just because I don’t like to use Vista doesn’t mean I don’t appreciate all the security work that went into it, and let’s not forget all the benefits across the rest of the product line. Go count SQL Server 2005 vulnerabilities if you want any proof. You’ll only need one hand, and you’ll have 4 fingers left over (5, if you really look where the vuln came from). If MS buys Yahoo! and implements TCI, the impact could be enormous. Google isn’t doing a very good job of managing security issues, and if these things hit a certain point they could affect user behavior. Realistically it will take 3-5 years for the full implications of TCI to affect any product line, but we’ll see incremental improvements fairly quickly. Yahoo!’s security track record isn’t all that bad to start with, and I much prefer their privacy policy over Google’s. Should Microsoft! use security for competitive advantage (and it work), we can expect Google to respond fairly quickly. They aren’t stupid, and if security affects business they will get on the ball immediately. None of this, of course, will come to pass if market forces don’t place a priority on security. It doesn’t even need to be a top priority, just somewhere moderately high on the list. There could also be peripheral benefits to a major Web 2.0 company building the tools, techniques, and education for secure coding. My guess? Nothing earth shattering, but if the deal goes through there will be a net security benefit substantial enough that we’ll all be referring back to it in our blog posts in 5 years. < p style=”text-align:right;font-size:10px;”>Technorati Tags: Application security, Microsoft, Yahoo! Share:

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John Moltz 0day Pwns All Macs In Microsoft Plot

Securosis is in possession of damning documentation that proves, without a doubt, that John Moltz of Crazy Apple Rumors has taken control of all Macs through his ingenious use of the, “woe is me, I lost my funding, come to my site and cry your goodbyes” scam. We also possess genealogical evidence, provided by the Mormon church, proving that Motz is the bastard artificial child of John Gruber and Dave Maynor. During the infamous Black Hat Mac hacking incident, Maynor and Gruber were simultaneously drugged by Steve Ballmer and their genetic material was sampled. Ballmer then broke into a lab used by the Gates Foundation for malaria research and combined the genes to produce the ultimate Mac security threat. A snippet of a secret email sent by Ballmer reveals his evil plot: By combining the most hated OS X security researcher with the most beloved Mac enthusiast into a mindless creature under my control I will infiltrate the Apple community and use that trust to install a devastating trojan on all Macs, everywhere. We will final[sic][hic] wipe out Apple and control the hearts and minds of the world. BWAHAHAHAHAHAHA! Moltz, obeying the commands of his master in Redmond, used jokes blatantly stolen from Fake Steve Jobs (also a Ballmer creation) to draw humor-starved Mac enthusiasts to CARS. He then installed exploit code on CARS for an 0day Safari vulnerability and announced his so-called “break” to draw sufficient traffic to pass the critical threshold for his malicious software to achieve self-propagation. The code has since become self aware, joining with the Storm Worm and Facebook. It is expected to cross over into the mosquito population within weeks, overtaking bird flu as the greatest threat to humanity. Moltz is also responsible for global warming, and a kitten dies every time he laughs. … (For those who don’t know, CARS is going on hiatus and is a great loss to the tech community. It only linked to Securosis once, but that still drives more traffic than anything I write on enterprise security. We’ll miss ya John. Please start drinking heavily again so we get our daily laugh.) Share:

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Ask Securosis: Security vs. Productivity

This week’s question in our Ask Securosis series moves past a technology question into the realm of management and statistical research. Scott asks: … It seems that the companies Jason identified in his study have become the most productive in their industry sectors by streamlining, removing wasteful process, empowering staff, etc. (scary prospects for security professionals). Obviously, there is a cross-over point, of sorts, where this starts to impact information security in a way that puts them at risk for a big set-back that was just hadn’t happened yet. I’d really like to find any references to studies regarding how “good security” positively or negatively impacts long term productivity. We security geeks have a gut feel that it has a positive effect, if done right. But we need data to prove it. In all your market research experience have you come across any such studies, and do you feel they provide solid evidence or arguments for the case of Security vs. Productivity? If you don’t know of any, then chances are that there aren’t any well documented ones. Since I don’t have the resources to do this kind of study myself, I’m thinking of approaching a university business school to see if they can do a follow-up study on the companies Jason found, and look at their records on security. Or I guess I could try to ask the author himself. I think this is a key issue for managers struggling to understand the trade-offs in security: how much productivity will they be foregoing if they commit to a real security initiative. I’d like to explore this idea more to help them understand the impacts. No, I’m not aware of any study linking security with productivity metrics. Or even correlating highly productive companies with their security postures. Since I can’t point you in the right direction to get the answer you’re looking for, I’ll focus on providing a few aspects to look at if you do decide to link up with a university and perform a proper study. My gut feeling is there is an empirical problem in attempting a study like this. While we can accurately measure the productivity impact of certain security controls, correlating that to the additional risk exposure would, by nature, involve introducing risk metrics that are neither as precise nor as accurate as those measuring productivity. Risk measurements in infosec involve the use of estimates that don’t accurately reflect the full financial exposure of insufficient controls. We can never fully measure losses or potential losses, thus the numbers will be oranges to the apples of productivity measurements. The result ensures it’s nearly impossible to use these measurements to balance security vs. productivity, and depending on how the numbers skew we will draw the wrong conclusions. For example, they may show that passwords hurt productivity by X dollars, and security risk drops by an estimated Y dollars, with said estimate being nearly impossible to calculate accurately. We might end up thinking that because we’ve never had a system compromised due to a weak password, we don’t need them at all. Okay, an extreme example, so here are a few ideas on how I’d look at the research. Ideally I would try and find two organizations with equally good productivity, but variable security. If we can normalize enough of the variables, and find a big enough sample set, that gives us a good macro view on any causality. We might also look at a very productive company vs. a very secure company that isn’t productive. Good luck finding that. But I think what you really want to do is devise a model to determine the productivity impact of potential security controls, not just security in general. You should be able to measure that for any specific security control as long as you have a corresponding measurement of productivity. You should then map in estimates of risk measurements to make a decision. Otherwise, nearly everything will reduce productivity, but the corresponding risk might exceed acceptable tolerance. Also, this should take into account any alternative controls that achieve the same goal, with a lower productivity impact. And that control impact varies over time. At this point we’ve just created enough complexity that measuring the performance impact of a security control is now greater than the performance impact of said control. My advice? We spend more time identifying the most efficient ways to be secure with the least performance impact. Share:

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